Real-Time Analysis: Maduro’s Capture Creates Risk of Expanding Venezuelan Instability

In the early hours of Jan. 3, U.S. forces debilitated Venezuelan air defense systems, paving the way for the extrajudicial capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has justified Maduro’s kidnapping as a “law enforcement exercise” to deliver accountability against a Venezuelan government engaged in illicit drug smuggling, blaming Maduro and his administration for growing drug addiction rates and insecurity in the United States. However, the decision to remove Maduro and potentially reverse the Chavista regime in Venezuela likely will introduce new challenges in dismantling illicit activity and criminal behavior. In this real-time analysis, experts from the New Lines Institute’s Crime-Conflict Nexus Portfolio react to Maduro’s capture.

Caroline Rose, Director

The Trump administration has removed Maduro from power in Venezuela under the premise that he is primarily driving a criminal enterprise, the Cártel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns), that operationalizes illicit drug trafficking into the United States. Trump has stated that with the removal of Maduro, the U.S. will inherit Venezuela’s political system and its oil sector.

However, Washington must keep in mind that it will also inherit an increasingly complex illicit landscape consisting not of top-down cartel structures but of a culture of criminality and corruption that would take years if not decades to reverse. If the U.S. is to have a plan in post-Maduro Venezuela, it must account for how to engage against criminal enterprises beyond simple interdiction measures.

Rafaella Lipschitz

Maduro’s capture is unlikely to curb drug flows to the U.S., but it might create criminal competition that could exacerbate violence and regional instability. Given that most fentanyl reaches the U.S. through Mexico and most cocaine transiting through Venezuela is destined for Europe, Trump’s initial objective of reducing the flow of drugs to the U.S. is unlikely to be realized through capturing Maduro.

Maduro’s capture could, however, trigger competition among illicit actors by disrupting a delicate system of cooperation and alliances. Maduro-aligned actors reliant on illicit revenue like Cártel de los Soles members or civilian paramilitary groups known as  colectivos could vie for control over trafficking earnings. Nonstate actors may also attempt to expand if informal alliance systems are disrupted. The Colombia-based guerrilla group Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) might seek to consolidate and expand control over borderlands, exacerbating competition with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) factions still operating in Venezuela after the group’s formal disbandment. These disruptions could open space for other groups, such as Mexican cartels and Brazilian gangs, to exploit emerging vacuums.

Competition among actors that operated in a somewhat stable criminal ecosystem under Maduro risks escalating violence, instability, and displacement, especially along the border region.

Robert Kremzner

One of Trump’s oft stated goals of regime change in Venezuela is to consolidate control over Venezuela’s oil sector and accompanying infrastructure. However, the rampant criminality in Venezuela extends to this vital sector and will complicate this effort.

In addition to the already-high costs to restore Venezuelan oil output, estimated at about $100 billion over the next decade, the security of the oil sector would need to be ensured as well. Across Venezuela, criminal groups routinely tap into oil pipelines for their own illicit trade, siphoning as much as 30% of the fuel supplying some regions of the country.

In the event of increased instability in the country, this may only escalate. Criminal groups may diversify into fuel smuggling (or pivot to fuel from drugs if increased competition pushes them out), and a lack of security forces opposing the gangs in more rural areas may only worsen this issue. Without security along pipelines, criminal groups will be able to easily siphon gas or steal unsecured infrastructure for scrap metal, a common practice. Furthermore, the coast of Venezuela is one of the hotspots for piracy in the Western hemisphere, posing a threat to oil tankers.

Without sustained security efforts by the United States or a friendly Venezuelan government, these issues will continue to make the oil industry in Venezuela unstable and deter investment by U.S. companies.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.