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Charles Walsh
Charles Walsh
Charles Walsh is the Program Head and Analyst of the Transnational Repression Portfolio and the Central Asia Center. He received a Bachelor's Degree in International Affairs with a Minor in German Language from the University of Mary Washington, as well as having studied at ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan. Before…

Reports Illuminate Deficiencies in the U.S. and U.K. Responses to TNR

The U.S. and U.K. governments of late have taken an explicit interest in the topic of transnational repression (TNR), a state’s deliberate targeting of its own nationals living in foreign countries in order to prevent diasporas, exiles, and activists from criticizing their country of origin. That interest, however, has yet to translate into concrete, meaningful policy action.  

The lack of a cohesive strategy and tools to counter these hostile actions have undermined the British and American efforts to combat TNR. To fill these gaps, their governments should implement recommendations advanced in recently published reports, including two by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, that would strengthen government responses to attacks on their sovereignty and provide resources for vulnerable communities.  

U.K. Weaknesses 

On July 30, the British government published a report by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights on the topic of transnational repression (TNR) in the United Kingdom. The nearly yearlong inquiry, drawing on expert and written testimony, details how foreign governments use a variety of tools to target dissidents and diaspora communities living in the U.K. The report joins a growing body of work from human rights groups, nongovernmental organizations, and governments themselves.  

The committee’s report highlights several key weaknesses in the U.K.’s ability to respond to TNR — including the lack of a clear national strategy or even a formal definition of transnational repression.  The absence of a clear definition specifically hinders the government’s ability to conduct the most important element of countering TNR: collecting reliable and timely data on scale, methods, actors, and targets  

To date, the Home Office collects most of its data on TNR from law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations, i.e., secondhand. The absence of strong reporting methods in the Home Office itself is problematic because without such information, the government lacks understanding of both how serious the issue is and how it should direct any countermeasures. Additionally, the reliance on NGOs, with their limitations in budget and capacity, means whatever data the government collects is almost inherently incomplete. Furthermore, the British government’s currently broad description of TNR, which is used instead of a formalized definition, may result in authorities deeming some clear-cut cases of TNR as not serious enough to warrant a criminal investigation or even to warrant reporting as cases of TNR.  

The report also found that the U.K. does not conduct outreach to communities vulnerable to TNR. This leaves those communities and individuals unaware of either the threats they may face or the resources available to them when they have been targeted. Failure to conduct outreach may also engender distrust in local and national law enforcement, leading to further underreporting as victims feel both unable to go to authorities and worried they may not be taken seriously if they do. Many respondents to the committee’s inquiry discussed what they saw as inconsistent action by U.K. law enforcement, with high-profile victims receiving adequate attention and support, with others being given inadequate and alarming advice, such as to self-censor or avoid political activity. This inconsistency in law enforcement advice among police stations led one respondent to the committee to note, it amounts to a “total postcode lottery” as to what treatment a victim may receive. 

U.S. Weaknesses 

The issues highlighted by the Joint Committee’s report are not exclusive to the U.K. Many democratic countries, including the U.S., have failed to take concrete actions to counter transnational repression. A  report published in July by New Lines on the U.S. government’s response to transnational repression found many of the same deficiencies in strategy, reporting, and law enforcement outreach. In some cases, the U.S. is doing better than the U.K. For instance, the State Department has been collecting data on the number of TNR instances that occur year over year as a part of its annual “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” Still, that data is limited, as the reports only include cases reported in the media, by NGOs, or in otherwise publicly available reporting.   

An issue specific to the U.S. highlighted in the New Lines report, co-authored by Ted Bromund, Sandra Grossman, and Bradley Jardine, highlights a disconnect between the legislative and executive branches when it comes to formulating strategy to counter TNR. The issue is two-fold. On the one hand, Congress has not been able to pass legislation tackling the issue. On the other, the executive branch has been hesitant to encourage congressional efforts to pass legislation while also refusing to abide by the legal requirements set out in relevant legislation that has been passed.  

While this dynamic between Congress and the executive branch will take a more sustained effort to solve, many of the issues pointed out by recent reporting are in the process of being addressed. “The Transnational Repression Policy Act,” recently re-introduced in both chambers of Congress, proposes pathways for improving the U.S. government’s ability to collect data, conduct outreach to vulnerable communities, and work with like-minded allies across the world to coordinate effective responses to TNR. The bill would also address the need for a codified legal definition for TNR by providing one broad and robust enough to ensure proper protection for victims. 

The Path Forward 

The costs of perpetrating transnational repression, particularly in its most everyday forms, are low, and so far, perpetrators have faced few consequences.  Host-country governments must begin taking concrete action to respond to the threat, protect targets living within their borders, and make TNR costly for those who practice it. Both the New Lines and Joint Committee reports both offer actionable guidance on how the respective governments in the U.S. and U.K. can improve their response to TNR. Congress is already moving legislatively to fill the gaps with bills such as the Transnational Repression Policy Act. By passing this legislation, the U.S. will have not only strengthened its own protections from TNR but also provided another effective blueprint demonstrating what other countries, such as the U.K., can do to protect against transnational repression.


The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not an official policy or position of New Lines Institute.