Kenya as a Node for Transnational Repression in East Africa
In the early morning hours of June 11, masked men abducted Athorbey Al-Gaddhaffy-Dit, a South Sudanese corruption whistleblower, from outside a casino in Nairobi and took him back to Juba. The abduction, which Amnesty International called a “serious and urgent threat to [Gaddhafi-Dit’s] life, safety, and fundamental rights,” follows an increasing trend in the country of transnational repression (TNR) – the targeting by a government of dissidents residing in foreign countries. Kenya is becoming a central node of a network of TNR that spans much of East Africa, with recent incidents including deportations, extraditions, and kidnappings of foreign nationals being pursued by their home countries, where they are under serious threat of political persecution. It is a trend with major implications for both Kenya, the United States, and the wider region.
Kenya and the Network of Transnational Repression in East Africa
Recognition of Kenya’s place within the region’s transnational repression network is growing. Kenya was one of six countries that the U.S.-based human rights organization Freedom House included for the first time as a perpetrator of TNR in its 2026 yearly report on the topic, joining several other East African states on that list, the most prolific being Uganda, Eritrea, and Rwanda. Kenya’s southern neighbor, Tanzania, was also included on the list for the first time this year.
In East Africa, the primary targets for transnational repression are political opposition figures and human rights activists, with incidents of TNR, as well as other forms of political repression, appearing to spike during politically sensitive times, such as election seasons. Prior to the Tanzanian elections in October 2025 and Ugandan elections in January 2026, both countries’ governments utilized transnational repression against political opponents.
Many of those targeted were residing in Kenya at the time of their abduction, with both Uganda and Tanzania accusing the Kenyan government accused of participating in these abductions. In July 2025, Kenyan civil rights advocate Mwabili Mwagodi was briefly abducted while in the Tanzanian city of Dar Al-Salam. Mwagodi is known for mobilizing youth activism against political influence in Kenya’s religious institutions, increasing the likelihood that he was targeted by Kenyan authorities. Later, in February 2026, Mwagodi was stopped and arrested while attempting to leave Kenya due to an Interpol Red Notice being issued against him. The misuse of Red Notices is a common tool of transnational repression. Though the Red Notice was issued in Kenya, comments from Kenyan police alleging he posed a danger in Tanzania leave open the possibility that the Tanzanian government was involved. This indicates collaboration between Kenya and other East African governments in the transborder repression of opposition political activity. Collaboration in the transnational repression of dissidents is not limited to the Kampala-Nairobi-Dodoma axis; it is regionwide.
Kenya is set to hold elections in 2027. While the country remains a multiparty democracy with a vibrant civil society, Freedom House notes that corruption in the country is rife, police brutality is commonplace, and the country’s restrictive laws make human rights advocates and journalists vulnerable to intimidation and abuse, a situation that is becoming worse each year. Kenya already has a long history of violence and crackdowns during elections, especially when unpopular incumbents are running for reelection. The confluence of factors surrounding the 2027 election means the Kenyan government could cross the line from being a collaborator in transnational repression to actively perpetrating TNR itself. A state’s collaboration in TNR makes it more likely that the state will engage in TNR of its own. The case of Mwabili Mwagodi is an indication that this may already be happening.
A Strain on U.S.-Kenya Relations
Kenya’s expanding role in East Africa’s transnational repression network poses problems for actors like the United States, which have held the protection of human rights and civil liberties as pillars of their foreign policy. Kenya, already a strong U.S. ally, has been a key counterterrorism partner since 1998. The country was the first sub-Saharan state to be upgraded to Major Non-NATO Ally status in 2024. Kenya previously received close to $1 billion yearly in foreign assistance from the U.S. and recently signed a five-year, $2.5 billion health cooperation deal. This level of investment should be complicated by Kenya’s role in the transnational repression of both domestic and foreign dissidents. TNR has been recognized as an issue of concern in the U.S.-Kenyan relationship, and U.S. tax dollars should not go to actors engaging in TNR. Such breaches of rights could impact Americans as well, since current estimates of the Kenyan diaspora in the U.S. total just under 100,000 people.
The U.S. government should more forcefully pressure the Kenyan government to walk back its status as a collaborator in and perpetrator of TNR. This could be achieved by either withholding more non-humanitarian foreign assistance or even rethinking new cooperation agreements, such as a prospective critical minerals deal. Less drastic action is also possible, such as sanctioning certain political figures or members of the security forces who have been proven to engage in activities considered TNR.
While the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has generally de-emphasized human rights issues while conducting foreign policy, there is precedent for this type of action. In May 2026, the U.S. State Department placed sanctions on a Tanzanian police commissioner for his role in the abduction, torture, and sexual assault of Kenyan activist Boniface Mwangi and Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire. The use of targeted sanctions could be a relatively easy way to induce a change of behavior regarding Kenya’s role in transnational repression, especially since Nairobi is reliant on U.S. support on a range of issues.
Kenya for years has been described as a “safe haven” for dissidents from across East Africa. However, unless action is taken, Kenya’s role in regional TNR appears likely to increase. While a new government in 2027 could reverse course, with authoritarianism on the rise in much of the world, the chances seem slim. Pressure may have to come from outside to change the Kenyan government’s behavior – or, better yet, empower good-faith actors within Kenya to stop the country’s deep involvement in East Africa’s transnational repression network.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.
Photo: Kenyan journalist and human rights activist Boniface Mwangi (R) and Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire (L) react as they narrate their ordeals during a joint press conference in Nairobi on June 2, 2025, following their three-day detention and alleged torture. (Photo by TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images)
