In this episode of the Contours Lebanese Logic Podcast, host Faysal Itani sits down with Non-Resident Senior Fellow Dania Arayssi. Together, they discuss the recent effort by the Lebanese government and military to disarm Hezbollah, including how likely the effort is to succeed, and what the future landscape of power looks like in the country.
Faysal Itani: Hello. Welcome, everybody, to our latest episode of Lebanese Logic, which focuses on Lebanese politics, political economy, and geopolitics. I’m hosting today. I’m Faysal Itani at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy. Joining me is Dania Arayssi, who is a non-resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute as well. Today, our topic is the latest Cabinet decision in Lebanon, circling around the topic of the future of Hezbollah, of course, one of the largest, if not the most, contentious political issue in the country.
On Aug. 5, 2025, the Lebanese government instructed the Lebanese army or the Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF, to prepare a plan to disarm all armed militias in the country, of course, that means Hezbollah, by the end of the current year. A couple of days later, the government approved the document presented by U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, which included a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Now, first, let me say, before we get into the details, this is pretty momentous time for Lebanon. Even a few months ago, before the war with Israel, before a few other regional developments, it would have been completely unthinkable for us to be having this conversation about an official Cabinet plan to disarm Hezbollah. In the past, attempts to circumscribe Hezbollah’s powers, or limit them, have usually been met with violence. Violence directed at the politicians or the security forces aligned with those efforts. We haven’t had that reaction yet, although, of course, everything is up in the air.
Among other things, this plan to disarm Hezbollah raises many questions. One question is how to achieve an actual complete end of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon and Israel have a very old armistice in place, but it doesn’t really reflect current reality. Anyway, no one’s abiding by it, so it doesn’t matter. It also raises a bunch of other non-international, very important local issues, which is, what’s going to happen if the government sees this through? What’s going to happen to political stability in Lebanon? What’s going to happen to Hezbollah itself, its Shia constituency, the Lebanese Armed Forces who are supposed to be charged with doing this?
Finally, there’s the international question of Israel’s position on such a development, and whether the United States can pressure the Israelis to actually comply with this ceasefire in Lebanon and withdraw from some of the territories they occupied during the last round of fighting with Hezbollah. As I said, this decision raises a number of questions about domestic and foreign policy. Most immediately, the onus here is on the Lebanese Armed Forces to go after or to implement this plan to disarm Hezbollah. I guess before we go any further, Dania, I’d like to ask you what you think about their ability and political will to do something like this, to implement this Cabinet decision.
Dania Arayssi: Hi, Faysal. I think this is a very good question to start with. There’s definitely a concern about the capability of the armed forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces have a modest, limited capability to deal with a paramilitary group such as Hezbollah, given their organizations and their structure. We’ve seen recently there has been an incident where four or five soldiers from the Lebanese Armed Forces lost their lives in Lebanon because of this lack of cooperation and lack of preparedness of how to deal with this. There is definitely a question about the capability of the armed forces. There is limited capability, which raise concerns about how much can we implement such decisions.
I know the Lebanese Armed Forces did receive some trainings on dealing with paramilitary groups and terrorist groups like Hezbollah, but the trainings is limited. The resources is limited on the ground in terms of military capabilities and technical services and resources. That’s definitely a concern for the Cabinet to be aware of, especially when it comes to the implementation. This is where, for example, one of the recommendations that I personally think right now is very important and crucial toward the implementation of such decision is to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, especially in terms of dealing with such groups. When I’m saying supports, I’m talking about military support for them.
When it comes to the political will, I’m less concerned about the political will. I think the Cabinets have received a green light to proceed with such decision, especially from the different political fractions and groups in Lebanon. This is not really a big concern for me. Definitely, there is a concern about civil war and concerns about whether Hezbollah were likely to comply with these decisions. In Lebanon, even the groups who used to be a very big supporter of Hezbollah, the Awnist, they’re going with the decisions of the Cabinet of disarming. Political will is not a big concern, but the military capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to proceed with such decisions is definitely something to be concerned of.
Faysal: If there’s political will, as you say, and I agree with you, there does seem to be a consistency about this for it to have happened at all, but if there’s a political will, but there’s a capability gap, then what is this really? Is this a gamble by the government that Hezbollah will cooperate with the Lebanese Armed Forces? Do you think that’s one scenario is it a realistic scenario? If not, what does this implementation look like in practice? I know the LAF hasn’t given us the details, obviously, but speculate.
Dania: So far, what we have seen on the news is Hezbollah being very clear, unlikely to cooperate with the Cabinet and with LAF on the implementation of such decisions. Hezbollah is threatening that any attempt to really implement such decision will likely to lead to a civil war. This takes off the option of cooperation from Hezbollah. The other option is possible enforcement, but then the enforcement of such decisions increase the chances of a civil war. This raise another questions related to the question, is what kind of support the Cabinet has to implement such decision? Because so far, nothing really signals that Hezbollah is likely to cooperate and to implement such decision.
The only possible option that I see that might lead Hezbollah to cooperate and then take off the option of enforcement and civil war is whether the Israelis are likely to withdraw from these five villages in Lebanon. If this happens and the Israeli agrees to withdraw from these five territories or five villages in Lebanon, then I see a likelihood for Hezbollah to lower the hostility with the Cfabinet and maybe be like, “We’re willing to cooperate a little bit in the disarmament,” but so far, nothing really signal cooperation with the Lebanese Cabinets.
Then the concern is, yes, we’re literally gambling, the Cabinet is gambling, or the other possible scenario is the Cabinet is getting some sort of support to take such a risky, high-stake decision and support, I don’t know from who, from the Americans, from the Gulf countries. There is some sort of support, because such decision by the Lebanese Cabinet to officially disarm Hezbollah is a big decision and comes with a lot of risks. You must be getting some sort of support to take such decision knowing that Hezbollah is likely to respond in a very violent way. We have the example of 2008. We have examples of how he responded. There is something and support the Cabinet is getting to make such decision.
Faysal: Yes, no, I see the logic. The problem, of course, is that this is a difficult and risky undertaking. Even at the pure military level, it’s very difficult. We don’t really know what the balance of forces is.
My understanding is there is some support coming, but I’m not sure, that’s code for I don’t think, that the level of support is matching the level of what’s being requested from the Lebanese army, assuming that one of the scenarios you talked about plays out, which is that Hezbollah says no and digs in and just you have to do it by force. By which point we see whether the Cabinet is willing to do something like that, and the LAF for that matter, or whether the Hezbollah is calling everybody’s bluff and makes everything much more difficult for everybody.
You raised a very interesting point about withdrawal from the five territories. In a way, that puts them on the back foot and they have to defend themselves because then you’re going forward and doing and saying what they say only they can do, which is to extract concessions from the Israelis. In Lebanese history, as you and I know, the only people who’ve ever extracted concessions from the Israelis have been Hezbollah. Of course, that’s one of the reasons why they’ve been able to draw on this reputation.
There is one interesting scenario that being discussed, I think it’s quite usual for this kind of stuff to come up when you have these demobilization conversations, which is that Hezbollah or these major elements of Hezbollah would be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces. This has always been part of the discussion of disarming Hezbollah. What does that actually look like? What are the operational challenges? For that matter, what are the ideological challenges of trying to do something like that?
Dania: Yes. This is not yet an official policy in Lebanon, but there is definitely conversations going on about, let’s say, the disarming happens, you disarm Hezbollah, what are you going to do with those fighters and this organizational structure? One possible scenario is integrating them in the Lebanese Armed Forces. Another possible scenario, just letting them go and just have their own freedom of joining or doing anything they want to do. Then there are very serious risk of integrating Hezbollah fighters or militias within the Lebanese Armed Forces. I think the first possible scenario, we’re talking about ideological differences. The Lebanese, the Hezbollah fighters have this idea of muqawama, or we need to fight any Western ideology, anti-liberal Western ideologies.
On the other hand, currently, at least the Cabinet and its forces, they’re taking a different approach. They’re becoming much more open for the Western world. They’re going against this Iranian influence. This is likely to create a clash within the Armed Forces. You don’t want that to happen in a situation in Lebanon, because then this is likely to lead to a whole state collapse. You don’t want the Armed Forces to be not united, because then you’re risking the whole collapse of the military.
We’ve seen this in Lebanon. A lot of times people were talking about the whole collapse of the state, but then the only thing that was still hanging there was the Armed Forces. If the Armed Forces collapse, then you’re risking a whole state collapse. This is the major concern ideologically, because they’re coming from a different ideology compared to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and you don’t want this to occur, the whole collapse of the state.
Faysal: This is a good question. Even on the ideological basis, it’s a problem. Of course, there’s another problem too, which is that if the military is asked to move against Hezbollah at any level, I think about a third of the Armed Forces is Shia, maybe give or take, I’m not sure about the number. There is, of course, this other concern that you’re asking them to turn their guns on their core religionists, other Shia. Even if obviously they need the paycheck from the LAF, it’s not like people have many options now. You never really know how people are going to behave in these situations. Is there a scenario where we end up with a splintered military?
Dania: Comparatively speaking, we have cases in Africa where there wasn’t paramilitary groups, I think in North Africa, it might be Sudan. Then the new government tried to integrate the paramilitary group’s fighters within the new state building in Sudan. I think Northern Sudan. This did not work. There was a huge split in the army.
We have cases previously where in a weak state capacity like Lebanon, in different ideology, when you try to integrate the paramilitary groups within the state, you’re likely going to end up with a split in the institutions, and this is risky, to establish order, to establish stability, to establish this kind of state building. The military is one of the pillars of any state building. There is this risk component going on. I think the Cabinet is aware of this.
I think I’m not totally into the idea of integrating Hezbollah forces into the military armed group because of that risk, and because we are in a stage where we’re building our institutions. This is risky from an ideological component. Then it raise concerns of compliance. Are you willing to defend and protect the entire country? Even though you might be not really believing in the mission and the vision of these institutions, are you likely to prepare for a coup from within the military to overthrow the system and to establish your own institutions?
We’ve have cases where a military coup happen. This is the whole story of a military coup, how a military coup really happens. People are really fighting against the institutions, because ideologically they’re different or have different interests. Those are really serious concerns if we go with the integrations of Hezbollah within the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Faysal: That’s interesting. Unconventional view, but I take your point. I never thought about those particular concerns. That’s what we’re talking about, actual literal Hezbollah people, not just Shia Lebanese soldiers, but people who were in the party, or maybe they were fighters and now they’re being asked to take orders to do this or that. Yes, fair enough. The comparative perspective is very valuable.
Let me ask you a more complicated question. We have Hezbollah, the militia, but of course we have Hezbollah, the political actor, in Lebanon. These two things are obviously intertwined, but it’s difficult to tell exactly how and where one begins, the other ends. In a scenario of disarmament, let’s say that Hezbollah were significantly weakened militarily or disarmed, what does that mean for Hezbollah as a political movement? Is it the case that Hezbollah’s political power flows out of the barrel of a gun, as they say? Therefore, would this just de facto weaken them, or might it create a political rallying effect around the party where the Shia constituency sticks to them even more? I realize this is a little hard to make a prediction, but what are your thoughts on the dynamic?
Dania: Usually, we know from history and literature, these paramilitary groups, their political power really depends on the military. The military is not the only factors that gives Hezbollah the power and the representation, but it’s an important factor to consider. We know that right now the disarmament of Hezbollah is likely to definitely impact to a certain degree and certain level their political power and their representation for different reasons.
First reason is, the Shias community perceive themselves a minority, perceive themselves threatened. On top of this, they perceive themselves threatened by Israel, threatened by the growing Sunnis, by the Christians. They see Hezbollah and its political power as protecting them and representing them, given the low state capacity that we have. Definitely, disarming Hezbollah will raise questions for the Shias groups of like, “Who else are we going to be seeking to represent us and to protect us? What other groups can protect us?”
There is valid concerns about Hezbollah representation. It would be very interesting to compare how much Hezbollah’s political power is likely to be in the upcoming election compared to before the disarmament, just to see how much military or disarmament of Hezbollah has really impacted their political power and representations, particularly among the Shias constituency, because this is the valid concerns in them. I don’t expect that Hezbollah is totally going to collapse politically, but I do expect that their political power, a little bit, is likely to decrease because you’re really looking for someone else to give you this protection and this security that Hezbollah, once upon a time, was giving it to you as a Shia person.
There is definitely concern about rallying around the flag, and it’s actually happening as we speak right now. We are seeing every day people are protesting, people are walking around, calling out against the government and its decisions. Those are particularly Shias calling for Hezbollah arms to end these Cabinet decisions. There is rallying around the flag happening as we speak right now, but I don’t know how much this rallying around the flag is likely to continue until the next election.
Rallying around the flag, we know that it’s usually a short, emotional reaction in the people. It’s not something that happened for a long time. It’s a few weeks, few months, and then people have to go back to their usual life and think about themselves and their political attitude. Same thing will happen in the States, same thing is happening in Lebanon right now.
Then the bigger question is how much Hezbollah political power is likely to be impacted by this disarmament, and how much are they likely to secure seats in the parliament next year? Are they going to be winning the same number of seats, higher number of seats, and how much can they leverage this? Weapons are an important component of what is Hezbollah and what they do, their weapons and their arms.
Faysal: I’m very interested and curious to see how they perform next year. One of the complicating factors here, of course, to what you said is that you’re treating it like a non-zero something. In fact, it just may be the case that these guys spent the last 20 years destroying every single Shia political party, every Shia person who opposed them. Maybe we’re going to see this creative process in Lebanese Shia politics, but as soon as a year, it’s going to be like a desolate landscape for Shia politics if Hezbollah is disarmed.
They still have the ability, even if they don’t have rockets and AKs, you can still intimidate people. Harakat Amal still does that. Actually, hell, every single Lebanese political party does that to their own constituency. They threaten them, they manipulate them, some people get harmed every time there’s an election. I’d be curious to see what happens in a post-Hezbollah world, where Hezbollah has spent so much time destroying Shia politics.
Something similar, I think, happened, maybe not exactly the same thing, with Sunni politics, where you had Rafic Hariri, who just devoured all of Sunni politics with those 15 years. Then he was killed. Let’s face it, since then, they’ve had no meaningful leadership. They have sectarian solidarity, but they can’t translate it into any useful politics. Anyway, I’m just speculating. I’m very interested to see what happens in next year’s elections.
Let me switch gears a little bit to the international situation. What do we feel the U.S. role here is likely to be? My understanding is the United States, this administration, started this conversation by deploying Morgan Ortagus to Lebanon with a very hard line on Hezbollah and pressuring Lebanese Armed Forces and the Cabinet that they had better get on with the business of disarming them. My understanding is the current representative, Thomas Barrack, is a little more nuanced and subtle than this. It’s a little more understanding of Lebanon’s challenges.
Honestly, on balance, sitting here in Washington, I still think we don’t really know what they’re up against. We’re not giving them the capabilities they need to accomplish some of these things. I include within that the pressure on the Israelis to withdraw from those five territories, which there may be pressure, but obviously we haven’t seen it translate into anything. I don’t know. What’s your take on this?
Dania: Yes. This is a very good question. First of all, I think there is different ways to analyze these questions. The first one is, right now Lebanon what mostly needs from the States is, first of all, support and military support for the Lebanese Armed Forces to be able to implement such decision. It’s important that we take the decision, but most importantly, are we really serious about the implementation?
I think the United States, really right now, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces is highly needed, and especially not any support, not giving them weapons, but just giving them the trainings and the resources and the special weapons that they need to deal with such paramilitary groups. I think this is the first one.
I think political support is definitely needed. From the United States and from the Gulf countries, and we’ve seen this happening really recently. The Gulf countries have made a statement that they’re likely to go and reinvest again in Lebanon if this disarmament is really happening and being executed properly. The States has also said that they’re going to be pressuring the World Bank to really invest in Lebanon. The States are supporting Lebanon politically, economically, but then we need much more, right now, military, and special technical military support.
I think the approach that the States are taking, being more understanding of the concerns that Lebanon have to be aware of, is highly appreciated, because it’s not an easy decision. It’s not something that we can take in 24 hours. I think Barrack approach to the Lebanese politics and how things are is highly appreciated, because it’s a sensitive decision, let’s be honest, and there’s a lot of pressures on Lebanon. The Iranians came two days ago and they were trying to pressure Lebanon to step back on that decisions. Then the government was like, “This is a Lebanese politics, Lebanese domestic politics, and it’s really not something that you can interfere with.”
I think part of the strength of the Lebanese government right now is from the Americans. I still believe this. I’ve never seen the Lebanese government being very strong in their attitude and their voice toward the Iranians in terms of like, “Do not interfere in our domestic politics,” as I’ve seen right now. My understanding is one of the factors that explains such a strength in the attitude is the Americans and the Gulf countries supporting Lebanon, and being very serious. I think this is really encouraging and optimistic. The only concern is implementation, which requires serious support from the Americans.
Faysal: Those are excellent points. I appreciate it. Let me ask you the exact opposite question. So far, over the last couple of years, really, we’ve just seen Iran take one slap after the other, one humiliation after the other. Every time it looked like the Iranians had big tools to deploy geopolitically against Israel, against the United States, they’ve basically failed. They’ve lost all of these rounds. Then in the year that transpired when the war between Hezbollah and Israel really escalated, and then culminated in basically the assassination of most of Hezbollah’s leadership and the decimation of much of its armed forces, again, we see Iran make noise, complain, et cetera, but didn’t really do anything.
At least as far as I can see, I don’t see them doing anything major. I’m sure they’re sending weapons and money back to Lebanon, of course, but nothing that could counteract this momentum that’s happening right now. Beyond this expression of verbal support for Hezbollah, how is it going to respond to basically its primary asymmetric asset in the world, if not literally its most valuable military tool? No longer, I suppose. What can we expect them to do? What are their options? Do they have local options? Do they have geopolitical tools or options against Israel, the United States, or are they just going to be passive and watch this play out?
Dania: The only proxy for Iran right now that I see in the Middle East are the Houthis. They’re the only proxies right now that remain after all the failures and the collapse that the Iranians have gone through. Hezbollah military capabilities are almost done. I don’t see any windows for Iran to support Hezbollah beside just verbal support, because right now, which is a good optimistic things, Lebanon is being able to control their borders. Lebanon is really in charge of their borders. They’re checking everything getting inside Lebanon, in the airports, on the borders. That’s a good sign. Finally it’s happening. We are in charge of our own sovereignty, really. This has put limits on Iran and what can they do for Hezbollah.
Obviously, I don’t see any potential for Iran to support Hezbollah more than verbal support. The other potential scenario is taking the Hezbollah militia forces and switching them to another area, which is probably merging them with the Houthis, because Lebanon is a lost ground for them. There’s no way they can influence Lebanon and support Lebanon right now. You know what I mean? Establish their area of influence.
Maybe, I don’t know, they might be interested in expanding the remaining power for them in the Houthis in Yemen. I don’t know if they’re looking into that, because otherwise, let’s be honest, the Iranians have lost almost all their proxies in the Middle East. With Hamas, Hezbollah, in Iraq a little bit. There’s some forces for them in Iraq. Syria, a little bit too, but that’s it. The major proxies are done. What they’re going to do, either they’re going to let the Hezbollah be merged with the Lebanese Armed Forces, or they’re going to be like, “Okay, maybe we can invest with what we have remaining,” realistically speaking, and just take them to Yemen or to Syria or Iraq.
The Syrians are very realistic in terms of they’re trying to end all these militias there. Al-Sharaa has been very clear in his statements about this. Syria, it’s a big question about capability too, and how much the government can really implement those decisions in Syria in terms of ending and all these Iran’s militias, but they’re trying. I don’t see options right now, to be honest. They’re in their dark period of their geopolitics, to be honest.
Faysal: I probably think they would agree with you. I personally think that that’s very interesting, taking the Hezbollah investment and just put it somewhere else. You divest from Lebanon, but you keep Hezbollah, which is not the worst outcome for them when you think about it. That’s it. They’ve always been pragmatic, so I’m curious what they’re going to do. I personally think if you have a hostile Syria and a hostile Israel, it’s going to be very difficult to shape events in Lebanon. One or the other would be manageable, but both of them, I think, is too much. I don’t really see them as having many options.
Look, this Cabinet decision came out, last question, beginning of August, first week of August. Not that long ago, but we are not that far from the end of the year. The deadline here is for the Lebanese Armed Forces to present their plan to disarm, or is it that the disarmament has to finish?
Dania: That’s a very good question. Realistically speaking, I’m less optimistic about the disarmament process to actually happen and be executed by end of the year. Until now, as we speak, the Lebanese Armed Forces has not yet presented their plan to the Cabinet on what really the execution and the implementation of such decision looks like. We are almost into September. I don’t know how realistically are we likely to be disarming Hezbollah by end of 2025. Until now, we don’t have a plan in hand on what it really looks like.
I’m being very honest, I see the intentions, I understand the intentions of the government, I appreciate the intentions, but on the ground, I don’t see this as happening. I think we have to be realistic in terms of giving us more time to actually present the strategy to the Cabinet, because this strategy has to be discussed by the Cabinet member, has to be approved and voted by the Cabinet members, and then it has to go into implementation. This is how the things work in Lebanon. Everything has to be passed by the Cabinet before it gets executed.
We are expecting a serious pushback from different Cabinet members about the strategy or the policy that the Lebanese Armed Forces are likely to present. This pushbacks requires a lot of bargaining, a lot of conversations. What if we remove that? What if we add this point or we remove that point? I don’t see implementation really happening end of 2025, maybe mid-2026. Again, I’m being realistic, given Lebanon real politics there, but I appreciate the intentions of the government.
A very valid question here is, do we have enough information about Hezbollah sites and locations and guns and weapons? Do we know where things are located? Do the Lebanese Armed Forces know this information? I bet the Israelis have more information than the Lebanese Armed Forces have. The next question is, are the Americans willing to share information with the Lebanese government about those locations, about those weapons? We need this information, as a Lebanese government, to be able to implement this disarmament. How do we get this information? Who has access to this information?
There are serious concerns and challenges that the Cabinet have to be asking questions, because we don’t have this information. I’m personally realistic in terms of, I know Hezbollah is less likely to share this information with the Cabinet. Those are serious concerns that the Americans and the Lebanese have to be thinking about them, because I don’t know if the Israelis are willing. Are we willing to accept this information from the Israelis, as the Lebanese government, through the Americans? You know what I mean? I don’t know.
Faysal: I think some of that will inevitably happen, some of the intelligence-sharing, but I take your point, and I agree with you. I’m just going to say a couple of things to wrap up. First of all, it’s hard to exaggerate how significant all this is for Lebanon in such a short period of time. I think people maybe on the US side don’t quite grasp that from a Lebanon-centric perspective. It’s really, really huge. I will say I agree with you about the timeline, and I’m not contradicting anything you’re saying, probably, the thinking behind this has been to move quickly while there’s still an opportunity to do it, or at least start the process quickly.
I think sometimes if you’re in a leadership position and you want to see an end outcome, you set an unrealistic deadline. That’s just because you want to get everything moving and you want people to move towards that deadline, rather than this realistic expectation that the mission will be complete, which I think the possibility of that is zero. A lot could happen between now and the end of the year, even a last plan would be a huge, big deal if the LAF came up with some kind of blueprint for doing this and handing it to the Cabinet.
That’s an enormous deal because this represents how far things have gone from six months ago– Actually, wait a minute, one month ago, if you were Hezbollah and you were holding a weapon in your hand, you are on the side of the law and of Cabinet policy. Now you’re an outlaw and you’re a criminal. This is, I think, the biggest shift, and that’s already happened.
Anyway, thank you so much for your time. I always enjoy talking about Lebanon with you, and you enrich the Lebanese Logic podcast enormously. I’m looking forward to seeing more of your work on the country. Everybody, Dania Arayssi, and I’m Faysal Itani. Thank you for listening.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.
