In this episode of the Contours podcast, host Eugene Chausovsky sits down with Dr. Farid Shafiyev, the Chairman of the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations and former Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Canada and the Czech Republic. Together, they take an in-depth look at Azerbaijan-Armenia relations and their impact on geopolitical dynamics throughout Eurasia and beyond.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Hello everyone, and thank you for joining us for the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy Contours podcast series. I’m your host for today, Eugene Chausovsky, and I’ll be talking to Dr. Farid Shafiyev about Azerbaijan-Armenia relations and their impact on geopolitical dynamics throughout Eurasia and beyond. Farid is chairman of the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations, adjunct lecturer at ADA University, Azerbaijan. Dr. Shafiyev joined Azerbaijan’s Foreign Service in 1996 where he has worked in the Political-Military Issues Division, and in the United Nations Affairs Division. Dr. Shafiyev has also served as Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Canada and the Czech Republic. Farid, welcome to the show.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Hello. Thank you for inviting me.
Eugene Chausovsky:
So Farid, there’s been a lot of activity recently between Azerbaijan and Armenia across the diplomatic, economic, and security fronts, which I think could have significant implications for the Caucasus region and well beyond. Earlier this month we saw that Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, said that Baku and Yerevan have agreed to almost 80% of a framework for a peace treaty. Yet more recently we saw a spokesman for Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry say that a peace treaty with Armenia that only included mutually agreed upon provisions was “unacceptable and only serve to postpone the solution of existing problems in bilateral relations to the next stage.” So I was wondering if you could maybe start us off by giving us a bit of a background on how we got here and what is the current status of peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Yeah. In other, thank you again for inviting me, not to understand Azerbaijan’s current position and the situation with the peace process, we have to look very briefly back how indeed we came here. I mean, Azerbaijan still feels, the burden and the consequences of 30 years of occupation and destruction of its territory and ethnic cleansing. So Azerbaijan consistently advocated for the principle of territorial integrity. Unfortunately, it was Armenian site which claimed the Azerbaijani territory, Nagorno-Karabakh region, and the areas which Armenia occupied around the former autonomy. So that is the first one. It’s the importance of territorial integrity and the second territory claims. The third element is the security. So Azerbaijan was vulnerable in ’90s and later tried to restore its territorial integrity. Finally it did in 2020. But now we kind of see something, especially in the Western media and academia, like we should start from the scratch.
And yes, there is the peace treaty. It’s the paper principles, and by the way, those principles in the peace treaty, they are offered, initiated by Azerbaijan in February of 2022 and five principles around the mutual recognition of territorial integrity. Unfortunately, we still feel insecure in the sense that Armenian Constitution, or more precisely Declaration of Independence, which is referred by constitution, still has territorial claims because it refers to former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy and decision of Armenian parliament to annex to unify Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. So yes, we have a progress. I fully agree that the President Aliyev mentioned that 80% of the peace treaty is agreed upon, but any peace or legal document has its own philosophy, its own concept and structure, and just saying we agreed five principles, but leave aside three principles and we’ll come to that later, it doesn’t work that way because again, it’s the unified concept.
We can leave certain, let’s say, technical issues, like for example, if we agree on the principle of territorial integrity, the process of delimitation of our border, you know, it’s the long process and it takes a year to make demarcation so that can be dealt at the later stage. And we see also here the progress that on 30th of August this year, two countries delegations, we agreed upon the procedures in terms of delimitation. But the peace treaty itself, indeed we can, again, to postpone certain technical details, certain procedures, but the principle should be enshrined in the peace treaty, otherwise we will have tension later. It won’t be complete and durable peace.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Right. Thanks very much. So you mentioned a lot of interesting points that I think would be worth unpacking, but maybe if we could just take a quick step back because you mentioned some of the challenges between Armenia and Azerbaijan in terms of the constitution, in terms of delimitation, and the principles that are being discussed. But also this process is not happening in a vacuum. Right? There’s a regional context that’s happening in terms of some of the geopolitical shifts that we’ve noticed. We know that there’s a number of quite active both regional and global players in this region and that have played important roles in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here I’m thinking about countries like Russia, Türkiye to a lesser extent Iran, but also global players like the U.S. and EU. So I wonder, given all of the things that you’ve mentioned, how you would contextualize the role of these actors, both in terms of how we’ve gotten here to where we are and also how it will be influencing these negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan moving forward.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Well, the South Caucasus was always arena of geopolitical struggle between empires, between Persians, Russian Empire. Lately it is still we speaking about the regional powers, Russia, Iran, Türkiye. We have indeed new players in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union like United States and European Union, and lately we see increased presence of China. In terms of the distribution, let’s say, of alliances, in ’90s, Armenia concluded alliance with Russia. It hosted Russian military bases, and basically during the first Karabakh war where it was the assistance from Russia and lately in ’97 and so on. So one of the conclusions, the lessons which Azerbaijan drew from the first Karabakh war was that it’s the Russian factor. For the last 20 years, Azerbaijan tried to build relationship with Moscow. Armenia was always the big advocate of Russian presence in the South Caucasus. This situation has changed a bit lately.
I know Armenia is trying in, especially again in Western media, to portray that it’s moving away from Russia. It’s the Russian-Azerbaijan alliance against Armenia, but for people who know history of this region, you know that the Armenia was traditional ally of Russia. And not only Russia, but Iran and still Iran supports Armenia on many diplomatic fronts in terms of the security. But Azerbaijan also, it’s our neighborhood. Azerbaijan understand that you have to build a good relationship. What has changed lately, let’s say for past five, six years is the Turkish factor. Türkiye is playing more and more important role in the South Caucasus, and we believe it’s the important balancing power vis-a-vis our regional powers, which I mentioned. The American factor or European factor indeed has also increased presence. Though American presence was kind of was uneven. I mean in ’90s, United States was very active in the South Caucasus in terms of oil and gas project with Azerbaijan.
But starting with Obama administration, we haven’t seen the much active American foreign policy. Now the Biden administration is trying to strengthen its presence in Armenia and all this geopolitical struggle, especially in the context of Russian-Ukrainian war and in the context of the Western Russian standoff, it has negative implications for the South Caucasus. So Azerbaijan always pursued balanced foreign policy and tried to stay away from the geopolitical struggle, you know, which is unfolding in the South Caucasus anyway. For that reason, Azerbaijan offered Armenia on the peace treaty without mediators. The first mediator was, I mean, traditional mediators was so-called Minsk Group, Russia, United States, and France. Where mediation failed, Armenia refused so-called Minsk principles, more modern principles, sorry, within the Minsk-OSCE Minsk group. Then we had war and Minsk group now defunct. And initially in 2021, Russia offered mediation, and later starting December 2021, it was the EU President Charles Michel.
Occasionally we had Washington’s activity, but again, we sometimes witnessed that the mediators tried to compete with each other who will make bigger input, bigger influence in this process. So Azerbaijan was in favor of direct negotiations with Armenia without mediators, and it looks like we achieved certain success. For example, the process of delimitation already we have a certain segment of our borders, even demarcation happened there. So we did that without any mediators. So it’s possible that we will work and continue working on the peace treaty without mediators. However, of course, the reality is what we have, the struggle, power struggle between regional powers, Iran, Russia, United States, and ours. It’s very important really that those powers understand the implication of actions if we really interested in the durable peace in the South Caucasus.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Yeah. Absolutely. So I think you bring up a very important point in terms of this peace treaty, or at least the bilateral negotiations, the direct negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia without mediators. I think that’s been one of the biggest shifts that we’ve seen over the last couple of years. As you mentioned, all of these players, whether it’s the Russia factor, you know, Western countries, despite their active mediation over several decades essentially, you know, we didn’t see much progress. And one could argue, especially from the Russian perspective, that perhaps that mediation was not necessarily intended to create a peace per se, but rather to serve its own geopolitical interests in the region.
And so once we saw Azerbaijan be able to retake Nagorno-Karabakh recently starting in 2020 and then kind finishing the job, so to speak, in 2023, I don’t think it’s a coincidence that that has unlocked those direct negotiations with Armenia. So I wonder in that context, I mean you’ve already brought up some of the challenges or some of the things that still need to happen between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to get to the finish line, so to speak, of a peace treaty or at least a framework for such. But I wonder if you, in addition to those challenges, whether you see the external players, in particular Moscow, but perhaps some others that could serve as stumbling blocks to that potential agreement.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Yeah. Just the small technical notes, we no longer refer to former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy as such because it was basically the Bolsheviks invention because Nagorno. It’s the Russian world and Karabakh is the historical name, so where was the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy during Soviet time from 1923 until 1991. So we are speaking and generally not to understand what happened. We should not focus only on Nagorno-Karabakh. We’re speaking about historical region, Karabakh, and we’re speaking about what Prime Minister of Armenia (Nikol) Pashinyan referred as a mythical Armenia or great Armenia because Karabakh was part, only part of one element where it was some other Azerbaijani regions like Nakhchivan and ours, which Armenian historians claimed and still claiming. So we put an end to this conflict, and I think it really now with Armenian acceptance of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, I’m speaking, I mean underlying that was the stumbling block. And now we have that acceptance. The other stumbling block as you allude to that, it’s the geopolitical rivalry, especially between Russia and the West. But there is another now active player, Iran, for example. Recently Iran objected to Russian desire to have corridor, so-called Zangezur Corridor in the region.
Just for the people who maybe don’t know, we’re speaking about the land connection between Azerbaijan, proper mainland and its region, Nakhchivan. And that corridor should pass Armenian territory that will create links not only between two parts of Azerbaijan, but potentially can link Armenia with Russia, Armenia with Türkiye, and Türkiye with Azerbaijan. So Iran is objecting to that corridor, and even it objected to Russia because we know that lately in the context of Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia and Iran is closely cooperating. So there is indeed very complicated web of relationship between those powers. What can be another stumbling block, which I mentioned, it’s the geopolitical competition between West, Russia, and now also Iran, each one pursuing its own national interest and trying influence the situation on the ground. But I have a bit optimistic view that finally after so many years of conflict, of destruction, and the tragedies, and that was the negative consequences for the whole region, I think both countries, and I can at least can speak about Azerbaijan, understand the importance of direct talks, importance of peace between two countries, and importance keeping away those negative influences from regional powers.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Yeah. Absolutely. And so it’s interesting that you mentioned the Zangezur Corridor, and basically this is I think brings up the how important such a peace treaty or at least progress in that could have, not only for the importance that it would have, not only for Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also as you spoke about unlocking some of the regional connectivity efforts that have been significantly hampered by these political and security tensions and disputes. So as you say, this could give access to, for Azerbaijan’s perspective, access to the Nakhchivan Exclave and kind of beyond to Turkey, but also it would be a great opportunity for Armenia, which under the past few decades has been really kind of locked, so to speak, within the region having tense relations with Azerbaijan and with Türkiye having closed borders with both countries. And because Armenia is landlocked and really depended on Russia economically, there’s a lot to be gained. And those kind of connectivity efforts, whether you’re talking about road, rail, even pipelines, Azerbaijan as a major energy player.
Even looking beyond the Caspian Sea to Central Asia, there’s a lot of opportunity there and a lot of win-win, so to speak, for not only Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also some of the regional players. But as you note, because of the sheer number of these actors, there’s always going to be different views of that. But hopefully those are things that can be overcome. So I think maybe moving on, I’m curious to hear what your outlook is for the negotiations. I know that there’s been floated this idea that we could actually see some significant progress. Azerbaijan will be hosting the COP 29 Summit, the UN Climate talks, in Baku, later this year in November. That’s been floated as a potential venue. I think there’s going to be some Armenian representation there, and Armenia even voted in favor of Azerbaijan hosting those talks, which I think is also notable. So I mean, given all the things that we’ve talked about, I am curious to see, to hear what your outlook is both in that short term, but also perhaps beyond as well.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Yeah. Well, again, we have some progress, but we have also some disagreements on the, let’s say, we have around 16 articles in the treaty, and we have agreed on 13. We have disagreement on three articles. The Armenian side offers to postpone those three articles, remove them. But again, that might undermine the whole idea that the whole concept, unifying concept of the peace treaty. For us, indeed for Azerbaijan is important the amendments should be made in Armenian Constitution and in reference to Karabakh should be removed from Armenian Constitution because the conflict itself began from the territorial claims. Usually we’ve been told that we have to look at the West, at the European experience. We looked at European experience. There are two at least examples when, for example, the Belfast has a Good Friday Agreement when the island changed its constitution and removed reference to Northern Ireland to territorial claims to United Kingdom. And when we had another example with the name of the North Macedonia. So the referendum has been held and the country’s name has been changed in order to address Greece concern.
So we are not unique in this position asking about the change of Armenian Constitution. And the prime minister of Armenia also acknowledged the necessity to change constitution, but we are planning to do that in ’26, ’27. So I think that is the problem for Azerbaijanis side. Maybe how it can be resolved if the Armenia in the peace treaty will pledge to change constitution and let’s say if there is desire to sign in the immediate future the agreement. But hard to say, because COP 29 will be in November, and for me it’s difficult to predict that we will sign this agreement in November. Right?
It’s not so much time we have, but there is some, of course, positive momentum as you mentioned with COP 29, because yes, we agreed, we had mutual agreement with Armenia that Armenia would support Azerbaijan’s bid for hosting COP 29. In return also Azerbaijan supported Armenia in one of the UN bodies, you know, the elections. So upon that agreement, we have it showed, it manifested that countries can reach agreements. But we have also now a bit from diaspora, mostly from Armenian diaspora, campaign against Azerbaijan. We trying to utilize this momentum, COP 29. So we’ll see how it goes. Again, there is some positive things going on, but it’s early to say that whether it will lead to the signing peace treaty or not this year.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Right, yeah, I think that point that you mentioned about the constitution and the need to change it, but also perhaps some room for maneuver there in terms of a pledge to change that constitution, even if it doesn’t happen this year. So that’ll definitely be something-
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Yeah. I also would like to mention that Armenia also referring that the Azerbaijan has constitution some claims. I mean, this is not true. Being successor state of the previous, for example. Azerbaijan’s Constitution and or Azerbaijan Declaration of Independence refers to the Azerbaijan’s first democratic republic of 1918, 1920. Declaring Azerbaijan successor state of that first statehood does not mean that Azerbaijan has constitutional claims to Armenian territory, modern territory. Because for example, Russia has also assert that it’s the successor of the Soviet Union. But nevertheless, for example, Russia recognized territories of newly formed Soviet republics. You know, now it’s the view towards Ukraine and Georgia, there is change in position of Russia, but overall Russia respects the other’s, let’s say republics, territorial integrity. So that’s two things it should not be confused, and Azerbaijan does not have any claim to Armenian territory. Again, that’s for many years and decades. For the last three decades, Azerbaijan advocated for the principle of territorial integrity and remains so. And Azerbaijan is as a offer of this peace agreement ready to recognize Armenian territorial integrity, provided that the same will be done on the part of Armenia.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Right. Yeah. That’s an important clarification. So maybe just to kind of wrap things up, I wanted to get your thoughts on the potential impact or perhaps lack thereof of the upcoming U.S. elections on the current situation. You mentioned earlier that the U.S. has been kind of taking a lesser role since the Obama administration, basically how now Armenia, Azerbaijan, those negotiations are much more direct. That need for mediation from external parties has lessened, although I think there’s still quite a lot of activity diplomatically. So yeah, November not only being the month for the COP 29 summit, which could be important for those negotiations, but also of course U.S. elections as well. So whether it’s directly or perhaps even indirectly, how those elections could impact the broader situation in Eurasia, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, these things could potentially have some level of impact, I would imagine, on Azerbaijan, on the negotiations with Armenia. So I was wondering if you could just speak to that a little bit.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
I don’t think the US elections will have direct consequences for situation in the South Caucasus or let’s say for peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But indirectly, I agree because there is so much context who will win, how it will impact, first of all, Russian-Ukrainian war. We know that the Trump administration is not so willing to extend support to Ukrainian side. I mean the military support. So that will change. In the meantime, in the Middle East Trump administration looks like, I mean, it has very certain views on the Iran and on Israel, so that overall, in one way or another, let’s say the Kamala Harris will win, and that will be also implication for Russian-Ukrainian war, and for the Middle East. So these two conflicts indeed has overall impact for international peace and security, for geopolitical situation. But again, it is more kind of indirect, let’s say, implication for the South Caucasus.
I don’t think with either administration to be immediate effect for peace process. But when we’re speaking about geopolitical implication that indeed we can, I mean probably we need to extend it, interview about the what might be policy or implication of U.S. elections for Russian-Ukrainian war, because some argues it be with Trump. It will be less help. Some people say it won’t be so dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy because I mean, still there is the, even within Republican Party, there are so many supporters of Ukraine, et cetera, and the Middle East even more complicated. On one hand, we can see Trump offer of one of the, let’s say, promoters of Abraham Accord. On the other matter is the Iran’s nuclear deal. So that is, again, for the South Caucasus, at least I believe the countries like Azerbaijan, they will try to stay away from this geopolitical struggle. Of course, we understand that it’s not possible fully to when you have this storm, and even if you have your house inside, you will still feel something going on outside.
Eugene Chausovsky:
Yeah. Absolutely. So yeah, quite a lot at stake here, I think both for Azerbaijan and Armenia directly, but also for the region as a whole. And yeah, it sounds like there’s quite a bit of opportunities that you’ve outlined both politically and economically, but of course some persistent challenges as well on the domestic front, but also from some of the regional and global players. So a lot of important things to watch in the next couple of months, but unfortunately we’re going to have to wrap it up here. I wanted to thank you very much, Farid, for joining us and for sharing your valuable insights. And I also want to thank you all for listening. For more analysis related to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and geopolitical dynamics in Eurasia, please check out New Lines on our website at NewLinesInstitute.org. Thanks once again, Farid. Take care, and all the best.
Dr. Farid Shafiyev:
Thank you.
