From Protégé to Partner: The Way Forward for Kosovo-U.S. Relations
Executive Summary
Over the past quarter century, the U.S. role in Kosovo has evolved from that of midwife of a new nation to guardian of a troubled status quo. Washington policymakers should recognize the progress Kosovo has made in consolidating its young democracy and treat the Vetëvendosje party – whether in power or in opposition – as a genuine partner, recognizing its views of Kosovo’s sovereign interests. The U.S. should continue to strongly support political negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia but not at the expense of tolerating graft or state capture.
More than a quarter century after the 1999 United States-led NATO military intervention aimed at halting Serbian ethnic cleansing, Kosovo, Europe’s newest state, has evolved significantly and gained broader international acceptance. Despite a range of governance challenges and its long-running political dispute with Serbia, Kosovo has been ranked by the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index as the most democratic state in the Western Balkans.
Kosovo’s approach to its relationship with the United States, its most important external backer, has also evolved. Under recent governments led by Vetëvendosje, a reformist movement-turned-political party that has led Kosovo for most of the past five years, Pristina has increasingly been willing to prioritize its interests and assert its sovereignty, saying “no” to its chief ally at key junctures. This marks a major reversal from Kosovo’s first two decades of postwar transition. However, the U.S. has been slow to adapt to a government ready to move from protégé to partner. Washington would do well to use the lessons of its past diplomacy in Kosovo to hone its approach to the Pristina government in the present and future.
Conversations with Kosovar and U.S. officials reveal that the reasons for Washington’s inability to adapt to a changing Kosovo are multifold and rooted in how U.S. leaders have chosen to deploy their formidable leverage over the past quarter century. First, the U.S. has often focused on the “external,” particularly on Kosovo’s unresolved status vis-a-vis Serbia, over the “internal,” particularly governance and rule-of-law issues, despite a strong demand in Kosovo to combat corruption and state capture. Second, under Kosovo’s former ruling class – with which it became very close – the U.S. became accustomed to pliable Kosovar governments. Third, Washington missed opportunities to build a meaningful relationship with Vetëvendosje and its leader, Prime Minister Albin Kurti, increasing mutual distrust and acrimony.
There are steps U.S. policymakers can take to improve their relationship with Pristina, including by Washington doing more to find constructive ways to align U.S. policy with the rule of law and anticorruption policies of the Kurti government. When it does put pressure on Pristina, the U.S. should apply (at least) equal scrutiny to Serbia’s behavior – ending the perception that Belgrade’s authoritarian slide is being ignored while Pristina receives more scrutiny and criticism. The U.S. should also take a larger role in supporting creative solutions for the long-running EU-led negotiations that aim to resolve the protracted Kosovo-Serbia political dispute.
Policy Recommendations:
1. Washington should treat the Vetëvendosje party – whether in power or in opposition – as a genuine partner, recognizing its views of Kosovo’s sovereign interests and finding ways to partner on its anti-corruption goals. Meanwhile, U.S. officials should make it clear that they will no longer uncritically support leaders – in Pristina, Belgrade, or elsewhere – who undermine rule-of-law norms. This means continuing to strongly support political negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia but not at the expense of tolerating graft or state capture.
2. Even as it makes demands of Kosovo, the U.S. should apply equal examination to Serbia’s behavior – ending the perception that Belgrade’s authoritarian slide is being ignored while Pristina receives more scrutiny and criticism. Whether intentional or not, this policy has had the effect of emboldening Serbia in its negotiations with Kosovo. By holding both sides to consistent standards, the U.S. can bolster its credibility as a principled mediator.
3. The U.S. should engage in a robust dialogue with Kosovo’s civil society, activists, and independent media. These groups have often been at the forefront of exposing wrongdoing and pushing for accountability. Washington has poured aid into Kosovo’s civil society since 1999, helping build a vibrant NGO sector. Now, it should re-energize these partnerships with a focus on grassroots impact.
4. To resolve the impasse over the unsustainable situation in Kosovo’s north, the U.S. should lend support to ongoing EU-led negotiations and help in the search for a creative solution to the contested issue of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities. This should entail listening to Kosovo’s legitimate concerns and ensuring self-governance by Kosovo Serbs does not undermine the functioning of the state. Washington should also insist that Serbia fulfill its parallel obligations: dismantling illegal security structures in northern Kosovo, ending financing of illegitimate parallel institutions, and genuinely encouraging Kosovo Serbs to participate in the country’s democratic institutions.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.
