Since former rebel groups toppled the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December, Syria has faced a fragile power transition. While regional and international actors have stepped up efforts in recent weeks to stabilize the country, major challenges remain. Chief among these is a simmering geopolitical contest among Israel, Türkiye, and Iran that threatens to undercut fragile political progress and entangle Syria’s minority communities – Kurds, Druze, and Alawites – in a new wave of proxy conflicts.
Much of the discussion surrounding the geopolitical dimension of the regime change in Syria has framed Türkiye and Israel as winners and Iran as the primary loser. The dominant narrative suggests that Israel and Türkiye, aligned with the West, aim to contain Iran, while Tehran resists. However, this view oversimplifies the shifting dynamics.
Multiple plausible scenarios could unfold in Syria regarding this competition. One includes Türkiye and Israel reaching a deconfliction deal and informally dividing spheres of influence in Syria. Another could be a partial convergence of Israeli and Iranian interests, though not formal coordination, particularly in backing certain minority communities as a counter to Türkiye and Damascus. Both see Ankara’s growing regional role as a strategic threat. This, however, does not preclude continued Israeli-Iranian hostility, whether in Syria or elsewhere.
A third scenario is an alignment of Iranian and Turkish interests, and possibly even occasional cooperation, in checking Israel’s rising regional influence. This scenario does not rule out the longstanding rivalry between Tehran and Ankara themselves as they grapple for regional influence.
Another scenario considers the prospect of Iran seeking to spark a confrontation between Israel and Damascus with the potential of pulling Türkiye in as well. Alternatively, in the event of further instability in Syria, Israel might attempt to establish a de facto corridor from the south toward Northeast Syria – an outcome that appears unlikely but cannot be dismissed if conditions on the ground deteriorate and geopolitical competition intensifies. Syria’s vulnerable minority communities are likely to be among the most affected by renewed conflict and risk being used as proxies by neighboring states, although they might also seize such a scenario as a means to create or solidify facts on the ground and consolidate self-rule realities in their areas, particularly in Druze and Kurdish regions.
For regional and Western policymakers, especially the United States given its on-the-ground military presence and role in shaping Syria’s future, understanding the evolving dynamics of confrontation and alignment – along with the interplay between domestic and external factors – is essential to anticipating future flashpoints involving Syria and its neighbors. While supporting reconstruction efforts – primarily led by Türkiye and the Gulf states – meaningful stabilization in Syria also requires navigating the complex regional landscape, including easing mutual Syrian and Israeli security concerns to prevent future flare-ups through sustained multilateral coordination. It also demands addressing the grievances of Syria’s minority communities, which could otherwise aggravate broader regional dynamics. As such, the stakes are high for Syrians, regional states, and the broader international community – notably the United States – given the potential security risks emanating from Syria, including the potential for renewed regionally backed civil conflict and jihadist terrorism.
If transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa succeeds in easing long-term security concerns on the part of actors such as Israel and secures the support of Syrians, including non-Sunni Arab communities, through an inclusive and robust governance approach, Syria could avoid the most destabilizing outcomes. Yet the country’s trajectory remains uncertain – and its fate will shape the future regional balance of power.
Background
The fall of the Assad regime has profoundly reshaped regional dynamics, marking a shift in the balance of power among the three key states that have played a major role in Syria’s conflict: Iran, Türkiye, and Israel.
Iran’s Regional Decline
For several decades, Iran invested heavily in expanding its regional influence, particularly after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the popular uprisings in the region in the 2010s. Tehran saw nuclear weapons as the ultimate path to securing its status. Anticipating Israeli resistance – given past strikes on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear sites – Iran pursued forward deterrence by building a network of militias and engaging in strategic direct interventions, particularly in Syria.
Syria was Iran’s only true state ally, a relationship strengthened by mutual hostilities toward Iraq and Israel over the course of decades. Tehran’s intervention in Syria from 2011 onward solidified this partnership, with Iranian-backed militias gradually taking control of large parts of the country. However, Israel embarked on a progressively intensifying military campaign against Iran and its allied militias in Syria, especially after Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israeli soil.
The fall of Assad has dealt a severe blow to Iran’s regional Axis of Resistance, particularly as Damascus is now dominated by forces with a hardline Sunni Islamist identity with foreign jihadists in their ranks. Tehran was thought to have spent as much as $30 billion to $50 billion in Syria since 2011 to keep Assad in power and protect its regional interests. Additionally, aiding Assad against the Sunni-majority opposition tarnished the image of Iran and allies like Hezbollah in the broader region. Assad’s Syria had served as a crucial conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, and its loss significantly weakens Iran’s ability to project power into the broader Levant. This setback has been compounded by Israeli operations that have severely degraded Hezbollah and Hamas. Though Iran remains a key regional player, Assad’s fall signals a period of retrenchment rather than expansion, particularly as Iran came under a devastating Israeli and U.S. military campaign in mid to late June.
Türkiye’s Gamble: Victory or Overreach?
Türkiye was among the first external powers to support the Syrian uprising and opposition despite initial hesitation, considering its ties with Assad began to improve in the years before 2011. While the full details of the final push by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) against Assad in late 2024 remain unclear, Turkish backing throughout the years was undeniably critical.
With Assad gone, Türkiye has surpassed Iran as the dominant external power in Syria. It maintains a military presence in the northern areas held until December 2024 by the former pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (SNA) groups. Ankara is now reportedly planning to expand that presence through a defense pact with Damascus, still under negotiation, that could station Turkish forces at bases in central Syria, such as the strategic T-4 air base in Homs province.
A Syria aligned with Turkish interests offers Ankara both strategic and economic advantages. Turkish companies, particularly in the construction and energy, stand to benefit greatly from Syria’s reconstruction, which is estimated to require between $250 billion and $400 billion in investment.
However, Türkiye’s growing influence is unsettling regional actors. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s late-December remark that “Türkiye is bigger than Türkiye itself” underscores Ankara’s expansionist vision, stirring concerns among Arab states, Iran, and Israel. Iranian officials have been especially infuriated by Türkiye’s support for the opposition in toppling Assad.
Despite its gains, Türkiye faces serious challenges in Syria. The most immediate is the continued presence of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. Ankara considers the SDF an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has fought an insurgency against Türkiye for the past four decades. Kurds constitute the largest ethnic minority in Türkiye. The SDF denies having direct ties to the PKK, but its commander, Gen. Mazloum Abdi, has acknowledged the presence of PKK fighters in northeast Syria, adding that they will leave the country.
The greatest obstacle to Türkiye’s ambitions in Syria, however, may not be the Kurds but Israel. Ankara is increasingly alarmed by Israel’s expanding territorial foothold in southern Syria. There also appear to be concerns in Ankara about Kurds in Syria and beyond aligning with other regional powers, such as Israel, amid the shifting and unpredictable post-Oct. 7 landscape and recent Israeli expressions of support for the Kurds.
Israel’s Rise As a Regional Hegemon
Since 2015, Israel has targeted Iranian positions in Syria, but these operations intensified dramatically following the Hamas attacks. Strikes focused on Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officers, weapons shipments, and even a missile production facility inside Iran destroyed in September 2024. However, following Assad’s fall, Israel has continued its attacks in Syrian territory, launching over 1,000 combined air and artillery strikes and ground operations since December, according to Syria Weekly newsletter.
The fall of Assad removed a key link in the Iran-led axis, offering Israel a temporary strategic advantage. However, a January Israeli government report concluded that “the threat from Syria could evolve into something even more dangerous than the Iranian threat,” pointing to Türkiye’s expanding role. The report warned that Israel may be on a collision course with Türkiye, given Ankara’s sponsorship of former Syrian rebels now in power in Damascus and its support for Hamas.
Unlike Iran, Türkiye is not isolated. It is embedded in the Western-led security architecture, possesses NATO’s second-largest army, and is integrated into the global economic system – all while pursuing an increasingly assertive “strategic autonomy” doctrine through interventions in the South Caucasus, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean. For Israel, Türkiye’s rise as a regional power poses a far more complex challenge than does Iran.
Israel has seized on the post-Assad chaos to deepen its footprint in southern Syria, move beyond the Golan Heights, and present itself as a protector of minority Syrian communities – especially Druze, and to a lesser extent, Kurds and Alawites. These moves serve to build its strategic depth in the event that Syria’s fragile stability devolves into communal conflict and those groups seek external support. Israel’s positioning of itself to counter perceived emerging threats from Syrian territory has, however, angered the new Syrian government.
At the March 2025 Emergency Arab Summit on Gaza, al-Sharaa called for an Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria, but his government lacks the strength to enforce that desire. The interim president has also attempted to find common ground with Israel by highlighting both countries’ shared animosity toward Iranian influence.
Israel has long been a dominant regional power, but post-Oct. 7, it is displaying an unprecedented level of direct regional assertiveness – well beyond previous incursions or the periphery doctrine it has historically used to cultivate ties with non-Arab states like Türkiye and Iran. It has now entered the most proactive and far-reaching phase of its regional policy, with Syria as one of its core focuses.
Scenarios
Based on the behavior and strategic orientations of key regional state and non-state actors, several potential scenarios could shape Syria after Assad and broader regional dynamics involving Israel, Türkiye, and Iran.
Scenario 1: Israel-Turkish Understanding and Divided Influence Zones in Syria
In a scenario already beginning to take shape, Israel and Türkiye could reach a deconfliction agreement and even informally divide zones of influence in Syria. Given southern Syria’s strategic importance to Israel, Druze-majority areas and parts of Quneitra and Deraa provinces could fall under de facto Israeli influence, with a possible Israeli pullback to the Golan Heights if Damascus refrains from deploying military forces, or limits them to lightly armed security units, as a gesture of reassurance. From the Israeli perspective, such an arrangement would likely need to include a commitment from the West not to supply Syria with strategic weaponry – an agreement that Türkiye may also be asked to join – although Russia and perhaps China could still fill that gap. Russia’s close ties with the Assad regime and its prominent role in the disastrous conditions in the country after 2011 may pose a challenge, but the al-Sharaa government’s engagement with Moscow after Assad’s fall — particularly in securing the printing and transfer of Syrian currency — suggests that pragmatism could prevail if Syria genuinely needs Russia’s help.
The continuation of Israeli airstrikes, particularly ones similar to the extensive air campaign on April 2 that included the T-4 base, prompted regional efforts to seek a solution. On April 9, the Turkish and Israeli delegations met in Azerbaijan to establish a deconfliction mechanism and prevent security incidents. Because Ankara had reportedly reached a deal with Damascus to deploy fighter jets and air defense systems at T-4, its targeting raised the risk of a potential incident with Israel. Whether Turkish-controlled military bases within Syria would be acceptable to Israel has yet to be decided.
However, with the path of regional and international reintegration now open to Syria following the U.S. and Europe’s lifting of sanctions on the country, there will likely be more pressure on Israel to seek an amicable settlement with Damascus — one that, short of peace, might include a security arrangement under which the new government would not pose a threat to Israel.
Remarks by U.S. President Donald Trump during his April 7 White House meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggest U.S. backing for a deal between its two regional allies to head off a crisis that could draw Washington back into the region. Israel paused strikes in Syria after that White House meeting until late May, even though ground incursions in areas such as the Syrian Qunaytirah and Deraa provinces still continued. Reports alleging that al-Sharaa met with Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi in Abu Dhabi on 8 July point in that direction. If this scenario is to succeed, it will require serious U.S. mediation and sustained oversight in addition to mutual security guarantees from each of Syria, Türkiye, and Israel.
U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack, who also serves as special envoy to Syria, appears to be actively working toward an understanding among Türkiye, Syria, and Israel – a path that must be sustained to prevent renewed conflict. At present, the United States is the only actor with the influence and credibility to engage all sides, given its strong ties with each party and its recent reengagement with Damascus following mid-May relief of sanctions on Syria.
Scenario 2: Israeli and Iranian Support for Minority Groups and Armed Factions
Israel and Iran both view Türkiye’s expanding regional influence as a strategic threat. Since neither thus far wants to directly confront Türkiye, their most viable option is to counterbalance Ankara’s role through third parties. This opens the door to a partial – though not coordinated – alignment of Israeli and Iranian interests, particularly in supporting groups opposed to Turkish influence, such as the Kurds, Druze, and Alawites.
Israel has been explicit in its support for both Druze and Kurds. The Druze, who reside in the Golan Heights and southern Syria, remain divided on Israeli backing, with many preferring continued association with Syria. Still, widespread distrust of the new Damascus authorities – many of whom have jihadist roots – may push sections of the Druze toward some form of understanding with Israel. Israel intervened in early May to support Druze factions during recent clashes between government forces and armed Druze groups. The lingering threat of the Islamic State, coupled with the presence of extremist foreign fighters within the ranks of the new Syrian military, could further push the Druze and other minority communities to seek external protection, given their uncertainty about the al-Sharaa government’s long-term ability to contain extremist threats.
For both Israel and Iran, the Kurdish-led SDF is a natural partner in checking Turkish influence. With around 100,000 seasoned fighters, the SDF presents a formidable challenge to Turkish-backed forces. Thus far, Israel’s support has remained largely limited to rhetorical or diplomatic backing. However, growing conflict could push Israel to go further. In a March interview with BBC Persian, Abdi, the SDF commander, said his forces would be “happy to receive support from anyone willing to offer it.” In the event of renewed fighting between the SDF and Türkiye and its Syrian allies, Israeli support could primarily take the form of diplomatic pressure on Washington to maintain the U.S. troop presence and sustain support for the SDF or, in a more dramatic case, send arms to the group or deploy targeted strikes against Turkish-aligned militias. However, the geographical distance and the overall caution that Syrian Kurds display in leaning on Israel due to broader geopolitical risks will create challenges for forging a strong, practical relationship.
Iran, meanwhile, enjoys more operational flexibility. The SDF’s core – the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and its political wing the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – is part of the Kurdistan Communities Union, of which the PKK is the key component. Iran and the PKK have maintained a pragmatic, if uneasy, working relationship since the 1990s. In Iraq, the Sinjar Protection Units, aligned with the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), are ideologically close to the PKK. Located near SDF-held Hasakah province, and with PMF controlling the Iraqi side of the border, Iran has a direct corridor through which it could channel support to the SDF in the event of war between the group and Türkiye.
Media reports have claimed that Iran may have provided drones to the PKK and reached a deal to supply the SDF with drones as well—a claim the SDF has denied.. Nevertheless, the group has demonstrated effective drone capabilities, striking Turkish and allied militants’ positions in Syria. Whether externally sourced or locally built, these capabilities have alarmed Ankara. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently warned Iran that if it continues aiding Kurdish groups in Syria, “we may do the same to you in return,” underscoring rising tensions between the two powers.
Ongoing Turkish-PKK negotiations have for the moment eased tensions between the SDF, on one side, and Türkiye and Damascus, on the other. But trouble could erupt again. Despite a deal signed between al-Sharaa and Abdi on March 10 that enabled some security-military cooperation, a follow up meeting held July 9 between Abdi and the Syrian government failed to yield progress, reigniting political tensions. In any event, if the current fragile peace breaks down, Israel and Iran may seek to empower Syrian minority groups as counterweights to Turkish and Syrian influence. Iran’s long-standing ties to the Alawite community and the March insurgency in coastal Alawite-majority areas suggest new fronts may be opening. Reports indicate that hundreds of former Assad officers have relocated to Iraq, offering Iran a possible channel for outreach to disaffected Alawite and Shia groups.
Thus far, al-Sharaa’s government remains overstretched and incapable of managing these converging threats. Additionally, major Turkish support for Damascus (or even direct involvement) against the Kurds or a renewed Alawite insurgency would risk dragging Ankara into broader conflict with Israel, Iran, and elements of Iraq’s PMF. Such a scenario could lead to deepening Turkish entanglement in Syria, further straining its economy and stoking domestic tensions over a possible new influx of Syrian refugees.
Scenario 3: Turkish-Iranian Assistance to Palestinian Groups and Hezbollah
While Türkiye and Iran could find themselves at odds in Syria, they might have shared incentives to cooperate against Israel, particularly if the situation in Syria deteriorates. Both countries are governed by Islamist groups that champion the Palestinian cause, though Iran has played a far more extensive role in supporting Palestinian factions, particularly through military assistance. Tehran has engaged in direct military confrontation with Israel since April 2024, most recently the 12-Day War in June, and has long supported Lebanese Hezbollah’s armed conflict with Israel. Since the late 2000s, Türkiye has increasingly positioned itself as a defender of the Palestinian cause and has been seen as growing closer to Hamas – even allowing Hamas-aligned financial activities on its soil and hosting Hamas leaders for prolonged periods.However, Ankara is not known to have provided military support to Hamas or other Palestinian factions, nor has it engaged in any armed conflict with Israel.
With Iran’s land corridor to Lebanon disrupted following Assad’s fall and Israeli military campaign disrupting direct Iranian assistance to Hezbollah, alternative funding and arms supply routes may become necessary. A February 2025 report revealed the seizure of $2.5 million in cash transported through Türkiye to Hezbollah at Beirut’s airport, raising questions about whether Turkish authorities deliberately facilitated or turned a blind eye to the transfer. Given Türkiye’s growing desire to check Israel’s regional advances, Ankara and Tehran may pragmatically compartmentalize their rivalries and collaborate where their interests align against Israel, especially if Syrian stability breaks down. The scope of this scenario goes well beyond Syria. The likelihood of this scenario unfolding in an aggressive fashion is slim – especially at the moment – but some form of relationship and support for Hamas by Tehran and Ankara, though different in nature, remains ongoing.
Scenario 4: Iran Provoking Israel to Expand Syria Involvement
Another possible scenario involves Iran trying to drag Israel into escalating tensions – and possibly conflict – with Syria’s new government and, by extension, Türkiye, its main external backer. A June 3 attack from Deraa province into the Israel-controlled Golan Heights by Kataib Awli al-Bass (the Possessors of Might Brigades), a group claiming affiliation with the Iran-led Resistance Axis, may signal such an approach. Some reports attributed the attack to a Hamas-aligned faction, though Hamas has denied involvement. Israel responded by stating that al-Sharaa was responsible for the attack and struck various targets inside Syria, including three military sites. If Iran-linked groups continue launching attacks from Syrian soil, Israel may use them as a pretext to expand its military footprint, further destabilizing Syria.
Israel’s role and ambitions in Syria are of major strategic significance. An al-Sharaa-led government perceived as weak against Israel would risk losing legitimacy among the Sunni Arab majority, echoing the 25-year period after 1948 when opposition to Israel shaped Arab political credibility. By provoking Israel, Iran could simultaneously undermine the new Syrian government, pressure Türkiye into a tough position regarding Israel (or make it appear impotent and complacent by not acting), and mire Israel in an extended Syrian entanglement. The compounded effect would serve Tehran’s interests by destabilizing adversaries without direct confrontation. Depending on Iran’s strategy and its willingness to confront Israel in one form or another, the likelihood of this scenario materializing may rise or fall. In light of the recent U.S.-Israeli military campaigns against Iran, Tehran may choose to proceed more cautiously with such a scenario — at least in the foreseeable future — especially given Israel’s previously unprecedented willingness to directly strike Iran and the growing direct communication between Syria and Israel. .
Scenario 5: An Israeli-Protected Corridor in Syria
Another potential outcome could be a bold Israeli attempt to create a territorial corridor stretching from Daraa in the south, through Suwayda and the al-Tanf region, to SDF-held areas in the northeast. While this may seem far-fetched at the moment, prolonged instability in Syria could make such a scenario more plausible, as it would challenge Turkish military and allies inside Syria and serve as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions in the broader Levant. In reality, the success of such a project would require continued U.S. and Western support due to the level of commitment, resources, risk, and struggle it would entail for Israel – especially in securing such a corridor both on the ground and from the air. Whether Syria’s minority communities along its path would support the project is another matter – one contingent on cost-benefit calculations, conditions on the ground, and the extent of threat they face.
Türkiye and Iran would strongly oppose such a development, viewing a fragmented Syria shaped by Israeli intervention as both a strategic gain for Israel and a threat to their own territorial integrity, given their multiethnic and multisectarian makeup. With NATO’s future uncertain and the West firmly backing Israel, Ankara may not be able to rely on Western support in a future confrontation with Israel over Syria. It may instead seek closer ties with Russia or China or even cooperate with Iran and Iraq.
For Israel, such a buffer zone would serve multiple strategic purposes:
- Blocking Iran’s land access to Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories
- Providing a security umbrella for Druze and Kurdish forces opposed to both Damascus and Türkiye
- Containing Türkiye’s expansionist ambitions in Syria
A potential division of Syria into distinct zones of influence, with Israel exerting control over a significant southeastern-northeastern corridor, would mark an unprecedented shift in regional geopolitics.
Plausibility of Scenarios and the Broader Strategic Landscape
Stepping back to examine Syria’s broader landscape, the sheer number of stakeholders, shifting alliances, and competing strategic interests makes multiple scenarios possible. The Middle East has repeatedly witnessed events once deemed unthinkable: the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s fall, the popular uprisings of 2010s, the Islamic State’s rise, Hamas’s Oct. 7 attacks, Assad’s overthrow, and the Iran-led axis’s weakening. As interests shift, alliances and rivalries evolve accordingly.
The five scenarios outlined above are not mutually exclusive. Of them, the Turkish-Israeli agreement in Scenario 1 remains the most desirable, and currently likely, outcome from the perspectives of the U.S., Türkiye, and likely Israel – particularly if a more risk-averse government replaces Netanyahu’s in Israel. Scenarios 2, 3, and 5 could unfold in parallel, with Scenario 5, an Israeli corridor in Syria – if fully realized – possibly reducing the intensity of Scenario 2, alignment of Israeli and Iranian interests, while amplifying the effects of Scenario 3, the Iranian-Turkish convergence. Scenario 4, an Iranian attempt to pit Israel and Syria against one another, could unfold at any point and undermine the viability of Scenarios 1 and 3, particularly if the Israeli government doubts Damascus’s ability to rein in unruly armed groups. Each scenario envisions a distinct alignment of actors positioned in opposition to one another within a highly complex and fluid landscape—one where multiple scenarios may unfold simultaneously and overlaps between them are possible.
As Syria emerges from its devastating civil war and decades of regional isolation, it urgently needs stability through both balanced foreign relations and fair domestic governance. Externally, this means reintegration into a cooperative regional framework – especially with Türkiye and Arab states – and at the least, nonaggression with Israel. Lifting international sanctions would facilitate Syria’s reintegration into regional and global economic systems. Internally, inclusive governance and equitable development that take into account Syria’s ethnic, religious, and regional diversity are essential for effective reconstruction. In this regard, minority communities, with their regional and international ties, will be pivotal. Ignoring their legitimate grievances, a desire for some measure of local self-governance, risks renewed instability and deeper “proxification,” as external powers may seek to capitalize on these tensions and draw them into broader geopolitical struggles. Therefore, recasting a post-Sykes-Picot territorial state like Syria around an exclusionary Arab and Islamist-leaning Sunni Muslim identity would be a grave strategic error, one that would risk alienating the country’s minorities.
It is also important to recognize that each major regional player faces limitations. While Iran and Türkiye confront military, political, and economic constraints in pursuing their ambitions, Israel’s assertive posture carries risks of its own. Arab states may increasingly view Israeli territorial advances as a threat, particularly if Israel continues to reject proposals for Gaza’s postwar reconstruction and governance. While Netanyahu’s government seeks U.S. backing to reconfigure the region with Israel as the dominant power, Washington’s long-term commitment to that remains uncertain. Public pressure and shifting U.S. domestic politics and global priorities, especially under a potential Democratic-led administration dominated by the party’s progressive wing, could weaken Washington’s support for Israel in the medium to long term.
Regional and Western policymakers must remain alert to the risk of escalating internal divisions in Syria – potentially leading to renewed armed conflict and even another intercommunal civil war. The U.S. will be critical to shaping the trajectory of events in Syria and the wider region. This will necessitate maintaining a U.S. military presence – likely at a reduced level under current policy – and sustained engagement with various actors in Syria and the broader region to prevent a further descent into chaos and to facilitate compromises acceptable to various stakeholders.
In a domestic Syrian landscape marked by hostile forces and a high risk of violence, the U.S. is well poised to act as a coordination hub, especially in leading counter-Islamic State efforts and fostering an understanding between Damascus and the SDF. Washington should also continue encouraging major regional actors – Israel, Türkiye, and the Gulf Arab states – to agree on a shared vision for Syria that enables the rebuilding of the war-ravaged country, accommodates minority demands for rights and some form of decentralized local governance, and helps prevent future tensions with neighboring states.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.
