The Middle East is a region whose deeply diverse peoples are profoundly interconnected both with one another and the rest of the world. It is also a pool of immense human capital and tremendous youthful energy waiting to be used to advance human development and growth. U.S. policy has tended to ignore this connectivity, seeing immediate security concerns as divorced from or even in tension with regional human security and prosperity. This approach flows from zero-sum thinking about U.S. security and the security of the region’s people, generating policies that harm both. This center aims to inform a U.S. policy that recognizes the connectivity of U.S. and regional security and prosperity, and the connectivity that ties the region’s people together and to the world.
Fragmentation, power contestation, and Iran’s sway over Iraq’s various Shiite groups increase the threat of direct violence between rivals, heightening the risk of an open Shiite conflict in the event of a complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq. To mitigate this threat, the incoming U.S. administration should not only reassess the agreement regarding the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces but also prioritize reinforcing the U.S. strategic presence there.
In a volatile geopolitical environment and amid current Middle East turmoil, a stable Iraq serves as the cornerstone of regional stability, safeguarding the strategic interests of the U.S. and its allies, including ensuring the defeat of extremist groups and maintaining the balance of power vital to regional order.
The evolution of Iranian-backed Shiite groups in Iraq can be categorized into three distinct phases. The first began in the 1980s with the formation of the Badr Brigade, led by Hadi al-Amiri. The second emerged in 2003, marked by the proliferation of militias including the Mahdi Army, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Alyaom Almao’ud, Al-Nujaba Movement, Iraqi Hezbollah, and Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Battalion, collectively recognized as the “Islamic Resistance.” The third coincided with the rise of the Islamic State, catalyzing the establishment of several militia groups unified under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition encompassing the Imam Ali Brigade, Ashura Brigades, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigade, Al-Ghadab Battalion, and others. Tehran has long strategically operationalized its hegemonic intentions in measured phases to penetrate Iraq’s security and political spheres, taking advantage of Iraqi power vacuums such as ones that followed the 2003 U.S. intervention or the emergence in 2014 of ISIS to deepen its foothold within Iraq.
Over time, these patronage groups evolved into political entities with military wings, playing a pivotal role in Iraq’s political and security landscape. While the U.S. intervention gave these groups an opportunity to take control of Iraq’s political, security, and economic capabilities, mounting pressure from Shia political groups prompted U.S. troops to withdraw in December 2011.
After ISIS seized territory in Iraq in 2014, the U.S. was invited back to rescue a nation teetering on the brink of collapse. Yet, following the territorial defeat of the group, calls for the U.S. withdrawal intensified once more. The deaths of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani and PMF deputy chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a U.S. military operation sparked a political upheaval, leading Iraq’s parliament to demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces and rendering the U.S. presence a continual flashpoint.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani’s government, established on the strength of promises to expel U.S. troops, has reinforced this recurring narrative. For years, Baghdad’s streets have resonated with defiant slogans like “Death to America.” U.S. forces are preparing to begin their withdrawal before the end of 2025 and complete it in 2026.
Iranian-backed groups have advocated for the expulsion of U.S. forces, which would remove a critical external check on their power and allow them to fully consolidate their control over Iraq’s political and security institutions. Expelling the U.S. aligns with Iran’s strategic objectives, ensuring Iraq’s deeper integration into Tehran’s sphere of influence while marginalizing Western involvement. This shift would strengthen Iran’s ideological and geopolitical foothold and enhance its ability to project power across the Middle East.
Iraq’s Deepening Shiite Fragmentation
Iraq’s Shiite political sphere is marked by fragmentation, with the Coordination Framework coalition and factions led by Muqtada al-Sadr and Ali al-Sistani each embodying competing visions.
Al-Sadr, the populist Shiite cleric, rose to prominence after the 2003 U.S. intervention by leading his militia, the Mahdi Army, in challenging the foreign presence in Iraq, including calls for attacks on U.S. troops. Today, he presents himself as a nationalist who, while resisting U.S. influence, also “rebels” against Iranian political interference.
The Coordination Framework, predominantly composed of Islamist parties and groups, is a substantial Shiite political alliance in Iraq composed of various Iran-backed political parties that have affiliated militia groups. Key figures within this group include former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of the State of Law Coalition; Hadi Al-Ameri of the Fatah Alliance, who is also secretary general of the Badr Organization; Ammar Al-Hakim of the Hikmah Movement; Haider Al-Abadi of the Nasr Bloc; Falih Al-Fayyadh of Aqd Al-Watani, who is also chairman the Popular Mobilization Committee; Hussein Mounis of the Hoquq Movement, who is the head of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq; and Qais al-Khazali, leader of the key Iraqi militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
These actors collectively navigate Iraq’s political landscape, aligning their strategies to advance both their shared interests and those of their patron, Tehran. The roots of the groups within the coalition, however, go back much further, as many of its constituents were originally established with Iranian support, either as militias resisting Saddam Hussein’s regime or as factions opposing the U.S. presence.
After Iraq’s 2021 parliamentary election, the power struggle to form a government reached a stalemate between the al-Sadr-led Sadrist Movement and the Coordination Framework. Subsequently, the Coordination Framework nominated Sudani to lead the next Iraqi government, sparking protests from Sadrist Movement supporters, who staged a sit-in in Parliament. Eventually, lawmakers from the Sadrist bloc resigned their seats at al-Sadr’s request amid an extended deadlock over government formation.
The Coordination Framework is also not without controversy, as it involves several influential divergent agendas and interests. The Sudanese front, supported by figures like Al-Hakim, Al-Abadi, and Ahmed Al-Asadi, contrasts with the al-Maliki camp, which holds the most electoral seats. Additionally, the Qais al-Khazali faction and its allies are gaining influence in southern Iraqi governorates as well as in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al-Din.
Al-Sistani, the leading authority of the Najaf religious establishment, has played a crucial role in shaping Iraq’s political landscape, especially since the U.S.-led intervention in 2003. Unlike other clerics who might engage directly in politics, al-Sistani has consistently encouraged the idea of limited clerical intervention, favoring a separation between religious authority and the governing apparatus. His approach echoes the Najaf tradition of quietist clericalism, which stands in contrast to the activist political theology seen in Iran.
Al-Sadr’s nationalist populism, al-Sistani’s quietist neutrality, and the Coordination Framework’s alignment with Iranian strategic aims each represent distinct, deeply rooted agendas that contribute to the underlying volatility of Iraq’s political fabric.
Intensifying Shiite Power Contestation
Al-Sadr wields a blend of political, military, and religious power within Iraq. His authority comes from his large and devoted following, primarily composed of Iraq’s urban poor, who view him as a defender of Iraqi nationalism and sovereignty. Though he holds no formal government position, his faction, the Sadrist Movement, has had significant representation in Iraq’s parliament, often acting as a kingmaker in negotiations.
The Sadrist Movement has steadily accrued seats in Iraq’s parliament, increasing its total from 34 in 2014 to 54 in 2018, then ultimately claiming the body’ largest bloc with 73 seats in 2021. Additionally, his influence in government remains fluid, enabling him to engage or withdraw his bloc based on strategic needs, which amplifies his leverage over Iraq’s political direction.
Militarily, he commands Saraya al-Salam, a formidable militia formed in June 2014 to succeed his former Mahdi Army. Initially established to combat ISIS and press for al-Maliki’s resignation as prime minister, the group now fields up to 50,000 fighters and maintains three brigades under the PMF in Salah al-Din governorate. This militia provides al-Sadr with the means to exert military pressure to serve his strategic interests, whether against what he describes as foreign interference or political foes. The integration of Saraya al-Salam into the state framework serves multiple purposes: securing salaries, logistics, and legitimacy, while mitigating the risk of being labeled a terrorist organization by the West. However, its loyalty remains exclusively to al-Sadr.
Conversely, even before the formal establishment of the Coordination Framework in 2021, its constituent groups wielded substantial power in Iraq. For example, the Badr Organization was a dominant force within the PMF and held significant sway within the Iraqi government since 2014. Similarly, the State of Law Coalition commanded considerable political influence since 2009.
Following the 2021 electoral impasse and the withdrawal of al-Sadr’s MPs, the Coordination Framework absorbed 40 of the vacated seats, raising its total to approximately 130 and establishing itself as the largest force in parliament.
The struggle for control over the government, its institutions, and key personnel has been a central source of power dynamics and division within the Coordination Framework.
Militarily, the PMF, established in response to al-Sistani’s fatwa, or religious edict, issued after ISIS’s capture of Mosul in 2014, has evolved into a coalition of convenience of over 230,000 personnel. Initially, a loosely organized militia coalition, the PMF gained formal recognition and integration within Iraq’s security apparatus by 2018, securing official salaries and benefits comparable to those of the national military. This incorporation provided PMF members with the financial and institutional support of state-backed forces.
Under Sudani, the PMF has further expanded its resources, receiving a $2.7 billion tranche of the national budget and recruiting an additional 116,000 members, to solidify its standing as one of Iraq’s most potent armed factions. While embedded within the state security apparatus, the PMF sustains a parallel alignment, operating both within Iraq’s institutional framework and with an extraterritorial dimension. This configuration grants the PMF privileged access to state resources and constitutional protections while effectively insulating it from comprehensive state oversight.
Among its prominent members, the PMF includes the Badr Organization with a substantial presence of 15 brigades across Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Diyala, and Kirkuk; the Islamic Dawa Party led by al-Maliki, operating four brigades within Diyala, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa; and the Supreme Islamic Council, active within Anbar and Diyala. Additional major factions within the axis are the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades, led by Abu Hussein al-Muhammadawi and deployed in Baghdad, Anbar, and Salah al-Din; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais Khazali, with operations in southern Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Baghdad; and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of factions distributed across Baghdad, Salah al-Din, and Anbar.
Relative to the other two groups, al-Sistani holds greater moral and social influence, especially among Shiites in Iraq and beyond. However, he refrains from direct political or military intervention. He exercises his authority in a largely advisory capacity, offering religious guidance that is widely respected and followed by his adherents while emphasizing the independence of religious institutions from political rule.
He exerts indirect political influence through his sermons and religious edicts, often guiding Iraq’s approach to national crises. For instance, after Saddam’s fall from power in 2003, al-Sistani called for democratic elections and a civil government, shaping Iraq’s political direction.
While al-Sistani has no direct command over military forces, his moral authority gives him substantial influence over Shiite paramilitary groups. A key example is his 2014 declaration, commonly known as the “jihad fatwa,” issued in response to the ISIS threat, which mobilized tens of thousands to join the PMF.
The juxtaposition of political leverage and military strength among Iraq’s Shiite factions, particularly between al-Sadr’s bloc and the Coordination Framework, highlights a precarious balance shaped by institutional influence and paramilitary power. The entrenched presence of militias like Saraya al-Salam and the PMF reflects a critical capability for power projection that extends beyond conventional politics. In the event of a complete U.S. withdrawal, this power dynamic could intensify intra-Shiite contestation, escalating factional rivalries and amplifying the risk of military confrontation among the militias.
Iran’s Growing Influence in Iraq
Over the past 17 years, Iran has significantly expanded its influence in Iraq using three primary strategies. First, it cultivated strong patronage networks with established political allies, particularly within Shiite groups such as the Dawa Party, Badr Organization or others. Second, Iran has fostered new Iraq-based paramilitary groups with anti-U.S. and anti-Sunni narratives, currently backing more than a dozen militias. Iran has also initiated a broad range of soft power initiatives in Iraq, including cultural and charitable projects and media outreach.
The nature of Iranian influence on Iraq’s political actors diverges. Despite al-Sadr’s denials of receiving Iranian assistance, U.S. intelligence indicates that Iran’s Quds Force likely provided arms and financial backing to the Mahdi Army (now Saraya al-Salam). At a minimum, Iran offered al-Sadr refuge in Qom, facilitating his management of Mahdi Army operations from within Iranian borders between 2008 and 2011. Furthermore, substantial financial support has flowed to the Mahdi Army from prominent Iranian benefactors, particularly Grand Ayatollah Kazem Husseini Haeri, a key mentor to al-Sadr.
Al-Sadr’s first public clash with Iran commenced in July 2017, marked by a high-profile visit to Iranian rival Saudi Arabia, a move that displeased Tehran. Another significant event marking a divergence between al-Sadr and Iran unfolded in the summer of 2018, as he provided tacit support for widespread protests that erupted across southern Iraq, denouncing government corruption and Iran’s exploitation of the nation. This marked the first instance of a Shiite-led opposition against a Shiite ruling elite, a dynamic that has continued to shape current Iraqi politics.
Since then, he has shifted to open resistance of Iranian political influence. This break became particularly evident after the 2021 elections, in which his movement outperformed pro-Iranian factions, intensifying Shiite political divisions and heightening fears of potential unrest among Iraqi Shiite actors.
Resistance to Iranian political influence peaked at a meeting between al-Sadr and the Quds Force commander, Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani, in February 2022. Their discussion about Iran’s role in Iraq did not change al-Sadr’s stance, and, in fact, it further cemented his stance on opposing Iranian influence and promoting Iraqi nationalism. Subsequent to that, al-Sadr reaffirmed his commitment to a government free from foreign influence, proclaiming in a post on X (formerly Twitter) his vision for a nationalist majority government that would be neither Eastern nor Western.
On the other hand, Iran’s relationship with the Coordination Framework and allied groups has allowed it to shape alliances and governing coalitions, ensuring that Baghdad remains supportive of Tehran’s interests. Historically, the groups within Iraq’s Coordination Framework have sustained a favorable relationship with Iran, characterized by alignment on political and security matters and bolstered by Iran’s consistent support for several of them.
Parallel with both camps, al-Sistani has wielded substantial influence in Iraq. His authority has been crucial in strengthening Shiite influence in Iraqi politics, aligning in part with Iran’s goal of a friendly government in Baghdad. However, his strong support for Iraqi sovereignty often constrains Iran’s political reach. For example, during popular protests in 2019-2020 in Iraq, al-Sistani openly criticized the violence perpetrated against protesters, including actions taken by Iranian-backed militias.
While Iran respects al-Sistani’s stature as a leading Shiite authority, his approach challenges its overarching vision of Shiite political leadership. Unlike Iran’s supreme leader, who governs under the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), al-Sistani advocates for a quietist stance in which clerics offer guidance rather than direct governance.
Iran’s multifaceted influence across Iraq’s Shiite political landscape reflects a carefully calibrated strategy of alliance-building, military patronage, and soft power initiatives. While its ties with the Coordination Framework bolster Tehran’s leverage in Baghdad, al-Sadr’s nationalist stance and Sistani’s quietist philosophy pose significant obstacles to Iranian ambitions. In the absence of a U.S. presence, external actors like Iran are poised to deepen their involvement, further intensifying Iraq’s internal divisions and amplifying the risk of sectarian-driven conflict.
Recommendations
- The U.S. should collaborate with the Iraqi authorities at all levels, including the federal government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the legislative and judicial branches, and other political actors to reassess the scale and timeline of the withdrawal agreement to avoid a power vacuum and to lessen any prospect of an open conflict. In addition, maintaining and reinforcing the U.S. presence in Iraq is essential to mitigating intra-Shiite tensions and preventing a potential civil war. Partnering with Gulf states and the European Union to counter Iranian influence through alternative infrastructure investments and energy cooperation should remain a U.S. option.
- To enhance security and stability, the U.S. should urge the Iraqi government to establish enforceable arms control and disarmament initiatives aimed at limiting militia access to weaponry. Additionally, robust oversight mechanisms must be promoted to prevent coalition-supplied weapons from being diverted into the hands of militias. The U.S. should incline the Iraqi government to prohibit financial resources and benefits to groups actively opposing U.S. interests.
- Strengthening local governance is critical to address grievances and reduce the overcentralization of power that militias often exploit. The U.S. should further support legislative and administrative decentralization, alongside promoting equitable resource devolution through reforms, capacity building, and encouragement of political actors.
- Finally, countering militia influence requires the establishment of a Threat Intelligence Hub to monitor, analyze, and report on Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. This would provide actionable intelligence to inform U.S. strategy and bolster regional stability. Moreover, clear consequences for militia engagement in violence and destabilizing activities must be defined and enforced.
Binar FK is a Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and is pursuing Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Based in Washington, D.C., he writes on and researches political and security issues in the Middle East. He previously worked in journalism, covering wars and conflicts in the region, focusing on extremist groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militias. He has appeared on national media to analyze and discuss Middle East affairs and regional dynamics. He has collaborated with the EU, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, YouGov, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of the New Lines Institute.
