

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

# A Thousand Hezbollah's: Iraq's Emerging Militia State



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“In sum, Iraq’s PMF problem – the tensions over monopolizing violence and rule of law – has become largely an extension of the Iran problem.”



Popular Mobilization Forces fighters on infantry-fighting vehicles during an advance toward villages between the northern Iraqi cities of Hawija and Kirkuk on Oct. 6, 2017, after the Iraqi forces retook Hawija from Islamic State fighters a day before. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/ Getty Images)

COVER PHOTOS (Clockwise from top left):

- Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (left) and Qassem Soleimani are shown at Soleimani’s father’s funeral in December 2017. (HOSSEIN VELAYATI/ Creative Commons)
- Shiite pilgrims stop at a tent adorned with portraits of al-Muhandis (right) and Soleimani (center) in the Al-Dora area of Baghdad in October 2020. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/ Getty Images)
- Fighters from a Shiite militia within the Popular Mobilization Forces at the front line in the Iraqi village of Zargo, southwest of Mosul. (SEBASTIAN BACKHAUS/ Getty Images)
- An Iraqi flag flutters above an armored vehicle as troops, supported by the Popular Mobilization Forces, advance south of Mosul, after a February 2017 offensive to retake the area from Islamic State fighters. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/ Getty Images)



# Intelligence Briefing: A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq's Emerging Militia State

## Executive Summary

This intelligence briefing provides extensive, never before reported details on how Iran-linked Iraqi militias are creating a new order to dominate a strategic region of the country that connects Iraq and Syria. Iranian-linked militia groups are taking advantage of the vacuum caused by the collapse of ISIS's caliphate to begin building security, social, political, and economic structures to dominate this strategic area of Iraq.

### Among the findings in this briefing are:

- The militias' infiltration into police and security forces has allowed militias to control Iraqi citizens' movements, trade, occupation, and other aspects of private life. Some factions threaten journalists, block roads to important commercial areas to hamper business, and even take scores of residents from villages to unknown locations.
- Militias have used threats and acts of violence to get their preferred academics put in charge of some of the more important colleges in provinces where the militias are flourishing. They have also established schools that do not follow local or federal norms and rules.
- Following the liberation of Mosul and the rest of Ninewa province from ISIS, the militias began manipulating land ownership to engage in demographic engineering. Agricultural lands in the Ninewa Plain area were distributed among

the militias. These villages on the outskirts of Mosul were predominantly Christian. ISIS seized them in 2014. After security forces retook the villages, militias seized the lands in Bartella, Hamdaniya, and other areas, preventing many Christians from returning. Militia fighters from central and southern Iraq have registered as residents of Ninewa Plain and Mosul in order to legitimize the seizure of property there.

- The Shiite religious endowments incorporated 17 religious sites and shrines in the old city in Mosul. When such moves were contested, Shiite militias sent a show of force to local authorities to establish ownership of Sunni sites and endowments.
- The militias took control of more than 72 oil fields in the Qayyarah area south of Mosul that ISIS had previously controlled, and the factions pilfer around 100 tanker trucks of crude oil daily.
- The militias make hundreds of thousands of dollars every day through extortion at illegal checkpoints they have set up across the country.
- The militias demand protection money of \$1,000 to \$3,000 monthly on larger restaurants. Owners who fail to pay could have their restaurants blown up, and other parties, including the Iraqi army, would falsely attribute the explosion to ISIS.




- Local and provincial politicians cooperate with some of the militias out of their own interests, courting the PMF for political and financial support.
- Frictions have escalated among the militias: between the militias loyal to Iran and those loyal to the Iraqi shrines, and between the Shiite militias and the Sunni and tribal militias, who receive fewer positions of authority and less-effective weaponry and equipment than their Shiite counterparts.

The conclusion of the counter-ISIS campaign, far from stabilizing Iraq, is creating the context for future conflict and disorder that will have regional consequences and create complications for the United States. A key unintended consequence of the U.S. move to effect regime change in Iraq is that the country fell into Iran's geopolitical orbit. Tehran was able to place its political proxies – largely among elements of Iraq's Shiite majority community – in the new political system built by the United States. However, the nascent state was going to be weak and thus insufficient for the Islamic Republic's efforts to dominate its western neighbor. For this reason, Iran moved to cultivate Shiite militias as a key instrument through which it could transform a state that represented a threat into a one that is weak and subordinate to its wishes.

It was not until well after the 2011 U.S. military departure from the country, and

really after ISIS was able to establish its caliphate in 2014, that the Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shiite militias became visible as a major force. Through the critical role it played in the dismantling of the ISIS caliphate in Iraq, the Shiite militia coalition known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) established itself as a major force. By 2017, and as a consequence of its heavy involvement in the liberation of areas that had been taken over by ISIS, the Shiite militia alliance emerged as a power center rivaling Baghdad and a threat to human security in the country. Not only did these militias in an unprecedented manner seize control over largely Sunni areas of the country, but they also posed a major challenge to the writ of the Iraqi state.





In this briefing, we offer granular details of the extent to which Shiite militias have embedded themselves into the political economy of areas that they took from ISIS. While attempts to bring these militias within the fold of the Iraqi state have been unsuccessful, this report shows how these nonstate actors have become a parallel state by creating their own political economy, which is riddled with corruption. Additionally, these Shiite militias have coerced their way into Iraq's national security apparatus and have been recipients of official state funds since the prime minister at the time, Haydar al-Abadi, moved in 2018 to try to incorporate them into the state security system. The writ of the federal government in Baghdad is being weakened in the process. The January 2020 U.S. decision to assassinate a top leader of the PMF, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, along with the top Iranian

commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani – the architect of the Iran's Iraqi Shiite proxy network – did strike a major blow to these militias but also emboldened them, and as a result they remain deeply rooted in the country.

These militias represent a major challenge for U.S. efforts to work with the Iraqi government and counter Iran's influence in the country. More recently, these militias have also begun to threaten Turkish forces trying to project influence into northern Iraq. This report highlights how these Shiite Islamist armed nonstate actors are controlling key sectors beyond security, such as real estate, construction, infrastructure, and education. In this way, they are consolidating their grip in northwestern Iraq and are enabling Iran's broader regional strategy extending through the Levant to the Mediterranean.

## Introduction

This intelligence briefing reveals, to an unprecedented degree, the sheer breadth and depth of the penetration of Iraq by the Shiite-dominated militia confederation known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Independent investigation and communication with well-placed Iraqi sources reveal an Iraq in which widespread public and private institutions are thoroughly infiltrated, dominated, co-opted, or otherwise compromised by PMF elements. Significantly, the PMF factions most implicated with the undermining of the Iraqi state are the ones closest to the Islamic Republic of Iran and/or its allied Iraqi political principals, such as the Fatah alliance and the Sanad parliamentary bloc.

The PMF's influence and control over the Iraqi state is the most obvious aspect of the broader reality that the post-Baathist regime is

dominated by Shiite actors with close ties to Tehran. The PMF enjoys this deep penetration of the Iraqi state and society because the post-2003 republic that the United States helped establish has been heavily shaped by Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite factions. This militia encroachment on, and exploitation of, various spheres of life in Iraq is not limited to institutions but extends to the daily lives of vast numbers of Iraqis and their quotidian matters. In the aggregate, this creates new elites complicit and invested in a circle of militarized corruption.

This intelligence briefing highlights the growing dilemma facing nationally minded Iraqis in and out of government, as it has become increasingly difficult to conceive of a way to rein in much of the PMF or to weaken it without a destructive confrontation that would



Iraqi Shiite fighters from the Popular Mobilization Forces militias advance south of Tal Afar on Nov. 29, 2016. (AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images)

undermine the fragile Iraqi state. At the same time, various Iraqi leaders have attempted to do this to differing degrees rather than let the entrenchment deepen, raising the prospect of escalation between different stakeholders within the state as both sides' options narrow.

Research for this report was cut short, resulting in what appears to be an incomplete study (it should be noted that the graphics in this report cover details not mentioned in the text).

This report has extensive details on Ninewa province. There is a reason for this disproportionate focus: Ninewa is the province where these militias are most active well beyond their Shiite core turf in central and southern Iraq, because of the fight to liberate Mosul and other areas from the Islamic State. They filled the vacuum left by ISIS, which has allowed them to pervade the daily lives of the locals, including extortion of restaurants and demographic re-engineering (taking over Christian parts of the region, much as ISIS did). This is also where the militiamen from the Shiite south were given official domicile and were able to own land, appropriate businesses, and prevent displaced families from returning in order to make way

for Shiite settlements in historically Sunni-majority territories.

The report's focus on Ninewa presents a detailed case study of arguably the most critical area systematically targeted by these militias. It highlights how the Shiite militias exploited the war against the ISIS caliphate to dominate a very diverse region that has been the home of minority Sunni, Kurdish, Christian, and Yazidi communities. The details show the Shiite groups' strategic moves to dominate a region that connects Iraq to Syria and is part of Iran's effort to consolidate its sphere of influence from Mesopotamia through the Levant to the Mediterranean. The Iraqi Shiite takeover of Ninewa also helps the Iranians and their Iraqi allies to prevent the emergence of a cross-border Sunni majority region (formerly under ISIS control).

This report is based on extensive field research involving lengthy and detailed conversations and interviews with intelligence officers, local government officials, local residents, business owners, truck drivers, militias, and government officials in Baghdad.

– *Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy*



## Background

Iraq's PMF, known formally as the PMF Commission (also known as Popular Mobilization Units or the Hashd al-Shaabi), has strong ties to Shiite religious authorities. The PMF originally consisted of 67 Shiite factions, 43 Sunni factions, and nine factions belonging to the minorities in the areas south of the Kurdistan region. The 67 Shiite factions were divided in terms of ties to different clerics. Forty-four factions (known as the Hashd al-Wala'i, or "loyal factions") followed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and were directly linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Seventeen factions were linked to Iraq's shrines and followed the powerful Iraqi Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and the remaining Shiite factions followed other Shiite religious authorities inside and outside of Iraq.

The total manpower for the PMF is approximately 164,000 affiliated personnel and members in combat and logistics. Rough estimates put the manpower of the PMF's Shiite component at around 110,000 members, the Sunni component around 45,000, and the minorities around 10,000. Of the Shiite factions, the IRGC loyalists consist of approximately 70,000 personnel, and the militias who follow other religious authorities, including the Peace Brigades (Saraya al-Salam) affiliated with maverick Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, have approximately 40,000 members.

The PMF Commission gained legitimacy with Iraq's Law 40, passed in 2016, and adopted an organizational framework established by executive orders 237, 328, and 331, issued in 2019. The framework of the Popular Mobilization Forces Commission, in accordance with the executive orders issued in 2019, organized the PMF militias into 64 brigades distributed over eight operational commands. The brigades are not allowed to use their own banners or faction names; they are only allowed to use brigade numbers and official PMF banners. Executive Order 237 was meant to lay the groundwork to break the connection of the PMF militias with the political and religious parties and entities, while Executive Order 328 subordinated the PMF to the joint command for the Iraqi armed forces. Executive Order 331 established an organizational and administrative framework composed of:

**1. Four top leadership positions for the Shiite political house close to the leadership of the PMF factions loyal to Iran, known as wala'i factions:** head of the commission, office of head of the commission, secretary-general, and chief of staff for the IRGC loyalists (the groupings of Shiite militias loyal to the IRGC). Currently Abu Fadak Abd al-Aziz al-Mohammadawi is considered the supreme executive and practical leader, connected to five assistant offices to the chief of staff and eight operations commands of the PMF Commission forces.

Al-Mohammadawi was put on a U.S. Treasury sanctions list in January 2021.

**2. Mid-level positions:** five assistant to the chief of staff positions, three assistant offices under IRGC loyalist leadership, and two other assistant offices consisting of retired leaderships or mandated military and security leaderships who are chosen by political parties close to the IRGC loyalist leaders.

**3. Mid-level administration and logistical command positions:** around 10 directorates, seven of which are for the administration belonging to the militias loyal to Iran and three administrations for civilians who were elected with the recommendation of political parties close to the IRGC-aligned militia leaders.

**4. Field administration positions:** approximately 50 directorates, with a portion connected to offices of assistants to the chief of staff of the PMF Commission. Thirty-two are affiliated with the IRGC loyalist factions, and 18 are elected or delegated by political parties close to the leaders of the IRGC loyalists. This quick survey indicates that the organizational leadership and administrative framework for the PMF Commission is administered at a proportion of 80% through leadership and administrations affiliated with the Iranian religious authorities, while the groups affiliated with al-Sistani and the Sunni and minority PMF groups do not hold high or mid-level leadership positions.

## Frictions Within the PMF Commission

There are tensions between the two different clerical trends inside the PMF: the factions loyal to Iran's Khamenei, previously led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and the movement that follows the supreme Shiite cleric in Najaf, al-Sistani. In particular, the al-Abbas Combat Division, which is affiliated with the al-Abbas Shrine religious establishment in Karbala, which follows al-Sistani, has been at odds with the Iran-linked militia leadership.

These groups, though connected centrally with the government, differ in terms of financing, modus operandi, and ideologies. The IRGC-aligned factions calling themselves the "Islamic Resistance" incorporate groups that were established before al-Sistani's fatwa in 2014 that established the PMF to combat ISIS in Iraq. The "Resistance" factions – like the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hezbollah of Iraq – consider themselves more entitled than the others to financing and honors, since they fought the U.S. presence after 2003 and represent a core of Iran's military influence inside Iraq.

The tensions between the factions that follow al-Sistani and those loyal to Khamenei began after Iraq's prime minister, Haydar al-Abadi, agreed in July



“... the IRGC-aligned factions calling themselves the ‘Islamic Resistance’ incorporate factions that were established before al-Sistani’s fatwa in 2014 that established the PMF.”

2017 to formally connect an entire regiment of the al-Abbas Division to the Defense Ministry. Observers and military personnel described the move as “a positive transformation of the PMF, and including it into the ranks of the regular forces.” But the IRGC loyalist militia leaders in the PMF Commission were alarmed by this changing relationship between the government and a faction loyal to al-Sistani.

In January 2018, al-Muhandis decided to break the al-Abbas Division's link to the al-Abbas shrine and incorporate it fully into the PMF forces command in the Middle Euphrates, under the authority of the al-Muhandis appointee retired Brig. Gen. Ali al-Hamdani. This angered the commander of the al-Abbas Division, Maytham al-Zaidi, who launched a campaign of statements against al-Muhandis, criticizing his loyalty to Tehran

and the religious authorities there as represented by Khamenei.

In response to al-Muhandis' dealings with the al-Abbas Division, the trustee of the religious authorities in Najaf, Sayyid Ahmad al-Safi, said in a speech from Karbala: “The affiliation to the al-Abbas Combat Division must have a price, and part of that price is to be patient and not compromise on our principles and our identity and values, despite the presence of open choices.” This speech confirmed the depth of the disagreement between the two sides.

In a previous press conference, one of the commanders of the Imam Ali Battalions affiliated with al-Sistani, Sabah al-Azirjawi, revealed disagreements between the factions affiliated with Najaf and the holy shrines and their counterparts in the PMF. He said the disagreements involved logistics, thought, and ideology. Al-Azirjawi noted that “... there are Iraqi fighters with the regime in Syria, and a great many of them have returned recently. As for others, and they are some thousands, they are present and I do not know from where they obtain their money, frankly.” This was in reference to al-Nujaba', Kata'ib Hezbollah, Badr, and al-Khorasani forces, which have been fighting for years in the areas of Syria with Iranian financing and support from the Syrian regime, and the exploitation of the wealth of the



PMF in Iraq for the interest of those factions.

The friction between the two sides grew in February 2018 to the degree that al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the PMF Commission at the time, issued a series of decisions to put a financial and administrative stranglehold on the Iraq-oriented armed factions connected with the shrines and al-Sistani. By March 2018, the tensions between the two groups were at the point where a senior source told the newspaper Al-Aalem al-Jadid that:

*... a meeting was held at the start of last week that included leaders of the PMF to discuss the law presented by the prime minister Haydar al-Abadi and connected with the reorganizing of the framework of the PMF. And during the meeting Abu Mahdi asked the commander of the al-Abbas Combat Division Maytham al-Zaidi – and he is one of the members of the committee entrusted with reorganizing the PMF according to the new government law – to break the connection of his division and the rest of the holy shrine factions affiliated with the religious marja’iya [authorities] from those shrines, following the example of the factions that broke their link with their political parties and movements like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr organization [sic] and others, but this suggestion aroused the anger of al-Zaidi, as he absolutely*

*rejected it on the grounds that the holy shrines are not political parties or movements striving for authority and participating in the elections, but rather they are institutions affiliated with the state, describing Muhandis’ condition that it is an attempt to continue in the marginalizing and sidelining the factions loyal to the supreme marja’iya in Najaf for reasons of their wholesale disagreement with the views of al-Muhandis, which he saw as in conflict with Baghdad and Najaf.*

### Reasons for the Disagreement

The division of power and resources between the militias linked to the IRGC and the other PMF factions has given the brigades loyal to Iran’s Khamenei an advantage. The imbalance has created financial and logistical problems for the militia leaders associated with Iraq’s shrines and religious authorities, who feel thwarted and marginalized by the PMF leadership.

Additionally, the PMF Commission leaders have made decisions without transparency, depriving the leaders of the pro-Sistani factions the chance to participate in decision making, share their opinions, and propose solutions to problems the PMF encounters. The PMF Commission decisions are often not revealed until the office of the deputy head of the commission, or the commission’s chief of staff, releases reports about the

decisions that have been taken. The rest of the brigade leaders are thus unaware of the issues under discussion.

The lack of equal participation in PMF Commission decision making – especially about the commission’s framework and the election of al-Mohammadawi as al-Muhandis’ successor – undermines the ability of the nationalist brigades to influence the pro-IRGC leadership’s decisions. This marginalization of the pro-Sistani leaders has led to their militias’ separation from the PMF Commission. In April 2020, the factions loyal to al-Sistani administratively and operationally came under the direct command of the office of the general commander of the Iraqi armed forces.

Other PMF groups not aligned with the IRGC have approached the al-Sistani loyalists about joining them, perhaps in an entirely new organization that would have the same legal and financial cover as the PMF Commission, because they – particularly the pro-al-Sadr Peace Brigades and the Sunni factions – see no future for themselves within the PMF. It is not possible for the small and medium-sized PMF factions to make their voices heard – a violation of the principle of balance within the PMF Commission. The leaders of brigades linked to Iraq’s shrines and al-Sistani have demanded that the PMF Commission correct this imbalance for the factions

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**“ These militias [IRGC-linked brigades] are extensions of political parties, enjoy representation in the Iraqi state...”**

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not deeply tied to Iran by giving their leaders a central role. Iraqi Shiite religious personalities such as al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Safi and Sheikh Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbala’i have demanded a fundamental correction in the organizational framework for the PMF Commission that would improve representation.

The leadership of the pro-Sistani brigades and the Peace Brigades loyal to al-Sadr have criticized the number of economic offices supporting the factions loyal to Khamenei and have repeatedly asked for financial accountability. The pro-IRGC militia leaders justify the lack of oversight for those economic offices on the grounds that they are political, and thus not subject to the oversight of the PMF Commission. The two main issues are the setting of salaries for PMF Commission forces and that militias loyal to Iran and not affiliated with the commission brigades are using commission resources. Moreover, the IRGC-linked brigades are hybrids in that they have dual loyalties. These

militias are extensions of political parties, enjoy representation in the Iraqi state, and have seats on the PMF Commission, all while being connected to Iran’s transnational, pan-Shiite project.

In light of these issues, the necessity of modifying Executive Order 331 is obvious. The armed forces general commander should be able to impose his authority and exercise oversight of the actions of the PMF Commission’s supreme leadership.

### Obstacles to Reform

The lack of internal agreements on a new framework for the PMF Commission constitutes a real challenge to the modification of Executive Order 331. Suggestions from pro-Sistani factions and al-Sadr’s Peace Brigades to divide the positions and finances in the commission more fairly and encourage more comprehensive joint participation were met with rejection. The most prominent obstacles will be:

- 1.** The problematic independence of the PMF militias that have internal and external political and military connections. This could lead to inertia for the PMF Commission because of the increased likelihood of conflicts of interest with the increased proportion of positions for the pro-IRGC militia leaders and actions they could take to preserve their interests and those of their allies.

- 2.** Subordinating the factions to state control, in addition to the problems of military rank, age, educational attainment, and logistical and combat military classification. This could transform the PMF Commission into a theater for long and arduous bureaucratic discussions that undercut the need for quick decisions on critical issues.

- 3.** The leaders of the militias linked to al-Sistani and Iraq’s shrines and the al-Abbas Division’s al-Zaidi have no choice but to deal with the leaders of the IRGC-aligned brigades and al-Mohammadawi, and vice versa. The pro-Sistani factions currently depend on the Iran-linked groups and their resources for leadership, operations, security, political relationships, special forces, and military manufacturing. However, the Iran-linked groups also need the pro-Sistani militia groups for religious justification of the existence of the PMF Commission. The commission’s establishment is linked with the fatwa of June 13, 2014, issued by the religious authorities in al-Najaf, known as the fatwa of “collective defense.” Media linked to the IRGC loyalist militias have revealed over the past six years that the leaders of the Iran-linked militias use the Iraqi fatwa to give their combat policies religious legitimacy.

### Suggestions for Change

It is clear that the current framework of the PMF





Commission is not in agreement with the political system. More people oppose the commission's framework today than when it was established. The commission is experiencing many problems, and Western and Arab states are encouraging Iraq to dissolve or downsize the PMF, reduce the factions' manpower, merge the groups with Iraq's regular forces, or consider the factions as reserve forces to be summoned as needed and with fair retirement salaries. The current PMF framework does not align with Iraq's ongoing dramatic political and economic changes and multiple crises, such as terrorism, international conflicts, and increasing poverty. All of these factors further add to the need to reorganize the commission framework.

In the end, there must be clearly defined criteria for the positions of the PMF Commission; use of military law against renegades; active roles for security; and legalism. The commission needs to close the economic offices and forbid political and party activity so that the PMF can play its role inside the body of the Iraqi state and in harmony with the laws and constitution of Iraq.

It is also necessary to subject the commission's actions to financial and administrative oversight. The commission should also receive governmental and parliamentary oversight to prevent illegitimate decisions that contravene Iraqi law.

**“ The commission should also receive governmental and parliamentary oversight to prevent illegitimate decisions that contravene Iraqi law.”**

### The International Coalition and the IRGC-Linked Factions

Since March 2015, official sources from the IRGC-aligned factions like Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Nujaba', Sayyid al-Shuhada', and Jund al-Imam have been publishing statements, condemnations, and some videos and photos regarding U.S. targeting – directly or indirectly – of their fighters. These groups' main grievance is that the U.S. appears to be intentionally surpassing the confines of its mission to counter ISIS in Iraq with a perceived offensive on Iran-aligned PMF militias.

Most of those statements and documents issued via the Iraqi media have been subject to special technical and military investigations. Al-Abadi announced more than once, in his capacity as the general commander for the armed forces,

that these statements lack truth. The former Iraqi premier also said that they do not concern the Iraqi battlespace and described them as excerpts from cinematic films that are not appropriate as evidence. The reports published by research centers and Western papers affirmed that some of the IRGC-affiliated groups have lit the fuse of provocation without specific aims in directing unproven accusations unsupported by credible evidence. Those accusations grew more common after the U.S. announcement in May 2018 of its economic sanctions on Iran.

Meanwhile, the U.S. deployment of forces in Syria, particularly in the eastern areas, threatens lines of communication between Tehran and its allies in Syria – particularly the Iraqi and Lebanese factions – while also facilitating or tolerating Israeli air strikes on Iranian assets. The strikes have targeted personnel as well as Iran-linked militia bases and storage facilities in Iraq. The most intense of these attacks targeted the military camps of Amerli, south Baghdad, Balad, and al-Qa'im between July 2019 and September 2019.

Those Israeli raids pushed the pro-IRGC militia leaders and the Shiite political parties to hold the United States and the international coalition completely responsible, since they have the greatest influence over the Iraqi skies. Washington said it does not know who carried out

the raids but that even if it were Israel, the attacks were justified.

The IRGC-linked factions have dealt with the U.S. military presence in Iraq through the use of “Katyusha cells” – groups using Katyusha rockets – of unknown origins. So just as the United States says it has no knowledge of who targets the IRGC-aligned militias' bases, the Iran-linked militias say they bear no responsibility for or knowledge of who launched the Katyushas.

Between October 2019 and April 2021, the Katyusha cells increased the number of their operations, conducting more than 65 attacks that targeted the U.S. and international coalition military and civilian presence in Iraq. Then three organizations of unknown factional affiliation claimed the bombings of the al-Taji camp and the Basmaya camp. They also claimed drone reconnaissance operations to photograph the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Ain al-Assad base in Anbar, and the Ali al-Salim base in Kuwait. These organizations are Usbat al-Thaireen, Ashab al-Kahf, and Qubdat al-Hoda. Another new armed organization named Saraya Awliyat Al Dam claimed responsibility for a rocket attack in the center of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan on Feb. 15, 2021 – an unprecedented escalation in how these groups operated. They all claim that they are in a war with the United States and international coalition forces in Iraq. Since the attack on Erbil, the

Katyusha cells have called for Turkey to withdraw its forces.

According to statements published on social media accounts belonging to those organizations, including a slogan borne in the name of the “Islamic Resistance” and Qur'anic texts, the organizations explained their positions in different ways but with one meaning: Arms alone are what will lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces and the international coalition. Politics will only result in a larger presence of these foreign forces.

The international coalition, via direct discussions with the Iraqi leadership, coordinated the withdrawal of forces from nine camps and joint Iraqi bases. The coalition is also redeploying and concentrating its forces in three bases, while activating two Patriot missile systems – one in Anbar and another in Erbil – in order to resist the Iranian ballistic missiles. The Iraqi government has deployed the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) air defense system to counter Katyusha rockets and mortars. Government forces are in an area with a 50- to 70-kilometer buffer zone to prevent IRGC-linked militias from approaching coalition facilities. Pro-IRGC militiamen will be subject to deadly force if they attempt to approach these positions, especially in the area surrounding Ain al-Assad airbase in west Anbar.

**“ [These organizations believe] arms alone are what will lead to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces and the international coalition. Politics will only result in a larger presence of these foreign forces.”**

The Katyusha cells, according to analyses of the media from Iranian-linked factions, have announced their victory in compelling the international coalition to withdraw and mocked the ties between the withdrawal and procedures to limit the spread of COVID-19. While Iran has not been able to use Iraqi skies to threaten Israel, the recent drone activity by the IRGC loyalist groups has targeted Saudi Arabia.

During the last two years of the Trump administration, pro-IRGC militias lost their freedom to establish camps and weapons storage facilities. In addition, their manufacturing capabilities were weakened, their activities and movements have become restricted, and their leaders have been placed under economic sanctions and on terrorism lists. The leaders suffered from the





restrictions on their movement, particularly after the Jan. 3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and PMF deputy chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

### U.S. Actions Against High-level Figures

Before the assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the assumption was that the United States would not dare target top PMF leaders. This means they were not that concerned about their personal security.

The United States offered a \$10 million reward for information about Muhammad Kawtharani, the political coordinator between Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi political parties. Kawtharani's mission in Iraq included playing a large role in implementing reconciliation between Sunni and Shiite political forces. Washington may have information that he has carried out hostile acts, and it could be that he participated with armed groups in suppressing the demonstrations of 2019, or that he has recently filled the gap that Iran's Soleimani left in Iraq. He also has strong ties to the Iran-linked militias. It is well-known that he is not very concerned about his personal security when he is in Iraq, and he may be easier to target by drones. The Iraqi government has no intention of handing him over to the United States if he enters Iraqi territory; Baghdad has no bilateral agreement with

Washington to hand over wanted individuals. However, Kawtharani perhaps will consider changing the level of personal security he has and will be more discreet in his visits to Iraq.

Previously, the United States imposed sanctions on Ahmad al-Hamidawi, the secretary general of Kata'ib Hezbollah, who is close to the IRGC. The sanctions aimed to intensify pressure on Tehran, weaken its ability to threaten Western interests in Iraq, and keep it from avoiding the economic sanctions with the help of its Iraqi allies. The United States also imposed sanctions on Adnan Yunis al-Hamidawi, the special ops commander in Kata'ib Hezbollah. However, these sanctions have not harmed the IRGC-linked factions' economic resources. The militias' activities have not been deeply affected by either the sanctions or the foreign airstrikes.

### IRGC Loyalists and the Iraqi Government

The militias loyal to Iran's supreme leader gradually gained influence in the Adil Abd al-Mahdi government. They had unrestricted media access, a joint political wing in the parliament, important governmental positions, and the ability to self-finance, plus access to a network of internal and external investments. Their governmental cover gives them protection from pursuit by the judiciary or the security establishment.

However, there have been political divisions among pro-IRGC factions. After Mustafa al-Kadhimi's selection as a prime ministerial candidate, Kata'ib Hezbollah and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' violated the Shiite political consensus and likewise almost the consensus of the IRGC loyalists in accepting his nomination. (Previously, these groups fell out of sync with the PMF Commission presidency, the al-Sistani loyalist brigades, and the Peace Brigades leadership.) This division among the Iranian-linked militias is between two groups: one that considers fighting to be the solution because there is no more time for politics or diplomacy to expel foreign forces from Iraq, and one that favors using diplomatic and legal means before deciding to wage an armed conflict.

### Confronting the IRGC-Linked Hybrid Factions

The state's ability to monopolize violence is directly related to limiting the spread of weapons and neutralizing the warlike attitude of the factions that have put themselves in the gray area of having a political party ensconced in the legislature and the broader political system along with an ideological armed wing operating parallel to the state.

The state's capacity to impose its writ is mainly a function of its ability to gradually limit the

influence of armed factions through dealings with their political principals and without resorting to violent clashes. The gradual approach involves disbanding the armed factions and their transformation into parties engaged in a national legal dialogue. That said, those armed factions that resist disarmament will have to be dealt with using the state's coercive apparatuses.

The Iraqi political experience since 2007 shows the process for dealing with armed Shiite factions if the state is unable to influence their behavior and the influence of these factions threatens the state's institutions, constitution, economy, law, and sovereignty. The state could resort to seeking help from outside powers – a decision that could be affected by the growing role of the hybrid factions – in order to prevent the militias getting entangled with state organs.

The consequences of adopting purely coercive means and approaches, which are a combination of soft and hard power, disrupted the effectiveness of some of the hybrid factions but didn't eliminate them. Instead, it has shifted them from confrontations with the government to conflicts with the locals and security forces. Moreover, these factions are smaller offshoots of larger groups with the same ideology and methodology

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**“ Their governmental cover gives them protection from pursuit by the judiciary or the security establishment. ”**

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but with more experience and greater effectiveness.

The way the Iraqi state has dealt with armed groups has differed from one government to another and from one faction to another. In dealing with hybrid or mixed groups after 2007, four different prime ministers used four different methods:

### Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006-2014)

Al-Maliki's government did not resort to the use of force as the first option to counter rebellious Shiite groups. Al-Maliki used force only after attempts at reconciliation, disarmament, and integration failed. What motivated al-Maliki's government to employ force was the militias engaging in violence after the government threatened their military and economic power.

The al-Maliki administration launched Operation “Sawlat Al-Forsan” (Charge of the Knights) in coordination with U.S. forces, first

targeting the economic interests of the militias and their leaders while engaging in dialogue with their political branches and the religious offices that supported them. The government also pursued individuals involved in armed operations against Iraqi citizens – actions that classified the militias' most prominent leaders as terrorists under Iraqi law.

Al-Maliki's government also worked to sow divisions within the militias and to arm dissident fighters and citizens groups called “tribal support councils” to support the government in its military operations against the rebellious militias. The government then merged the support councils with the official security apparatus, thus avoiding direct confrontation with the rebellious factions. This is what happened in Basra and Baghdad in 2008.

This approach carries great risks and entails great caution. It also requires authorities to have the will and control to end the confrontation at a given time and to be able to manage splinter groups. Since 2011, such groups have grown large enough to create their own parallel state.

Thus, this method could lead to an intra-Shiite war if loyalists from both the government and militias' side of the conflict were involved. Moreover, the government failed to keep weapons in the hands of its forces and the forces it







backed, leading to a proliferation of arms in several regions that has created a lasting threat to the stability of the state.

### Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi (2014-2018)

Al-Abadi's government promoted the integration of hybrid factions into the political arena by enacting Law No. 40 of 2016 of the Popular Mobilization Authority, which separates armed action and political action. Al-Abadi's methodology stemmed from the deepening of the involvement of the hybrid factions in political life, their preoccupation with government issues and legislation, and their demilitarization outside the PMF.

The logic in using this method was that it would create some kind of moderation in the leaders of the hybrid factions; they would become less radical, more pragmatic, and more able to switch from the doctrine of armed solutions to the doctrine of solutions through dialogue. They would also become willing to spend time building alliances in order to obtain their share of ministries and agencies, even with parties that differ ideologically and systematically from them, including their opponents.

Al-Abadi did not really choose this methodology; pressure stemming from liberation operations imposed this option upon him. The PMF forced this

“... al-Abadi's government allowed hybrid factions to administrate the Sunni and minority cities according to a specific timeline which did not allow them to be part of the coming elections.”

method on al-Abadi because the militias earned their legitimacy from their perceived sacrifices in the battles to liberate parts of Iraq from ISIS and the government's failure to openly reject their growing influence.

During the liberation, when al-Muhandis was the top commander of the militias, the groups' activities changed to focus more on providing essential needs and public services the government had been unable to provide the citizenry, and on preserving security and stability. This made the citizens trust the militias and forced the government to accept that the groups would need to be involved in preserving the security of the liberated areas, especially where other authorities felt powerless.

As part of this approach, al-Abadi's government allowed

hybrid factions to administrate the Sunni and minority cities according to a specific timeline that did not allow them to be part of the coming elections. However, they could still impose their favored candidates.

In March 2018, al-Abadi issued precise instructions that paved the way for the involvement of hybrid militias within the national defense system. These instructions were meant to facilitate his interactions with them based on the law of military discipline, which includes the disclosure of the militias' networks of economic resources. However, al-Abadi's instructions created a rough relationship between the prime minister and the leaders of the hybrid militias, which resulted in al-Abadi's failure to win a second term.

### Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi (2018-2020)

Al-Mahdi's methodology enabled the hybrid factions and their parties to participate in the government's executive and legislative authorities. The logic behind this was that the government typically fails to dismantle or control the militias, so it would be better to bring them in as partners. Al-Mahdi gave the factions every reason to participate and was good to the groups, yet they treated him badly. He left his position early because of the October 2019 protests and the Shiite religious authorities' demands.

Al-Mahdi's government failed to reach a true understanding with the militias, and this methodology was the reason why many PMF groups became hybrid factions. The al-Mahdi government lacked the firmness, control, and respect for partnership with the armed factions for this methodology to work. Partnerships require concessions from both parties to reach a common ground and not the imposition of unrealistic red lines, such as those not met during several incidents between mid-2019 and mid-2020.

### Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi (2020-)

The current government is using a blend of soft power and hard power, targeting the militias' interests, classifying them according to how closely they adhere to the national standard for the PMF, and working to stop them from infiltrating governmental bodies.

Al-Kadhimi's government realizes that it is too early to start a bone-breaking battle with the hybrid factions. The current administration realizes that any attempt to impose the law on the militias could become a complex misadventure and that it may be difficult for the hybrid factions to accept integration into the state or to negotiate. This means the government could target the official positions the militias have acquired illegally and strip them of economic offices that control wealth and public funds,

thus restricting the militias and influencing their violent behavior.

The way al-Kadhimi's government dealt with the Albu Eitha incident south of Baghdad on June 26, 2020 – in which the PMF headquarters was raided – could be considered a rushed application of this methodology. Fourteen militia members accused of attacking the U.S. Embassy were arrested in the raid. Though there was popular and judicial cover – the government had indicting evidence – the government backed off and released all of those arrested. The quick move back to dialogue from prosecution shows that the government had not fully gamed out the plan before pulling the trigger.

This retreat may halt the state's attempts to use force to limit the influence of the hybrid factions. Instead, the state could return to pursuing dialogue and using cautious containment to restrict the militias' expansion and the pan-Shiite resistance aspect of the IRGC-linked factions.

Al-Kadhimi's team has realized that there must be a strong state in order to implement the smart power methodology to limit the size of these factions and their involvement in the government bodies. The failure in Albu Eitha forced the government to accept that the state will need to balance its power with the militias'. Taking another rushed step could put

al-Kadhimi in a situation similar to al-Mahdi's, especially if the rebellious factions felt that the government's actions could threaten their very existence. They have political, military, economic, and media power which enables them to fight back against anyone that threatens their interests, and they are capable of making al-Kadhimi accept a balance of power.

## The Militias' Economic Activities in Baghdad and Ninewa Province

### Security Checkpoints in Baghdad

**1. Al-Sayafiya checkpoint – Albu Sayfi:** Located on the international route connecting Baghdad and the provinces of the mid-Euphrates. The checkpoint was set up in 2015 under the supervision of Baghdad operations. Division 17 of the Iraqi army and a force of Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' Brigade 14 participates with them, as do Kata'ib Hezbollah Brigade 46 and Saraya al-Khorasani Brigade 18. The militias collect between \$5,000 and \$10,000 each day, illegally, from the movement of goods and trucks.

**2. Diyala Bridge checkpoint:** Located south of Baghdad at its entrance from the side of al-Mada'in, set up in 2014, and under the supervision of the Baghdad operations and the federal police command.





Brigade 6 of the Popular Mobilization Forces Kata'ib Jund al-Imam and Brigade 18 Saraya al-Khorasani participate in the administration of the checkpoint unofficially. They were represented by Maytham al-Akili (Editor's note: al-Akili, who had been arrested in May 2020, was sentenced to death by an Iraqi court in September for extorting contractors in the Mada'in area.) This checkpoint is along the old route between Baghdad and the southern provinces. The PMF personnel have collected illegal funds from the Diyala Bridge since 2014, and their daily take exceeds \$100,000, according to an officer in the federal police intelligence. A former Interior Ministry inspector visited the Diyala Bridge checkpoint on the route connecting the provinces of Baghdad and Wasit. The inspector met with the checkpoint commander and a number of the officers, in addition to several truck drivers at the checkpoint, in order to verify claims that truck and car drivers were subjected to extortion. Some car drivers have encountered extortion at the checkpoint, where traffic personnel and the PMF allow them to pass directly in exchange for money.

The inspector demanded that the checkpoint be relocated to a less-congested area and that the sandy road that leads to the checkpoint's truck sensors be paved. He also called for the Interior Ministry to take measures

to address the special treatment that certain vehicles receive at the checkpoint (vehicles linked to certain political parties or influential individuals). Most of these vehicles are used for smuggling. They also become a source of bribery for the soldiers at the checkpoint. The inspector demanded documentation of any instances of exploitation that allow these vehicles to carry unsanctioned goods and to take measures against those who commit these violations. He also asked for a rotation of personnel at checkpoints and the prioritizing of cargo vehicles carrying perishable goods such as food by giving them a special route.

The inspector added that some parties have violated regulations and have let cargo cars pass through the checkpoints without stopping or lining up. Some vehicles loaded with scrap metal would stop a significant distance before certain checkpoints while they awaited a "special permit" that would allow them entrance. Each permit would then allow the passage of many cargo cars without having to stop for inspection.

Since al-Akili's arrest, control of the checkpoint is no longer administrated by PMF's Brigade 6, but it remains unclear if all extortion operations have ended.

### 3. Al-Abayaji checkpoint:

Located between north Baghdad and south Salah al-Din on the international route. Established

in 2016, the checkpoint is under joint supervision between the Salah al-Din and Baghdad security forces. Participating in the supervision are forces from Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Brigade 43, which has economic and security connections with Asa'ib commander Jawad al-Talaibawi. The checkpoint prevents Sunni citizens from crossing toward Baghdad unless they pay \$10 for each person and \$100 for each truck. Citizens have mentioned that the ban applies to women, men, children, and the infirm. Travelers have mentioned rough treatment from the soldiers overseeing the checkpoint, which is considered the gate to enter Baghdad from Salah al-Din province. The checkpoint collects \$30,000 daily for Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq.

### 4. Iskaniya-Awirij checkpoint:

Located south of Baghdad on the Baghdad-Babil road. Established in the 1980s, this checkpoint has been under the administration of Baghdad operations command since 2012. It is supervised by Division 17 of the Iraqi army, and in 2014 a force from Brigade 46 Kata'ib Hezbollah and a force from Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' Brigade 14 began participating in the checkpoint's supervision illegally. This checkpoint gives the brigades around \$100,000 a day, according to an intelligence officer from the Iraqi army.

### 5. Al-Ghalibiya checkpoint:

Located east of Baghdad on the route connecting Baghdad and

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**“The checkpoint prevents Sunni citizens from crossing toward Baghdad unless they pay \$10 for each person and \$100 for each truck.”**

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Diyala, this is considered the main checkpoint for the eastern entrance to Baghdad. Established in the 1980s and reactivated in 2004, this checkpoint is affiliated with the Baghdad security forces. Administration is a joint effort between Division 11 of the Iraqi army and the federal police. In 2014 the PMF began to participate in its administration in an illegal sense: A force from Brigade 42 Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq accumulates a daily sum of \$10,000-\$20,000 from illegal taxes taken for the passage of goods and trucks.

### 6. Al-Tahaddi checkpoint at al-Karmah:

In 2016 the security forces opened the al-Tahaddi checkpoint east of Fallujah four years after the checkpoint's closure, in order to reduce the traffic going through the al-Suqur checkpoint. The Anbar security forces supervise this checkpoint, with participation from Brigade 27 PMF affiliated with the Badr Organization. This checkpoint connects Baghdad and Anbar

through the old Baghdad-Fallujah route. The Badr Organization collects a sum of \$10,000 daily from illegal taxes on trucks and goods, according to a source who works for the local government.

### 7. Khan Bani Sa'ad checkpoint:

Located on the old route between Baghdad and Baqubah, this checkpoint is controlled by Saraya al-Khorasani Brigade 18. Reactivated in 2015, the checkpoint provides \$5,000-\$7,000 daily from illegal taxes imposed on farmers' goods.

### 8. Dira' Dijla checkpoint:

Located on the road connecting northwest Baghdad and Fallujah, this checkpoint was established in 2011 and is under the control of Baghdad security forces and Division 6 of the Iraqi army. The now-defunct Brigade 99 PMF Jaysh al-Mu'ammal, affiliated with Sa'ad Sawar, also participated in supervising the checkpoint, which collected an estimated \$1,000 daily from the movement of people and agricultural products, according to an Iraqi army intelligence officer.

## Activities in Ninewa

**1. Clothes and food:** Former provincial governor Nofal al-Akoub was supplying the PMF under al-Muhandis' command with clothes and military necessities in addition to comestibles designated for cooking. In one of his deals, al-Akoub used more than \$250,000 from the Ninewa

provincial budget to support the PMF under the recommendation of the Marji'yah in Najaf. Al-Akoub gave official statements to the media praising the PMF's heroism and saying the clothes were a part of a duty paid to them in the name of Ninewa province. After Iraqi security forces liberated Sunni-majority provinces from ISIS, PMF-aligned officials and other influential people started using phrases like "Sunnis are grateful" or "Sunnis are indebted" to the Shiite militias, casting a sectarian light on the whole Iraqi security apparatus. Rejecting the idea would be considered controversial or sectarian, as it could be seen as a denial of the Shiite role in military operations. Therefore, no one could question al-Akoub's decisions to reward the PMF with the province's funds.

**2. Agricultural lands:** After the liberation of Mosul and the rest of Ninewa province from ISIS, agricultural lands in the Ninewa Plain area – about 74 acres – were distributed among the militias. These villages on the outskirts of Mosul were predominantly Christian. ISIS seized them in 2014, and after security forces retook the villages PMF factions seized the lands in Bartella, al-Hamdaniya, and other areas, preventing many Christians from returning. This is part of a campaign of demographic change that seeks to move Shiites into these areas. There have also been systematic and legal moves





to consolidate this process of demographic engineering. Additionally, fighters who came from central and southern Iraq have registered as residents of Ninewa Plain and Mosul in order to legitimize the seizure of this property. This occurred as a result of pressure from Hadi al-Amiri (who leads both the Badr Organization militia and the Fatah Alliance parliamentary bloc) and al-Muhandis.

**3. Dealing in land:** The PMF factions in Mosul are working with the help of directors in some of the land registry offices to seize large tracts of land in Ninewa, particularly in Mosul. The PMF factions have seized approximately 200 strips of residential, business, and agricultural land, with some of these fields being close to 40 acres. The PMF, with the help of the current director of the municipal offices of Ninewa, seized a piece of agricultural land in the al-Shalalat region northwest of Mosul, obtaining agreements illegitimately to convert the land to a residential area. The land has been divided up and sold to citizens at prices reaching 40,000,000 Iraqi dinars (\$33,500) for every 200 square meters (about 0.05 acres). Note that the price of the entire piece of land did not exceed 4 billion dinars (\$3.3 million) when it was divided into more than 900 parcels.

**4. Investment in commercial properties:** PMF factions

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**“Brigade 30 ‘Shabak Regiment’ takes \$400 from restaurant owners and \$200 from café owners monthly, collecting around \$120,000 a month.”**

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have seized prized portions of commercial property at the intersection of the al-Bakr, al-Nour, and al-Sina’a regions and the fourth bridge on the east side of Mosul, in addition to the al-Karama industrial area and the al-Khansaa’ hospital. All of these properties have been converted into business buildings through which PMF factions obtain dozens of millions of dinars monthly. Some of these properties were designated for public services, but the greed of the municipal directors has deprived the city of this real estate.

**5. Base renovations:** Al-Akoub renovated the base of the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ faction, located near the Ninewa Awbarwi hotel. He took the renovation budget from a portion of the profits from the investment projects that he implements in western Mosul, including contracting and reconstruction, as he has imposed a “tax” on the contractors and companies. The renovation was meant to win the Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ faction’s approval and help al-Akoub to remain in office.

**6. Fees from restaurants and cafes:** Brigade 30 “Shabak Regiment” takes \$400 from restaurant owners and \$200 from cafe owners monthly, collecting around \$120,000 a month from more than 900 restaurants and cafes in the Ninewa Plain area as protection money. This is an unofficial arrangement but has been conducted with the knowledge of the Ninewa provincial council under the supervision of the former director of the municipal offices of Ninewa, Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Hassan al-Dakheel, who is affiliated with the Peace Brigades and who imposes taxes and fees and distributes them to the Shiite PMF groups in Ninewa province.

**7. Religious sites:** According to official documents issued by the Sunni Waqf (charitable foundation) and the investment property commission of the Sunni Waqf in Ninewa, the Shiite Waqf continues to try to incorporate 17 religious sites in the old city in the heart of Mosul. The shrines have cultural and spiritual significance in the city. The takeover of the shrines by the Shiite Waqf is seen as a violation by the population and could risk increasing sectarian tensions. The shrines

allegedly have the tombs of several descendants of the Imams who are revered in both Shiite and Sunni Islam. Instead of utilizing the shrines to serve concepts of unity and tolerance, they have been politicized to further the militia domination of Mosul. The director of the Shiite Waqf in Ninewa, Basim al-Bayati, has tried to send official letters accompanied by a force affiliated with the PMF with equipment, weapons, and military vehicles. All these activities to establish ownership for the interest of the Shiite Waqf have been in coordination with the former head of the security committee in the Ninewa provincial council, Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati. He is affiliated with the al-Hikma movement led by the prominent Shiite clerical al-Hakim family, which played a key role in the moves to topple the Baathist regime and its replacement with the current political system.

**8. Commercial properties:** The Shiite Waqf is trying to get its hands on properties of the Sunni Waqf in the areas of Nabi Sheet, al-Dawasa, Bab al-Toub, Bab al-Sari, and the al-Sayagh market in old Mosul, after it seized the waqf belonging to the mosque of Nabi Yunis in the city’s east. The Shiite Waqf has tried to seize properties belonging to the mosque of the daughters of al-Hassan in al-Sayagh market, a mosque built by the Shaheedos, a well-known Mosul family. The mosque has been operated by Shaheedos for many generations as per

Sunni Waqf documents. The PMF has acted in cooperation with the former director of the investment commission, Abd al-Kareem Muhammad Hassan, the husband of the Ninewa provincial councilmember Khalida al-Ma’amari from the Sanad Bloc, which is affiliated with former PMF Commission spokesman Ahmad al-Asadi. There have been intensive meetings with the director of the investment commission and commanders from the PMF to transfer ownership of the lands through official means from the Ninewa provincial council.

**9. Oil tanker trucks:** Militias took control of more than 72 oil fields in the Qayyarah area south of Mosul that ISIS had previously controlled. After the liberation of Mosul from ISIS, the smuggling operations have continued under the supervision of factions affiliated with the PMF and with the knowledge of the local authorities. Daily, the factions steal around 100 tanker trucks of crude oil and sell the oil. The local council in Ninewa province does not speak about the oil portfolio at all because there is an agreement between the current governor, Najim al-Jubouri, and the PMF Commission in Ninewa stipulating that the oil portfolio in the districts and subdistricts should belong to the PMF as payment for sacrifices during the liberation of Mosul, in addition to the protection that the PMF forces offer in those areas. These operations continue in

an official capacity but under dubious legal cover.

**10. Real estate:** PMF factions are involved in selling and buying houses and real estate, especially properties in the important and vital economic areas in the province. For instance, the factions are involved in home and land sales in the old city in Mosul, where the real estate trade is growing. The lack of basic goods and services has contributed to the increase of sales, as have the deteriorated living and economic conditions and the fear of explosive devices left by ISIS. The sales are encouraged by the government’s motivation to turn the city over to investment companies for rebuilding. As a result, dozens of residential blocks that were designated for governmental projects like health centers and schools in the neighborhoods of al-Muhandiseen, al-Zirai’i, and al-Wuzara’, along with farms and properties in other areas, have been sold at moderate prices by the municipal office to influential people in Ninewa, including its council members and officials. The investment projects and the lands seized in Ninewa are valued at around \$35 million. These operations are done through official ownership transfers of residential blocks by al-Dakheel, who divided the areas among the Shiite PMF groups affiliated with the commission.





**11. Real estate in major/traditional marketplaces:** Many properties in the area of al-Nabi Yunis, the market of Bab al-Sari, have been transformed into shops and sold and rented out to the inhabitants of the city, although the land belongs to the Sunni Waqf, and its endowment has been operating for more than 30 years. The PMF has obtained all the necessary documents without recourse for the Sunni Waqf.

**12. Taxes and rents from parking garages for cars and transport and truck companies:**

The economic offices controlled by the militias impose fees and taxes on the owners of businesses, restaurants, companies, public transportation, cars, and car park squares, and those who do not pay are extorted. Several businesses have been victims of grenade and IED attacks. Targets have included a restaurant, a trucking company in Mosul, and three other businesses. In each case, the business owner refused to pay the armed factions in charge of the economic offices in the city. This indicates that these offices are a tool for Iran and its proxies that refused to withdraw from Mosul after liberation on the pretext of preventing ISIS's return. The former director of the municipal offices in Ninewa province, Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Hassan al-Dakheel, is the one who transferred taxes of public properties and rents belonging to the province to the Shiite

“The economic offices controlled by the militias impose fees and taxes on the owners of businesses, restaurants, companies, public transportation, cars, and car park squares, and those who do not pay are extorted.”

PMF factions, who then divide the tax money up according to agreements among them. No investigation has been opened because the garages and transportation of goods are connected exclusively to the PMF.

**13. Water and sewage:** The PMF is involved in most projects connected with extending water pipes and sewage, and others within reconstruction projects, investment projects, building of residential complexes, and extension of water lines to the villages and countryside areas. This is done in cooperation with the director of the water office in Ninewa and the director of the sewages of Ninewa. Bids are accepted from companies linked to the PMF (businessmen act as fronts and facilitate the

PMF contracts). Al-Dakheel participates in this process; he is the one who chooses the bids and refers them to the PMF and obtains a financial share, in addition to other shares for the director of the water office and the director of the sewage office in Ninewa. This office is linked to the Fatah Alliance (the largest bloc in parliament representing PMF factions) and the MP of Tal Afar, Mukhtar Mahmoud Yusuf Salman al-Mousawi, who facilitates the works from his position as a parliament member and maintains ties with the PMF.

**14. Larger restaurants:** The PMF imposes taxes of \$1,000 to \$3,000 on the pretext of protection on larger restaurants, and those who do not pay are subject to extortion and attacks, such as the explosion that targeted the well-known Abu Layla restaurant in the middle of Mosul in November 2018. The explosion was not a terrorist attack carried out by ISIS, as announced by the Iraqi army, but came a day after a threat to the restaurant owner who refused to give a \$2,500 monthly fee to one of the economic offices, as he had already paid a similar sum to another office. These extortions occur under the watch of the mayor of Mosul, Zuhair al-Araji.

**15. Contracting and reconstruction projects:** The central government in Baghdad has disbursed nearly \$336 million for the reconstruction of Mosul. The most prominent

disbursements were for projects in the old city, which was controlled by Kata'ib Babiliyun, and other areas in the al-Hadhr area, such as Nimrud, Tal Abta, and Tal Afar, which were controlled by PMF groups affiliated with Harakat al-Nujaba', Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, and Sayyid al-Shuhada'. The contracts connected with bridges and some of the service offices are transferred to the municipal directorate in Ninewa, which refers them to the engineering offices affiliated with the PMF groups, compares the biddings to determine preference, and divides the projects among the armed factions as a donation in a legal sense without exposure to accountability. Some of the projects have failed or slowed, like the al-Suwais and al-Muthanna bridges. At the same time, previous contractors – owners of engineering and building companies – are not awarded the contracts, even though they have expertise and reputations in Ninewa province. The contracts have been valued at more than \$59 million, which the PMF factions have divided among themselves, with some going to influential officials and building companies.

**16. IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) camps:** International NGOs do not grant the PMF forces money, but they pay taxes to the Ninewa provincial council and other taxes on social security and health insurance. The Shiite PMF groups – most

prominently the Peace Brigades, Brigade 30, Lalish, and Izidkhan – divide the money among themselves according to the agreement with the local council under the advisement of the parliamentary committee of migration and displacement. The committee has counted 13 camps in the Ninewa area with a population that reached 700,000 IDPs between 2014 and now. Meanwhile, the armed PMF groups obtain a portion of protection payment from the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration – 15% of the funds allocated by the ministry for the camps. The money coming from European states to support the IDPs is divided among the factions.

**17. Tourist projects:** The owner of the al-Jazeera Umm Rabaen tourist project in Mosul signed an agreement with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq giving the group 20% of the project's profits in exchange for protection, lower taxes, and easier municipal procedures. This was implemented until a ferry transporting families to a tourist area on the Umm Rabaen island in the Tigris sank in March 2019, killing more than 57 people and leaving more than 45 other people, including women and children, missing. It is believed that the ferry owner worked extra hours, including during high tides, and overloaded the ferry in order to pay the 20% fee. A few months ago, however, an agreement was reached to reopen the project after a payment of

blood money to the families of the drowned and the survivors, reckoned at 10,000,000 Iraqi dinars (almost \$8,400), with the continuation of the agreement between Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the owners of the project. The director of investment and the former director of the municipal offices in the province of Ninewa participated in this deal.

**18. Stationery and teaching necessities:** Khalid Taha Sa'id, the general director of the Ninewa education directorate, distributes lucrative financial contracts connected with necessities for government schools – stationery and paper goods, clothes, books, and school maintenance – and distributes about 25% of the expenditure money to PMF factions. He does this to preserve his position and close corruption files against him. The most prominent PMF group taking a portion from the education directorate is the Badr Organization, affiliated with Hadi al-Amiri.

**19. Salaries of martyrs of the PMF:** The Martyrs Foundation specifies salaries for the sons of the PMF as a part of the donations and government support. The foundation is reorganizing its structure. A number of contingents have joined it, like victims of terrorist operations and their wounded, and martyrs of the PMF and their wounded, in addition to the martyrs of the past regime, which necessitates a reconsideration of





the framework of the foundation. The salaries of the PMF martyrs offered to their families can reach 875,000 dinars (about \$733) per family per month.

## The PMF in Ninewa, Basra, and Salah al-Din

### Ninewa: A PMF Haven

Ninewa is emerging as an important crossroads of military escalation and confrontation between Turkish forces and allied peshmerga fighters, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) elements, and Iran-aligned PMF militias. The PMF's expanding influence in Ninewa province indicates a long-term objective of increased presence and control in northern Iraq.

The PMF has influential political representation in the Ninewa provincial council through members loyal to the forces, just as the province currently has the greatest number of Shiite PMF fighters deployed after the liberation operations in 2017. The PMF also has a strong connection with the country's National Security Council (NSC). Below is an explanation of the most prominent PMF representatives in Ninewa, the PMF's most prominent political and security relationships in the province, and the connections between provincial officials and the PMF Commission.

### PMF factions in Ninewa and their relations with Shiite political elites

There are more than 30,000 PMF fighters spread throughout Ninewa and trained in the camps of Makhmour east of Mosul and Aweinat to the west, and at the Qayyarah base to the south. Indeed, the PMF has its own operations command in Ninewa province. One should in general distinguish between the larger PMF formations that are registered as brigades on the PMF Commission and the smaller tribal PMF groups that have regiment numbers. Many of the tribal groups work closely with the Iraqi army divisions stationed in Ninewa. Their training has been supervised by Maj. Gen. Karim al-Shuwaili, who has served as deputy commander of the Ninewa operations command of the Iraqi army and as general overseer of the PMF in Ninewa.

**1. Shabak Regiment-Brigade 30, also called the Ninewa Plain Forces:** A regiment of the Shiite Shabak component, considered one of the most powerful factions of the PMF in the Ninewa Plain, previously headed by Wa'ad al-Qaddo, brother of Hanin al-Qaddo, the deputy for the Shabak component in the Iraqi parliament for Ninewa province. Hanin al-Qaddo was nominated as a candidate under the Fatah Alliance parliamentary bloc. The brigade's origins lie in the Badr Organization.

**2. Babiliyun Battalions (Brigade 50):** A Christian regiment, considered one of the most important factions of the PMF in Ninewa province, headed by Rayan al-Kaldani and supported directly by Da'wa Party Secretary General Nouri al-Maliki. The group originated in Brigade 30.

**3. Imam Ali Battalions:** A regiment headed by Shabal al-Zaidi and Abu Azra'il. Its military advance began in Salah al-Din province, then reached Ninewa province (al-Qayrwan, al-Hadhar and Tal Abta), with support from the former governor Nofal al-Akoub, who lives in al-Hadhar district. Abu Ali al-Karwi, a military official in the group, serves as the deputy commander of the PMF's Ninewa operations command.

**4. Al-Hussein Brigade (Brigade 53):** A group recruited primarily from Shiite Turkmen of the Tal Afar area. It is tied to the Badr Organization, whose Ninewa branch is headed by Abu Zainab al-Ta'i. The original commander of this brigade, Mukhtar al-Mousawi, subsequently became al-Fatah Alliance MP for Tal Afar.

**5. Asayish Izidkhan and Sinjar Resistance Units:** Yazidi groups linked to the YPG (People's Protection Units) in Syria and the PKK. These groups are part of an "autonomous administration" project in Sinjar similar to the project in the areas held by the YPG/Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria. Parts of the Sinjar Resistance Units have been

incorporated into the PMF – first as the al-Nasr al-Mubin regiment and then as Regiment 80.

**6. Lalish Regiment (Brigade 36):** A regiment of Yazidis headed by Al-Khal Ali and Khadida Kojo, considered one of the most extreme PMF groups as it commits violations against both Muslims and Christians in Mount Sinjar and al-Qayrwan. It has created many problems and seized other sects' agricultural lands. The group originated in Brigade 53 of the PMF, affiliated with the Badr Organization.

**7. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' (Brigade 14):** A Shiite regiment headed by Abu Ala al-Wala'i, deputy of the PMF Commission who succeeded al-Muhandis. He has strong connections with the most prominent of the commanders of the Ninewa operations, and he is considered the most powerful personality in coordinating the movements of the PMF in the districts and subdistricts of Ninewa province.

**8. Al-Asa'ib Regiment (Brigades 41, 42, and 43):** A Shiite regiment headed by Abu Baqir al-Jubouri, who is also the director of the office of Asa'ib al-Haq chief Qais al-Khaz'ali. This PMF faction has an economic arm based on the west side of Mosul, which extorts fees from owners of factories and workshops.

**9. Saraya al-Khorasani (Brigade 18):** A Shiite regiment headed by Khudhair Alaiwi al-Sabbar that

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**“ The explosion was not a terrorist attack carried out by ISIS, as announced by the Iraqi army, but came a day after a threat to the restaurant owner who refused to give a \$2,500 monthly fee to one of the economic offices, as he had already paid a similar sum to another office.”**

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has an office for economic affairs on the west side of Mosul, and it controls the Badush area. Al-Sabbar has direct relations with the PMF's intelligence apparatus and the commander of the Ninth Emergency Police Regiment.

**10. Al-Luhaib Regiment (Regiment 44):** A Sunni regiment headed by Marwan al-Zaidan, member of the Ninewa provincial council and brother of the MP Faleh al-Zaidan. This PMF faction uses its fighters to pressure members of their tribe to vote for them in elections.

**11. Suqour al-Jazeera:** A Sunni regiment headed by Nayef al-Shammari, an MP in the Iraqi parliament for Ninewa province with connections to Hadi al-Amiri. Al-Shammari supports al-Amiri in parliament and supplies the militia with equipment and weapons. This faction is present in the Tal Afar subdistrict area, controls the Tal Afar airport, and is considered one of the largest PMF groups. It is in contact with the provincial council through the militia's female candidate, Aseen Hamza.

**12. Al-Nawader Regiment (Regiments 69 and 70):** A Sunni regiment headed by MP Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari. He has a direct effect on the formation of general opinion inside the Ninewa provincial council, and he has close connections with the command of the Iraqi special forces known as SWAT forces.

**13. Lions of the Tigris Force (Regiment 36):** A Sunni regiment headed by Muhammad Ahmad Saleh al-Jubouri, one of the most important sheikhs of the al-Jubour tribes. He has ties with Ahmad al-Jubouri (also known as Abu Mazen), and his forces are present in south and west Mosul.

**14. South Mosul Regiment (Regiment 31):** A Sunni regiment headed by Nazhan al-Sakhr al-Lahibi, who is connected with the MP Faleh al-Zaidan from the al-Lahib tribe.





### 15. Al-Tahaddi Regiment

**(Regiment 34):** A Sunni regiment headed by Watban al-Ramah, one of the most prominent sheikhs of the Shammar tribe in the Rabi'a area. He has close connections with prominent parliamentarian Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari.

### 16. Al-Jubour Tribe Regiment:

A Sunni regiment headed by Muhammad al-Sabah, one of the most important sheikhs of the tribes supporting former Ninewa governor Mansour al-Mar'id. They are present in the al-Ba'aj district. Al-Sabah had an important role in convincing a great portion of the al-Jubour tribe to vote for al-Mar'id.

### 17. Al-Arabi Neighborhood

**Regiment (Regiment 14):** A Sunni regiment headed by Omar al-Alaf. He has ties with the former deputy for the Ninewa provincial council, Hassan al-Alaf. This regiment is present in the al-Arabi neighborhood on the east side of Mosul. This is considered a strategic area between Dahuk in the northern autonomous Kurdistan region and Mosul.

### 18. Lions of Al-Jaghyafa

**Regiment (Regiment 60):** A Sunni regiment led by Nawar Nayef al-Afin, who resisted the strongest of the ISIS attacks in the area of Rabi'a and al-Ba'aj. He cooperates closely with the Iraqi military's Ninewa operations command and therefore has large quantities of weapons.

**19. Rabi'a Regiment:** A Sunni regiment led by Fawaz Dhiyab al-Jarba, one of the most prominent leaders upon whom the Shammar tribe relies in its relations with the government in Baghdad.

### 20. Ninewa Guard (Brigade 57):

A Sunni regiment present in the Badush area, it is considered among the largest factions. Its commander is Maj. Gen. Muhammad Yahya al-Talib.

### 21. Al-Qayyara Martyrs

**(Regiment 32):** A Sunni regiment led by Muhammad al-Mar'id, brother of the previous governor of Ninewa, Mansour al-Mar'id. He has close connections with the NSC.

### 22. Shammar forces regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Abd al-Kareem Madlul al-Jarba. It participated in the most important battles in confronting ISIS in the al-Ba'aj area. It has huge popular support among the Shammar tribe.

### 23. Mosul Shield Regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Dhiyab Makif al-Shammari, one of the sheikhs of the Shammar tribe who can influence members of the Ninewa Provincial Council.

### 24. Regiment 60 al-Tanaya 2:

A Sunni regiment led by Abdullah As'ad al-Basha that is present in the area of Rabi'a and al-Ba'aj. Al-Basha has ties with the federal police.

### 25. Lions of Ninewa Regiment

**(Regiment 64):** A Sunni regiment led by MP Ahmad Madlul al-Jarba of the Arab Project bloc. It has direct relations with prominent Shiite political figure and militia leader Hadi al-Amiri and participates in the distribution of agricultural lands for the PMF.

### 26. Regiment 54 al-Tanaya 1:

A Sunni regiment led by Faysal Watan al-Jarba. He had close ties with al-Muhandis and controls farms for wheat and barley in Rabi'a on the Iraqi-Syrian border.

### 27. Al-Jazeera Shield Regiment

**(Regiment 52):** A Sunni regiment led by Safuk Mani' al-Yawar. This regiment is located in the area of al-Jazeera and al-Khalidiya and is in contact with the Ninewa operations command through a group of army officers, the most prominent of whom is Col. Mazhar al-Gharkan al-Bailawi.

### 28. Al-Jawa'ina Regiment

**(Regiment 37):** Led by Sunni tribal sheikh Hamdi al-Jaw'ani. Its base lies in the al-Sada al-Jawa'ina tribe in south Ninewa province. It works with the Iraqi army's 16th division. It has close connections with the Kurdistan Regional Government through oil projects in Ninewa province.

### 29. Regiment 65 al-Luwaizi:

A Sunni regiment led by Munif al-Ali al-Luwaizi and connected with the MP for Ninewa province Abd al-Rahman al-Luwaizi. This regiment has close

ties with other regiments, in particular Brigade 30.

### 30. Al-Karar Regiment (Regiment

**41):** A Shiite regiment led by Iraq army officer veteran Muhammad al-Waka', who is a native of the south Mosul area and a member of the al-Jubouri tribe. The group operates in the Tal Afar district and al-Ayadhiya subdistrict, comprises Turkmen fighters, and has close connections with the Fatah Bloc led by Hadi al-Amiri.

### 31. Al-Hadhr Regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Hawad al-Ahmadi. It has close connections with the PMF through the former governor, Nofal al-Akoub. It is present in the al-Hadhr area and controls the most important archaeological sites in al-Hadhr.

### 32. Talul al-Baaj Regiment

**(Regiment 51):** A Sunni regiment led by Ahmad Mahaidi Saleh al-Shammari. It has close connections with the former Ninewa operations commander and the current governor, Najim al-Jubouri.

### 33. Hamam al-Alil Regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Naseef al-Ameed Ibrahim al-Marsoumi. It has close connections with the former head of the Iraqi army's Ninewa operations commander and the current governor, al-Jubouri.

### 34. Al-Nimrud Regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Ahmad al-Jawari and closely connected with tribal chief Sheikh Khalid

al-Sabah al-Jubouri, who formed the regiment in the Nimrud area. It has close connections with Rayan al-Kaldani, the leader of Kata'ib Babiliyun.

### 35. Shield of the Hunchback

**Regiment (Regiment 15):** A Sunni regiment led by Ahmad Mahmoud al-Warshan, comprising fighters affiliated with the al-Hadidin tribe in Ninewa province. It has close connections with the head of the joint center for intelligence and security of Ninewa, Maj. Gen. Abd al-Khaliq al-Khayqani.

### 36. Heroes of Sinjar Regiment:

A Sunni regiment led by Aamer al-Sinjari, cooperating with the Yazidi Izidkhan and Lalish regiments and coordinating control of the Sinjar area, setting up checkpoints in Sunni Arab areas of the community. The regiment has ties with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party.

### 37. Regiment 11 al-Hamdani:

A Sunni regiment led by Hisham al-Hamdani. It has close ties with the PMF leader Abd al-Karim al-Shuwaili.

### 38. Knights of al-Jubour

**(Regiment 48):** A Sunni regiment led by Ahmad al-Jubouri, the MP for Ninewa province. This regiment participated in directing a great portion of the al-Jubouri tribe in al-Qayara and al-Ba'aj to vote for al-Jubouri in the 2018 elections.

### 39. Bayariq al-Iraq Regiment

**(Regiment 38):** A Sunni regiment led by Meqdad al-Sheikh Faris Abdullah al-Sab'awi. The regiment is affiliated with the al-Sab'aween tribe present in the area of Bu'waiza and al-Rashidiya.

### 40. Al-Akoub Regiment

**(Regiment 17):** A Sunni regiment led by Mazahem Ghazi, one of the relatives of the former Ninewa governor al-Akoub. It extorted the families and inhabitants to vote for al-Akoub in order to avoid investigation of the investment deals connected with the ruins in the al-Hadhr area.

### 41. Ramah al-Mosul Regiment

**(Regiments 23 and 24):** A Sunni regiment led by Yusuf al-Ramah and Abu Ramah al-Siyab and closely connected with MP for Ninewa Muhammad Iqbal al-Saydali, who formed the regiment. It obtained votes for al-Saydali in 2018.

### 42. Al-Jubouri Commandos

**Regiment (Regiment 39):** A Sunni regiment led by MP for Ninewa province Muhammad Nouri al-Abd Rabbah. He has direct contact with the current governor, al-Jubouri.

### 43. Regiment 63 al-Safuk:

A Sunni regiment led by Fanar Ahmad al-Safuk. The regiment is present in the al-Ayadhiya area in Tal Afar and closely connected with Hadi al-Amiri. The group also has important information about the Sunni component in the Tal Afar district.





**44. Badush Regiment:** A Sunni regiment led by Radwan Nafi' Muhammad and present in Badush in Ninewa province. The regiment is closely connected with Sheikh Emad al-Saylaiwi, who established the PMF and commands Division 15. The group also has direct contact with 71st Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Moayed Muhammad.

**45. Al-Matyutiya Regiment (Regiment 19):**

A Sunni regiment led by Ali Jasim al-Matyuti, closely connected with the directorate of the Ninewa emergency regiment and present in the areas of Tal Abta and al-Ba'aj.

**46. Al-Khafaja Regiment (Regiment 46):**

A Sunni regiment led by Shahadha Jasim Azzawi al-Khafaji, closely connected with the former commander of the PMF in Ninewa, Maj. Gen. Karim al-Shuwaili, who was responsible for overseeing and training Ninewa's tribal PMF factions. It is based in the south Ninewa region.

**Pro-PMF members of the Ninewa Provincial Council**

**1. Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati (Abu Haydar):**

A Shiite Turkmen from the al-Hikma National Movement headed by Ammar al-Hakeem. Al-Bayati is the de facto head of the Shiite lobby in the Ninewa Provincial Council. He is the former head of the security committee, and he controls the Shiite council members and directs their votes.

He is the most important source of intelligence on PMF operations in the province.

He had direct relations with the previous governor, Nofal al-Akoub, who became governor with the support of the NSC. Al-Bayati heads the security committee. He accompanied al-Akoub in all his field tours and attended the security meetings with the Ninewa security forces command, the intelligence apparatus, and the PMF Commission. Therefore he possesses important information and has influence, and he uses extortion against all who oppose the presence of the PMF in Ninewa province. Also, al-Bayati meets weekly with the PMF forces affiliated with the Shiite component, like Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada'. Al-Bayati coordinates all the activities of the current governor, Najim al-Jubouri, and he gives security agreements for NGOs, foundations, and all the news and press agencies.

Al-Bayati has direct ties with the director of the investment committee in the province, Abd al-Kareem Muhamad Hassan, and he does not give security agreements to investors' projects unless there are financial payments, the biggest portion of which goes to the PMF on the pretext of protecting the investments. He is closely connected as well with the former director of the municipal offices of Ninewa province, Abd al-Qadir al-Dakheel, who is considered

the key person connecting all the building projects and contractors with the security committee. He gives the PMF about 15-25% of the profits, depending on the number of projects and the extent of financial grants from the foreign states.

**2. Dawoud Jundi Suleiman Sheikh Kalo:**

Council member for the PUK, close to the PKK forces in the Sinjar area. The PKK has strong ties with the PMF, by virtue of the PUK's connection with Iran, and their continuing disagreements with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region. Kalo also has ties to the Yazidis and Kurdish nationalists in the Sinjar mountain area.

The PMF and the PKK struck an agreement shortly before the battle to regain Mosul on Oct. 17, 2016, that gave the party's fighters weapons and allowed the Kurds' distribution among PMF factions in order to fight ISIS. The PMF leadership coordinates almost continual meetings between leaders in the IRGC and the PKK to discuss the provision of military aid to reinforce the party's fighters in coordination with the PMF, in order to secure the land route connecting the western borders of Iran and Syria through the town of Sinjar. And the PKK adopts the official Iranian and Iraqi positions, as well as those of the PMF leadership, in opposing the independence of the Kurdistan region, the



**“(Al-Bayati) possesses important information and has influence, and he uses extortion against all who oppose the presence of the PMF in Ninewa province.”**

incorporation of the Sinjar district to the region, and the rejection of holding a referendum on the fate of Kurdistan.

**3. Balqis Taha Hussein Shanin, Huda Zaki al-Wazan, Khalida Ismail Mahaimid al-Ma'amari, and Kamila Nashmi al-Matyuti:**

Provincial council members for the Sanad Bloc. Sanad was not on the list of blocs participating in Ninewa's provincial council elections in 2013 and had no political role in Ninewa. But after ISIS seized Ninewa in 2014, the council was dissolved, and after the liberation operations in 2016, the PMF entered Ninewa among various Iraqi forces and remained there, cementing its control over large areas of Ninewa province, including the Ninewa Plain and Tal Afar. The relatively young Sanad Bloc is led by MP Ahmad al-Asadi, who served as a spokesman for the official PMF Commission and is tied to Kata'ib Jund al-Imam (PMF Brigade 6). These four women were convinced to join the Sanad Bloc with offers of more than \$30,000 each, with houses and 2019 Land Cruisers.

**4. Daldar Abdullah Ahmad al-Zibari:**

He has close ties to the PUK and stands against the policy of the KDP because of old tribal disagreements. He has a party called Development and Justice, and he has longstanding relations with the Iraqi government. He participated in intensive meetings in Baghdad with former IRGC-Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani. His paternal uncle is Arshad Zibari, a delegate minister in the time of Saddam Hussein and the official responsible for the National Defense Units al-Fursan at that time (al-Fursan's mission was to recruit Kurdish fighters to pursue and kill some of the sheikhs of the tribes affiliated with al-Barzani's forces). Al-Zibari is considered the chief PUK official coordinating the party's security and political relations with both the PMF and the PKK. The PMF supports al-Zibari with money and influence and pressured officials to appoint him as deputy governor of Ninewa in the prior session.

**5. Hashim Muhammad Ali Taha al-Barifkani:**

He is affiliated

with the KDP. He has served as head of the Energy Committee there and deputy head of the Security Committee in the province. He has direct ties with the governor, Najim al-Jubouri, and the PMF. The oil wells in Ninewa are divided between the PMF and the KDP, and al-Barifkani is the key link between the two sides. Oil business deals are done through him, especially those involving the Safiya oil field, which since 2019 has been under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

**6. Asin Hamza Khalil Amin:**

Council member for the Fatah Alliance and a Shiite Turkmen. She has close political connections with Fatah chief Hadi al-Amiri. Amin is the most prominent candidate for Fatah in Ninewa, as she announced her intention to run in the Iraqi parliament elections for the fourth session in 2020. She entered the Ninewa Provincial Council with support from al-Amiri as a step toward entering the Iraqi parliament. Amin supports the PMF openly in her speeches and was very close to Gen. Najim al-Jubouri when he was in the anti-ISIS Crisis Committee. She was the legal adviser who investigated corruption charges and was on the investigation committee for the ferry incident in Mosul.

**7. Ali Khudair al-Jubouri:**

Council member representing the Iraqiyat Ninewa bloc led



“Al-Dakheel is the official responsible for the fund that receives international grants to rebuild the hospitals, bridges, roads, and schools, and no deal is finalized without his signature.”

### PMF leaders' positions in Ninewa province

**1. Khalid Taha Sa'id:** Former general director of education in Ninewa and Sanad Bloc candidate. His appointment as general director for education in Ninewa came after he used guards from among the PMF to attack the directorate building. The previous director, Khalid Jum'a Shaheen, received death threats, including an envelope containing a bullet and a letter telling him to abandon his position. Shaheen found the letter on the door of his house after the education directorate removed the previous director, Aseel al-Abadi. Shaheen opposed Sa'id's aggressive means and threats, and he refused to hand his position over to Sa'id without an official order from the Education Ministry. The competition for the general director position came after 7,000 job appointments were made for the inhabitants of Ninewa. This competition led the Sanad Bloc, supported by the PMF, to come to Sa'id's aid before the employment appointments could be assigned. In the end, the Education Ministry issued an order to appoint Sa'id as general director of education as a candidate nominated by the Sanad Bloc and recommended by the province's governor, Najim al-Jubouri, who rejected the idea of investigating Sa'id's attack on the directorate on the pretext of avoiding political conflicts. In April 2020, however, Sa'id was arrested and the Ninewa

Education Directorate announced the appointment of Yusuf Faraj al-Sab'awi as his successor.

**2. Zuhair Mohsen al-Araji:** Mayor of the Mosul district, whose real name is Zuhair al-Bakdashi. He hails from the area of Sadat Bu'wayza. Al-Araji was mayor of Mosul district in 2006 and was elected to the Iraqi parliament in 2010, then he became mayor of Mosul district again in 2018. He is a KDP candidate and is considered the most prominent person who used to accompany Nofal al-Akoub in all his investment tours. He connected the PMF with the KDP through a series of intensive meetings. He lives in Erbil and has close connections with the intelligence apparatus of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Asayish security forces.

Al-Araji is considered the most prominent person overseeing the interests of the KDP in Ninewa province. Therefore, he was not subject to questioning or accountability when al-Akoub was removed. Note that he supervised the investment projects that al-Akoub obtained from foreign companies. The most prominent of his agreements was when he obtained \$4 million from the United States to pave the streets of Mosul. The money was disbursed to him by recommendation of some parties working in the Kurdistan region. However, only 10% of the sum was distributed; the rest was stolen without the director of

by Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi. Al-Jubouri is considered to be among the members who benefit most from the PMF's investment deals in Ninewa. The former governor, Nofal al-Akoub, submitted him for trial on accusations of corruption and connections with terrorism by virtue of his benefiting from his brothers, who were ISIS leaders. But the trial was canceled because of his close relations with the PMF and the NSC, and he was thus exonerated of corruption charges. Al-Jubouri is considered among the strongest of al-Akoub's competitors. Both men deal with the PMF, so their relationship has been tense, as they have competed for investment projects for the PMF in the Ninewa Plain and the business markets in the old city.



“... Nofal al-Akoub submitted (al-Jubouri) for trial on accusations of corruption and connections with terrorism ... But the trial was canceled because of his close relations with the PMF and the National Security Apparatus.”

the municipal office conducting any financial or legal tracking. That director, Abd al-Sattar al-Habbo, received threats from the PMF because it had half of the disbursement.

Al-Araji had close connections with the Da'wa party's political wing, particularly with former premier Nouri al-Maliki, and was made a member of the consulting commission in the Mosul liberation operations room in 2016, on the recommendation of the KDP. This strengthened his position after the liberation operations and earned him the protection of the PMF that controls the area of Sadat Bu'wayza, which is inhabited by a Shiite majority from the Araji tribes. In addition to that, al-Araji gave investment deals to the PMF

to establish very large quarries for stone and cement. This assortment of political relations strengthened the relationship between the PMF and al-Araji. Moreover, al-Araji is considered one of the most prominent supporters of al-Jubouri as governor of Mosul, a position that reports to the Americans and KDP in addition to complying with the agreement with the PMF.

**3. Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Hassan al-Dakheel:** Former director of the municipal offices of Ninewa province and coordinator between the PMF and the local council. He also has an influential relationship with current governor Najim al-Jubouri. Al-Dakheel is from the Sa'irun alliance led by Muqtada al-Sadr and supported by the PMF. He is the negotiator who works with the PMF and the contractors who work on the reconstruction portfolio. Al-Dakheel has been responsible for the fund that receives international grants to rebuild the hospitals, bridges, roads, and schools, and no deal is finalized without his signature. He does not appear much in the media, but he is the most powerful personality in terms of business connections and investment contracts, as he directs the portfolio of the economic offices in Ninewa.

One of al-Dakheel's suspected deals is the certification of contract employment for 2,500 daily wage workers in the municipal office, as it guaranteed

bribes that reached \$6,000 for each contract. Afterwards, some of the contracts became official appointments and the bribes reached \$10,000 per contract in exchange for cementing the contract and transferring it to an official appointment.

Al-Dakheel has been responsible for the signing of financial grants to contractors from among the senior personalities in the PMF, especially the reconstruction projects in the old city of the Mosul district and investment projects in the Telkeppe district. He obtained about \$4 million from one of the Danish NGOs to renovate the infrastructure in Mosul connected with the bridges and roads, but only a very small portion of the grant – about 10% – was disbursed, and it was spent on the victory bridge that connects the two sides of Mosul.

**4. Abd al-Kareem Muhammad Hassan:** Former director of the investment commission in Ninewa and husband of provincial council member Khalida al-Ma'amari, who is affiliated with the Sanad Bloc. Hassan was head of the investment commission in 2014, but investment work stopped during the ISIS occupation. When the work resumed in 2018, the council reappointed him – per a deal between the PUK and the PMF – instead of the Islamic Party candidate Muhammad Aboudi, who was the original choice for the position.





Hassan, an engineer, is considered the person closest to Abd al-Qadir al-Dakheel, the former director of the municipal offices of Ninewa, by virtue of the connection between the funds disbursed for the purpose of building and funds designated for investment. The two offices are known to divide financial grants from international NGOs between themselves and also among the financial offices directly connected with the investment commission. Hassan and al-Dakheel's positions were protected by Muhammad Ibrahim al-Bayati, who was then the head of Ninewa provincial council security committee and who coordinated all the operations and activities of the PMF and is the most important intelligence source in Ninewa.

Hassan announced the launch of a project financed by foreign investors, including international NGOs, with the aim of building 1 million housing units. Due to military pressure from the PMF, Shiite contractors received the biggest portion of the contracts for the project. The residential complexes are under construction. Hassan also agreed to license the PMF to build shops in the most important areas in Mosul – the Jazeera area, al-Nabi Yunis, and al-Darkazliya, which are considered vital business centers. The PMF opened the shops without buying land from the local government because it obtained the license and began the work.

**“The previous director, Khalid Jum’a Shaheen, received death threats, including an envelope containing a bullet and a letter telling him to abandon his position.”**

**5. Numan Abd Najm al-Zoba’i:** Former head of the Iraqi army’s Ninewa operations command, in succession to Najim al-Jubouri, who was referred for retirement with the aim of focusing on the position of Ninewa governor. Al-Zoba’i was the commander of the 7th infantry division, and al-Jubouri vouched for him to become commander of the province’s security forces. Al-Zoba’i’s appointment occurred in cooperation with Parliament Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi and Ahmad al-Jubouri in agreement with the PMF, in order to coordinate work between them. Al-Zoba’i had close connections with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and had direct contact with the former head of the security committee in the provincial council, Muhammad Ibrahim al-Bayati.

**6. Waheed Mahmoud Ramo al-Ibrahimi:** Dean of the administration and economics college, appointed in November 2019. He was given this position after the University of Mosul head, Qusay al-Ahmadi, was threatened by Brigade 30, whose leader Wa’ad al-Qaddo is wanted

by the U.S. Treasury Department. Al-Ibrahimi is from the Shabak ethnic group from Ninewa Plain. Al-Qaddo summoned al-Ahmadi to the Ninewa Plain to meet with him regarding employee changes and senior positions at the university. Al-Ahmadi was accompanied by a force to the base of Brigade 30 in Bartella in the Ninewa Plain region. Al-Ahmadi was threatened and extorted, and Brigade 30 demanded that he appoint four deans of various colleges from among personalities loyal to the PMF. Employees were removed from the office of the university’s president and replaced with others close to the PMF. But al-Ahmadi rejected the order on the basis that the selection of deans should be based on strong criteria and the candidates must be assessed.

Before his appointment as dean of the administration and economics college, al-Ibrahimi was dean of the college of sciences and tourism. Brigade 30 demanded that he be appointed as assistant head of the University of Mosul for administrative affairs and dean

of the college of administration and economics. But al-Ahmadi rejected the demand and said al-Ibrahimi appeared to be involved in corruption and had cooperated with ISIS in 2014. (Documents leaked from the Higher Education and Scientific Research Ministry revealed cases of corruption and suspect relations indicting al-Ibrahimi. He was involved in corruption deals involving more than \$1.2 million and had suspected ties to ISIS during the organization’s control of Mosul.) At that point, al-Qaddo threatened to fabricate terrorism and corruption cases against al-Ahmadi if he did not reverse his decision. Al-Ahmadi rejected Brigade 30’s demands regarding al-Ibrahimi at a time when other university heads submitted to similar demands, including al-Hamdaniya, Tal Afar, and Ninewa.

In the end, al-Ahmadi faced more threats and growing pressure, but the decision was finalized by the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research Dr. Qusay al-Suhail, who issued a document from the ministry’s Department of Legal Affairs/ Branch of Legal Consultations. The document specified ending the appointments of the general directors and deans of the colleges and institutes, and stated that temporary directors and deans were to be relieved from their posts and replaced by senior academics from the colleges. Al-Ibrahimi’s appointment as the dean of the college of administration and

economics fulfilled the PMF’s wishes of having a loyalist head of one of the most important colleges at the university. However, his appointment was temporary; he was replaced by Tha’ir Ahmad Sa’adoun al-Saman in December 2019.

**7. Hayder Hajim Khalaf:** Official in the office of security permits in Ninewa, adviser in the National Security Apparatus, affiliated with former NSC Chairman Faleh al-Fayadh, officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is considered one of the most important security commanders loyal to the PMF, and he has close connections with Muhammad al-Bayati. The two men have a mutual understanding on issuing security permits for the Shiite factions and commanders that come from Baghdad to Ninewa. He also had direct contact with al-Muhandis, who mandated his appointment in the province after the liberation of Mosul.

**8. Muhammad Ali Askar al-Shaquli:** Director of the Ninewa martyrs directorate, responsible for registering and tracking the names of the martyrs who were killed because of the war against terrorism or during an attack or bombing. He is also considered the official responsible for obtaining compensation for the relatives of the martyrs. He took his assignments after the Mosul liberation operations in 2017, supported directly by al-Muhandis, under the guarantee of the PMF Commission. Al-Shaquli

works under the command of the PMF and guarantees salaries for relatives of martyrs of the PMF, particularly the Shiite factions in Ninewa.

**9. Nabil al-Hakam:** Assistant adviser to the governor of Ninewa for investment affairs. Al-Hakam was considered one of the most important advisers to former Ninewa governor Nofal al-Akoub and he continues to be a member of the provincial council. He obtained this advisory position as a result of giving the PMF Commission investment projects in important business areas in Mosul, especially the areas of the Jazeera neighborhood and al-Nabi Yunis. He has given contracts in the Ninewa Plain area to senior contractors loyal to the PMF.

**10. Abd al-Sattar al-Habo:** Former director of the municipal office of Mosul who was succeeded by Radwan al-Shahwani. Al-Habo, however, continues as technical adviser to the provincial council and has direct connections with the PMF groups, especially Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’. He gave some of these groups many plots of land in the Shabak, Kokjali, and other areas. Al-Habo also coordinated with Abd al-Qadir al-Dakheel to specify a portion of the profits to the PMF.

**11. Faris al-Bagoo’:** Member of the legal committee in the accountability and justice commission in Baghdad.





**“ But al-Ahmadi rejected the demand and said al-Ibrahimi appeared to be involved in corruption and had cooperated with ISIS in 2014.”**

Al-Bagoo' is an important and active personality who was nominated inside the provincial council as the representative for both former governor Mansour al-Mar'id and current governor Najim al-Jubouri under the authority of the NSC. He has longstanding relations with the Shiite PMF groups. Al-Bagoo' attended intensive meetings in Baghdad with al-Muhandis in order to give him accountability commission reports concerning the most important personalities who worked with the prior regime. He has been the key liaison between the accountability and justice commission and any Sunni official on the issue of de-Baathification. While professing loyalty to Osama al-Nujaifi, he serves the interests of the PMF.

**12. Muhammad Yahya al-Talib:** Major general and commander of the 4,000-strong Ninewa Guards. This faction is affiliated with the former governor Atheel al-Nujaifi and is led by his son, Abdullah Atheel al-Nujaifi. Al-Talib had close connections and held secret visits with al-Muhandis. His relationship with Abu Ala al-Wala'i, the commander of Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' and current deputy head of the PMF Commission, continues, as does

al-Talib and al-Wala'i's relationship with Abdullah al-Nujaifi. Al-Talib and the PMF cooperate in controlling the Badush area and have divided the agricultural lands there between them.

**13. Maj. Gen. Karim al-Shuwaili:** Former deputy commander of the Ninewa operations and former general overseer of the PMF in Ninewa. He was replaced in August 2019 by Muhammad al-Shabaki. The first official responsible for all the military movements in the PMF, al-Shuwaili was one of the most prominent personalities in the PMF security directorate of intelligence in Ninewa and developed particularly close relations with the tribal PMF regiments. He was appointed by al-Fayadh, who was NSC chairman at the time and who also heads the PMF Commission. Al-Shuwaili looks after military training for the PMF forces in Ninewa province and oversees the support for the Sunni tribal PMF groups with salaries and equipment. He enjoyed a solid relationship with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and used to accompany him on inspection tours of the PMF camps. Gen. Shuwaili has thus earned the reputation

of being one of the influential individuals in the Ninewa security forces command.

**14. Oday Asmat Sabir:** A brigadier general who is the director of the Ninewa police regiments command. Sabir has close and direct connections with the PMF of al-Khorasani through Khudair Alaiwi al-Sabbar, the former director of the Vanguard Party office that represents the political wing of the PMF of al-Khorasani in Ninewa (the current director is Faysal Al Badran al-Mousawi). Sabir oversees police activities in western Mosul and is the official responsible for the PMF group activities in the west side and in particular the old city.

**15. Shaheen al-Jaf:** Al-Jaf is the son of the sister of Wa'ad al-Qaddo, who headed Brigade 30. Al-Jaf holds the rank of major in the NSC and an official position in the youth portfolio in Ninewa province. Maj. al-Jaf organizes youth gatherings and forums like "Badayna" to recruit youths as informants within an organization called "Youth of Ninewa Cell." This organization operates under the aegis of the NSC, but its members receive salaries from the PMF Commission as civilian employees.

Some 25 such cell members and more prominent youth activists in Mosul have been summoned repeatedly to the NSC for criticizing the PMF or expressing political opinions on social media about keeping weapons in the state's hands and controlling armed factions affiliated with the PMF. These actions were taken against the activists in cooperation with Numan al-Zoba'i, the current Ninewa operations commander.

**16. Abd al-Khaliq al-Khaykani:** Holds the rank of major general and is head of the joint center for intelligence and security for Ninewa. He oversees all the information connected with the tribal PMF groups in Ninewa and coordinates all the intelligence data and cooperation with the PMF security in the province.

**17. Ali al-Husseini:** Relations official of the PMF Commission in all areas north of Taji, including Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din provinces. Al-Husseini had close ties with al-Muhandis and continues to coordinate relations with all of the Sunni factions and peshmerga forces. He also has close political ties with representatives of the Sanad Bloc on the Ninewa provincial council.

**18. Abd al-Amir Yar Allah:** Lieutenant general and chief of staff of the Iraqi army and a senior member of the NSC. Previously served as deputy commander of joint PMF-Peshmerga operations.

Yar Allah accompanied Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi in his meetings with the Kurdistan Regional Government and his inspection tours of PMF factions in Ninewa and Salah al-Din. He works very closely with al-Fayadh, especially regarding Ninewa's affairs and the PMF.

### **Ninewa's governors and their relationships with the PMF**

**1. Nofal Hamadi Sultan al-Akoub:** Al-Akoub acknowledged more than once that he is supported by the PMF militias, and al-Muhandis in particular, and that all the works he undertook after the liberation of eastern Mosul were in agreement with al-Muhandis, whose protection shielded him from accountability. For instance, money designated for IDPs in the province has been divided among corrupt people since 2014, but after 2017 it was done systematically.

Al-Akoub participated in the Mosul liberation operations in 2017 in the al-Hadhr district and set up a militia he called the regiment of al-Akoub with the designation Regiment 17 under the leadership of his cousin, Mazahem Ghazi. This gave him the opportunity to be governor of Ninewa in succession to Atheel al-Nujaifi. He also gave the PMF many reassurances in the event he should be appointed as governor of Ninewa.

Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati played an important role in implementing investment projects with al-Akoub and some of the PUK members, particularly Hashim al-Barifkani and Ali Khudayr, in deals with the PMF to strengthen al-Akoub's political position and support him in security matters. Al-Akoub gave al-Muhandis a payment of \$2 million in exchange for his support and protection, including shielding him from documented corruption activities. Were it not for the Mosul ferry incident in 2019, no one would have been able to remove al-Akoub (attempts by the council to remove him were met with extortion and threats from the PMF).

Al-Akoub is considered the most prominent figure who has helped the PMF gain a foothold in Ninewa. He has also helped PMF factions open 60 economic offices in Ninewa's villages, on the pretext of protecting the Shiite minority.

Al-Akoub had the largest role in distributing lands belonging to the state to PMF leaders, just as he granted investment opportunities to contractors loyal to the PMF concerning the reconstruction of Mosul. He distributed money to the PMF and the council members from the Fatah Alliance and the Sanad Bloc, as the wealth designated for the rebuilding of Mosul was distributed to political factions to guarantee their





support in order to maintain his position longer.

After corruption charges against al-Akoub were leaked, the PMF became implicated in his activities. Hundreds of journalists and activists from Mosul called for his resignation or arrest. Al-Muhandis arrived in Mosul and met with al-Akoub, praising his role in administering the province. The meeting was a clear show of support and a warning that al-Akoub was not to be touched. Al-Muhandis' visit also served to give legitimacy to the economic offices held by the PMF and to warn against criticizing or opposing the PMF officials in charge of those offices.

Members of the provincial council tried many times to prevent al-Akoub's removal, hoping to keep him in office to protect their economic interests and ensure the presence of tribal PMF groups in their areas to pressure voters during local elections. The PMF tried to restore al-Akoub as governor after his removal from the office after the deadly ferry incident. Leaked documents indicate the existence of an agreement between the Asa'ib al-Haq militia, the ferry owner, and the owner of the tourist island where the ferry sank, who himself announced on Iraqi news channels his opposition to extortion and demands for protection money by PMF factions.

**“Al-Khanjar bought the votes of some council members – \$300,000 for one vote – and promised every member an armored car valued at \$200,000 after the new governor was chosen.”**

The PMF tried to provide sufficient political protection for al-Akoub to prevent his removal, but it failed after the extent of Sunni anger against him became clear. In addition to that, al-Akoub was confronted by a wave of anger from the public, especially young activists, journalists, and NGOs. Journalists revealed documents containing accusations against al-Akoub of shortcomings and corruption and of wasting of public money, and the inhabitants of Mosul considered him an ally to political forces close to Iran. Moreover, the Iraqi Impartiality Commission investigated the loss of around \$60 million from Ninewa's provincial budget, stolen by employees close to al-Akoub.

Al-Akoub is considered the Ninewa governor who gave the most perks to the PMF and served the armed factions most. If not for the ferry incident, after which the U.S. Treasury Department put al-Akoub on the list of sanctioned individuals based on accusations of corruption and human rights violations, the Iraqi parliament would not have been able to remove al-Akoub because he

is the candidate of the Shiite religious authorities in Najaf. He stepped aside in his last public address only in response to the request of the Najaf religious authorities after he withstood all the popular pressures in Mosul.

**2. Mansour al-Mar'id:** Al-Mar'id was supported by then-chairman of the NSC, Faleh al-Fayadh, and was from the al-Ata' Bloc. Al-Mar'id reached an understanding with the Shiite members of the provincial council from the Sanad Bloc via deals and bribes that reached up to \$20,000. He also struck an arrangement with the KDP (again through al-Fayadh) to keep the Kurdish peshmerga forces in the Sinjar region after the members of the KDP thoroughly rejected the appointment of al-Mar'id as governor. This understanding was mediated by al-Fayadh in accordance with an agreement between the PMF and the peshmerga forces. But the dispute remains about the vote of the provincial council to remove al-Akoub and nominate al-Mar'id.

The Ninewa provincial council's vote to appoint al-Mar'id took place in May 2019. Al-Mar'id was

a parliament member from the al-Ata' movement, which is under the banner of the Victory Alliance led by former premier Haydar al-Abadi. The dissenting members supported the nomination of council member Hussam al-Din al-Abbar, but a political agreement led to the choice of al-Mar'id. The pact was arranged by Khamis al-Khanjar, the leader of the Arab Project, which was incorporated in the National Axis alliance, the biggest Sunni bloc in the Iraqi parliament.

Al-Mar'id played a major role in the liberation of Mosul, especially after he set up the Martyrs of Qayyarah Brigade of al-Jubour, led by his brother Muhammad al-Mar'id, in the Qayyarah district south of Mosul. Because of these actions, he was able to mobilize the area's residents to support him and defend him continuously in the media. Al-Khanjar bought the votes of some council members – \$300,000 for one vote – and promised every member an armored car valued at \$200,000 after the new governor was chosen. He made good on his promise.

Al-Mar'id received his orders from al-Fayadh directly, and he had a close connection with secret informants affiliated with the NSC, in addition to his close relationship with the head of the Patriotic Masses party and the former governor of Salah al-Din, Ahmad al-Jubouri. Al-Jubouri supported al-Mar'id politically and tribally by virtue of being

**“Al-Akoub is considered the Ninewa governor who gave the most perks to the PMF and the governor who served the armed factions most.”**

from the same al-Jubour tribe. In exchange for this, al-Mar'id gave al-Jubouri investment projects in the province.

When the disagreement began between al-Muhandis and al-Fayadh regarding investment deals in Ninewa province, the shares of the reconstruction funds, and the oil-producing areas the PMF controlled, a fissure occurred in the Sunni regions. The political disagreements over Ninewa led to a conflict inside the PMF over the organization's structure and security framework.

The PMF announced a new framework that Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi agreed to, which included granting then-NSC Chairman and PMF Commission head al-Fayadh the authority to appoint by proxy and cancel the position of the deputy head of the PMF Commission that al-Muhandis occupied. Al-Mahdi had issued an order on the

structure of the PMF months earlier. Al-Fayadh requested a deadline of two months to implement this framework amid sharp disagreements between himself and al-Muhandis. Those disagreements necessitated a visit by the head of IRGC's Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, to resolve the conflict.

Al-Muhandis rejected the new structure that divides the PMF into eight regions in the north, south, middle, and west, in addition to replacing the position of deputy head of the commission with a chief of staff. He also felt that he would not be welcome in the PMF Commission, as the position of chief of staff requires a high rank and did not suit al-Muhandis.

The decision to reorganize the structure of the PMF Commission in Iraq targeted al-Muhandis and was tantamount to restoring authority to the Iraqi state over the different types of its military forces in the country. Meanwhile, the political conflict between al-Fayadh and al-Muhandis intensified as they issued conflicting orders to the different PMF factions. This put the Iraqi armed forces commander in an awkward position regarding the PMF Commission.

Al-Mahdi issued Order No. 331, in which he first decided to certify the organizational structure for the PMF Commission and canceled titles and positions that conflict with the titles that





came with the new framework. Al-Muhandis considered this a setback to all his efforts during the prior years.

The ongoing conflict between al-Fayadh and al-Muhandis led the latter to cooperate with the National Axis bloc led by Muhammad al-Halbousi, Ahmad al-Jubouri, and Muhammad al-Karbouli from one side and Khamis al-Khanjar from another. This led to the division of the Sunni National Axis bloc, with al-Muhandis pressuring al-Halbousi, al-Jubouri, and al-Karbouli to resign. Al-Karbouli was also an ally of al-Fayadh, who supported Mansour al-Mar'id.

Al-Mar'id had offered a written resignation without a date to Ahmad al-Jubouri before the provincial council could vote al-Mar'id out as governor. After that there were disagreements because of investment projects that al-Mar'id had promised to al-Jubouri, and al-Jubouri leaked the resignation to the council.

Muhammad al-Halbousi, Ahmad al-Jubouri, and Muhammad al-Karbouli called on their members in the Ninewa provincial council to vote on the removal of Mansour al-Mar'id with support from al-Muhandis and a directive to nominate Najim al-Jubouri as his successor.

President Barham Salih signed a presidential order indicating that Najim al-Jubouri was appointed as the new governor of Ninewa.

**3. Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri:** Retired general and the current governor of Ninewa who has very close ties to the United States. The most prominent Sunni leaders in the Iraqi parliament – al-Halbousi, al-Jubouri, and al-Karbouli – support him.

Al-Jubouri has been able to bring agreement between the Sunnis and the Shiites with U.S. counsel and with political help from the KDP. Likewise, he convinced all the sides to appoint him as governor of Ninewa. His military connections, including ties with former Ninewa security forces commander Numan al-Zoba'i, and this political and security assurance granted him the opportunity to become governor of Ninewa.

Al-Jubouri agreed with the PMF leadership on his administration of the Mosul city center from the political and security and economic angle, and he agreed to allow the PMF to administer the other areas outside the city center. This helped complete the deal and satisfied al-Muhandis, who strongly supported al-Jubouri.

Najim al-Jubouri participated in the liberation of Mosul when he was commander of Ninewa's security forces. Then he gave the security agreement to the PMF and facilitated their positions in different areas of the province. Al-Muhandis did not forget this and supported al-Jubouri as governor. At the

same time, al-Jubouri obtained the support of the KDP because he entrusted assignments and gave broad authority to the first deputy governor of Ninewa, Sirin al-Ruzbayani, who approves all NGOs active in Ninewa, oversees the investment projects, and coordinates the relationship between Erbil and Ninewa.

In exchange for his appointment as governor, Najim al-Jubouri ensured that investment apportionment and government positions were given to al-Jubouri and al-Halbousi and to the PMF and the KDP.

The position of Ninewa governor is considered an attractive one because of the esteem that the governor enjoys and because the province's yearly budget reaches up to \$800 million and attracts many foreign investments to help the province develop and build. The financial gains associated with the governorship is what made the post the subject of a rivalry that led to the changing of three Ninewa governors in one year.

### **The PMF's economic offices in Ninewa**

The economic offices engage in their activities by imposing fees and wealth taxes on owners of businesses, restaurants, companies, public transportation vehicles, and parking spaces. Those who do not pay are subject to extortion, threats, and possibly attacks (such as the November

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**“... most tribal PMF fighters do not have weapons and do not receive salaries, and until recently no vehicles were available for them.”**

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2018 explosion that targeted Mosul's Abu Layla restaurant).

The financial offices serve as bases for more than 20 factions, and they are spread throughout different areas of Mosul. They are by nature different from the bases or military barracks for these militias that are also present inside the city, sometimes using citizens' houses. The offices compete among each other in imposing “taxes” on restaurants, businesses, public transportation vehicles, trucks delivering goods, and the sale of oil derivatives in the province.

The financial offices in Ninewa have also been able to seize lands affiliated with the local government and have opened businesses in economically important areas in Mosul. The most important of the shops are located in the Jazeera neighborhood and Nabi Yunis. Also, the Shiite Waqf has an

important role in seizing large properties in old Mosul and al-Najafi street and the Nabi Yunis area, as it has begun to alter the land to establish factories and very large business malls in the city.

The economic and security situation in Ninewa province is very bad, especially in terms of the PMF economic offices and the theft of oil and smuggling from Sinjar district, and likewise the presence of the PKK in the Sinjar district. The economic offices are involved in selling land belonging to the families of those involved with ISIS and the land and farms of Christians and Yazidis who left Iraq. Even though some Christians and Yazidis returned after the liberation operations, PMF forces refused to give up the farms on the pretext of using them to combat ISIS cells. Some of the economic offices impose fees on some humanitarian NGOs that engage in various activities to help the inhabitants. The NGOs designate a portion of in-kind assistance to the offices or grant them money in exchange for facilitating their activity in Mosul.

Among the most important economic offices operating in Mosul are those affiliated with the PMF groups of the Asa'ib, Badr, Nujaba', Khorasani, Hezbollah and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali. These offices are not engaged in military operations; they are confined to economic activity in Ninewa.

### **Differences between the Sunni tribal and Shiite PMF groups**

Many of the Sunni MPs from Ninewa have accused the federal authorities in Baghdad of neglecting the al-Jazeera areas (the western areas) in the province for a long time. They maintain that this neglect has led to greater ISIS influence, especially in the part of the al-Jazeera extending between Ninewa, Salah al-Din, and Anbar, reaching to the borders with Syria. This has led to a great number of casualties among the Sunni tribal PMF groups and more intense battles, bombings of houses, and destruction of schools and shops. The Sunni tribal PMF factions suffer from a clear deficiency in arms and heavy equipment, unlike the Shiite factions.

ISIS has threatened the areas of western Ninewa and in particular the areas south of al-Ba'aj toward the Syrian border, the south of the subdistrict of Tal Abta, and the district of al-Hadhr. These areas lack permanent security forces, and many IDPs from these areas have not yet returned since they were displaced during liberation operations in June 2017. The security of Mosul and Iraq in general is in danger if the federal government does not come up with long-term solutions for the security weaknesses in the areas of west Ninewa. A great number of fighters in the tribal PMF factions were wounded





during liberation operations, and hundreds of the personnel of the tribal PMF have been martyred. The daily military statements did not mention this, but compensations for the families of martyrs have not been paid out, unlike payments for the families of martyrs from the Shiite factions, which come monthly.

During the liberation of Mosul in 2017, the tribal PMF groups were a frontline force. The plan to liberate the left bank did not include the tribal forces; the counterterrorism service, the army, and the federal police divided the fighting among themselves. However, the tribal PMF factions fought elsewhere in the city in difficult operations during which many fighters were lost. Despite that, the Iraqi government's military statements ignore the participation of the tribal factions, so the inhabitants of Ninewa and the international community do not know about the sacrifices the tribal militias made while liberating many Iraqi towns from ISIS.

Moreover, most tribal PMF fighters do not have weapons and do not receive salaries, and until recently no vehicles were available for them. This has led many tribal PMF members to withdraw because they feel the government is neglecting them and does not value their lives. The tribal PMF factions in Ninewa are not allowed to possess more than a Kalashnikov rifle, and in some instances PKM rifles. The

PMF Commission has made very few cars available to the fighters; in most instances they use cars belonging to families in the tribe. The tribal factions (al-Lahib, al-Jubouri, al-Sab'awiin) have been present in south Mosul since last March; they fought ISIS on the Makhmour and Qayyarah fronts with intermittent salaries and weapons donated by tribal sheikhs and some of the Sunni MPs in Ninewa province. They have also gathered donations and weapons for tribe members to protect their areas from intermittent ISIS attacks. In contrast, the Shiite PMF groups possess heavy equipment and weapons to protect their areas.

The tribal PMF groups work at security checkpoints to identify people, as the national security and intelligence databases do not have the names of all ISIS personnel. This is the most important task the Sunni tribal PMF groups undertake, but the government does not mention this and does not share data with the tribal PMF factions. This makes it difficult for the Sunni groups to preserve security in the areas they protect.

The numbers of Sunni tribal fighters in Ninewa have not exceeded 10,000, contrary to what the PMF Commission has announced. The commission has said there were 15,000 tribal PMF fighters in Ninewa. Months before the launching of the Ninewa liberation operation there were

1,200 fighters south of Mosul, waging battles against ISIS.

### **PMF interventions in education**

The PMF, acting via Brigade 30 of the Shabak that was led by Wa'ad al-Qaddo, takes 20% of the profits from al-Nour College, the civilian university in Bartella in the Ninewa Plain. It also used threats to appoint the dean of the college of administration and economics in Mosul University and appointed three deans in the universities of al-Hamdaniya, Tal Afar, and Ninewa.

The PMF has tried to control the position of general director of education in Ninewa since Aseel al-Abadi – a Shiite from the Sanad Bloc, which is part of the Fatah Alliance – held the position. After the PMF entered Ninewa during liberation operations and the Fatah Alliance won 47 seats in 2018 parliamentary elections, the education directorate was given to the Sanad Bloc, who gave al-Abadi her position. Her bodyguards were from the PMF, and she declared in speeches that she was a daughter of PMF and supports it and that she accepts her orders from the PMF.

Al-Abadi was the assistant director of a high school with nine years of experience. She was officially appointed as general director of education on Aug. 28, 2019, by special order from the Education Ministry. However, Minister of Education

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**“The financial offices in Ninewa have also been able to seize lands affiliated with the local government and have opened business in economically important areas in Mosul.”**

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Qusay al-Suhail issued an order on Sept. 3, 2019, to rescind her appointment because she did not meet the criteria for the position; the director of education should have no less than 15 years of experience in education work. In the end, the position returned to the PMF through Sa'id's appointment as new general director of education in Ninewa.

The PMF has also built the al-Khomeini primary school in the Ninewa Plain without an official registration document from the Education Ministry. Then it threatened the former minister of education, Muhammad Iqbal, until he registered the primary school. The PMF also demanded of the Education Ministry that entitlements for the teachers should be disbursed, despite the calls from the area's residents – including Christians and Yazidis – to not establish schools

under the names of foreign states following sectarian ideologies. This will lead to sectarian feuds and quarrels between the other groups in the Ninewa Plain.

The PMF also established the al-Sadiq preparatory school (grades 10-12) for Islamic studies, without condition or qualification and with exemptions from age and average grade requirements. This school's task is to reinforce Shiite interpretations and to recruit students and appoint them in institutions of the state illegally and with falsified qualifications, according to an employee in the Education Ministry.

### **Prominent actions of the PMF in Ninewa**

PMF factions have extorted families of ISIS members. More importantly, they have been politically leveraging the ISIS phenomenon by threatening and blackmailing families in general with accusations of being pro-ISIS and potential prosecution for their alleged ties to the transnational jihadist group. These are scare tactics meant to dissuade families from talking to the media about the seizure of lands and homes for PMF commanders that the fighters took when people fled in 2014 and 2015.

The PMF has also used Brigade 30, the military wing for the Democratic Shabak Gathering Party (which is tied to the Badr Organization), to put a

stranglehold on another Shabak party called the Free Shabak Movement that is linked to the KDP. Brigade 30 has prevented them from opening party bases and having organizational meetings and has hampered the movement's political, social, and cultural activities. PMF factions have even threatened voters to not cast their votes. They also reject coordinating on security matters with the local police and army, and they interfere with the traffic police.

Some time ago, PMF forces kidnapped some businessmen, the most prominent of whom was well-known oil merchant Abeed al-Anaz al-Ma'amari, who refused to give the PMF a share of his oil profits. He was kidnapped in July 2019 and was released after a ransom of \$20,000 was paid. Livestock merchant Mani' Idbas al-Shammari also refused to pay the PMF a share of his profits from livestock feed, meats, and eggs. He was kidnapped and then released with a ransom of \$40,000.

After the liberation of Mosul, the people respected the army, police, and PMF groups and held them in high regard. Those sentiments have changed considerably, however. PMF factions have begun taking 20% of contract costs and/or gross profits from contractors, investors, and businessmen, just as ISIS used to take 10% as taxes and protection money. Those who do not pay could end up with a grenade



thrown into their businesses, threatening messages sent to their homes, or street closures on the routes to their businesses.

The PMF have committed wrongdoings in the Sinjar area. The most important of the PMF groups in that area is the Lalish Regiment, which has seized lands of the Sunni tribes in the areas of al-Qayrwan and Sinjar. The sheikhs of these tribes have informed the PMF Commission, but it has paid no attention and offered no intervention.

## Basra: An Easy Relationship

### Factions of the PMF present in Basra province

**1. Forces of Badr (e.g., Brigades 1, 4, 5, etc.):** Present in the PMF operations command base. The main camp in Basra is located in the al-Deir district (previously the base of the Iraqi army's 3rd Corps) which includes Brigades 1, 4, 5, and the naval regiment. The leader of the PMF operations is called Abu Jinan al-Basiri, and he also commands Brigade 1. Brigade 4 is led by Abu Hanan al-Kan'ani (his affiliation switched from Badr to Kata'ib Hezbollah, but after he was targeted in an assassination attempt he remained loyal to al-Muhandis). This base is the only one in the province, and although the factions play no role in security activities inside the province their weapons are present and can be used when needed. They are

“PMF factions have even threatened voters to not cast their votes.”

stronger than the state security organs, which lack the power to obstruct the PMF in Basra; indeed, the province has seen no attempts by security forces to oppose the PMF.

The Badr Organization has offices spread around the province, with a presence in the Abu al-Khaseeb, al-Qarna, al-Madina, Shatt al-Arab, al-Zubair, and al-Faw districts; the al-Basra center; Lebanon Casino Street; and the Safwan and Umm Qasr subdistricts.

**2. Saraya al-Salam (the Peace Brigades), Brigades 313, 314, and 315:** This group has a base in the al-Tuwaisa area and another in the al-Zubair district. The Peace Brigades play no security role inside the province, focusing instead on mobilization and support for the brigades connected with them outside the province.

**3. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' (Brigade 14)** has a base in the al-Hakimiya area.

**4. Kata'ib Hezbollah (Brigade 45)** has a base in the al-Hakimiya area.

**5. Quwat Wa'ad Allah (Brigade 33)** has an agency office in al-Basra, in the al-Jam'iyat area.

**6. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Brigades 41, 42, and 43)** has a number of offices in the province: in al-Qarna, the City, Shatt al-Arab, Abu al-Khaseeb, the al-Deir and al-Zubair districts, as well as in the Bariha area.

**7. Saraya al-Khorasani (Brigade 18):** This group has an agency office in the al-Jabaliya area.

**8. Al-Nujaba' (Brigade 12):** This faction has an agency office in the Manawi Lajm area.

**9. Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda (Brigade 28):** This faction has an office in the al-Jam'iyat area.

**10. Saraya Ashura' (Brigade 8)** has an agency office in the province.

**11. Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr al-Awal (Da'wa Party) (Brigade 15)** has an agency office in the province.

**12. Imam Ali Division (Brigade 2)** has an agency office in the province.

**13. Al-Abbas Division (Brigade 26)** has an agency office in the province.

**14. Saraya al-Difa' al-Shabi (Brigades 46 and 47),** which is loyal to Hezbollah, has a base in the naval academy in the al-Najibiya area.

**15. Saraya al-Jihad (Brigade 18)** has an office in the area of al-Mashraq al-Jadid.

**16. Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya' (Brigade 19)** has an office in the al-Janina area.

**17. Quwat al-Muntadhir (Brigade 7)** has an office in the al-Zubair district.

All the PMF factions in Basra have offices that are considered agencies, not military bases. The only military base is the one where the PMF operations command is located. These offices play roles in mobilization and logistical support, in addition to ideological and development training in Iran and military training courses for youths.

The headquarters of the PMF Commission is in the presidential palaces, located in the al-Barad'iya area. This headquarters houses PMF personnel from intelligence, security, administration, and the office of the head of the PMF in Basra, Ammar Faris, along with those of some of the factions.

Note that most of the offices of the agencies and parties have been closed since the beginning of the October protests.

### Prominent figures with ties to the PMF

One of the Jaysh al-Mahdi commanders in Basra, Mudhaffar Ismail al-Fadl, was arrested and

released. He participated in the Iraqi parliament elections in 2017 and served as an MP for the Sa'irun Bloc. MP Faleh al-Khaz'ali is the deputy secretary general for Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada', and MP Uday Awad is affiliated with the Asa'ib.

### The governor's relationship with the PMF

The political and administrative duties of a provincial governor require him to build bridges and balance relationships with all the groups that affect security and stability. As head of the province's security committee, Basra's governor, Asa'ad al-Eidani, has given the PMF Commission presidential palace sites consisting of numerous buildings from which to operate. There is no friction between the security forces and the PMF in Basra because the relationship between the governor and the PMF has been good and the PMF factions have a great deal of resources and influence. The Peace Brigades, Asa'ib, Badr, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada', and Kata'ib Hezbollah are the ones closest to the governor.

In order to keep the PMF out of political matters in Basra province other than supporting the governor, al-Eidani offers the factions benefits from the province's finances and natural resources such as oil and gas, along with benefits from the ports and border crossings with Iran and Kuwait. Al-Eidani has offered

to award projects to companies that represent the factions or are affiliated with them, along with contracts and investments in oil companies. Most of the security companies working in the oil fields are affiliated with the PMF and their respective political parties. At the ports and border crossings, importers who deal with the PMF have an easier time and are exempted from routine procedures and impediments. PMF officials also get appointed to public offices in the province. All of this cooperation between the governor and the PMF has been instrumental in preventing confrontation between the provincial government and the militia alliance.

During anti-government demonstrations, the PMF actively supported the governor and security leaders in the province; the Asa'ib in particular used tough measures to suppress the protests in Basra. In response to the brutality, demonstrators burned the PMF Commission's headquarters in the presidential palaces.

Al-Eidani has been successful in distributing financial resources, projects, and shares of appointments, and in balancing between the factions in terms of influence. He has avoided conflict with the PMF and emerged unscathed from the demonstrations. However, the offices of parliament and provincial council members, along with provincial buildings,



the Iranian consulate in Basra, and the facilities of many PMF factions were burned. The governor was able to move into a new provincial building and quell the demonstrations by making employment opportunities available for youths and providing more work for the people of Basra, particularly with the foreign companies working in the oil sector. However, his requirement that the foreign oil companies replace foreign workers with local workers did not provide very many jobs compared to the number of unemployed residents of Basra. Al-Eidani only faced one political challenge – from the al-Hikma Bloc in the provincial council – but the other blocs maintained their support for the governor, and he was able to remain in his position. Note that this was a political challenge, not one from the PMF.

### Provincial and municipal councils and the PMF

The relationship between the PMF and the provincial council is fairly strong. There are members connected in thought, ideology, and organization with some of the factions of the PMF, but no members of the provincial council have any military affiliation with the PMF.

In Basra, the municipal councils in al-Zubair and Abu al-Khaseeb – currently the only two areas with elected local legislatures – share a building as their headquarters from which they operate and

interact with citizens directly. They have no influential role in the PMF, which has no need to interact with the municipal councils. However, members of the councils have worked with the PMF, offering logistical support and gathering in-kind donations and food and sending them to the PMF forces fighting in different theaters.

The political and economic relationship between the PMF and the provincial council is clear. The council approves the annual budget for the entire province and is instrumental in granting massive projects to companies affiliated with PMF factions. Some provincial council members, because of their ideological leanings, have provided logistical support for the PMF. Meanwhile, the militia alliance has contributed to projects like building dams and protecting the oil fields in northern Basra from flooding. The PMF and the provincial government closely coordinate with one another on these issues.

Field research did not reveal any type of ill feelings between the Basra government and the PMF. While the two enjoy a great degree of mutual understanding, a problem occurred between the PMF and the head of the provincial council because of the proliferation of weapons among the tribes in northern Basra that use weaponry belonging to the PMF and constitute a large force that the local government

cannot match. The matter was resolved through directives to PMF members to not take weapons with them when they go to those areas to visit family. The directives went a long way toward resolving the problem.

There was friction between two PMF factions in 2018 in Basra: Badr Organization, led by al-Amiri, and al-Muhandis' Kata'ib Hezbollah. The reason was the formation of a ministerial committee from Baghdad, led by al-Amiri, to organize security for the oil fields, energy companies, and exports, and to ensure demonstrators did not disrupt crude exports. Al-Amiri wanted to redeploy Badr fighters, but al-Muhandis, al-Eidani, and the majority of the members of the provincial council blocked the move. As a result, al-Amiri returned to Baghdad and al-Muhandis' forces remained the strongest and most influential in Basra.

### PMF leaders or members and participation on local councils

The PMF is a product of al-Sistani's 2014 fatwa. Provincial council elections occurred in 2013, and the elections of municipal councils took place in al-Zubair in 2005 and in Abu al-Khaseeb in 2010, and there have not been any local council elections in any other district of Basra. Thus, members of the PMF have not had an opportunity to run for election because the PMF was formed after these

elections last occurred. However, most PMF members have some kind of party and/or ideological affiliation, and members of the councils have played important roles in offering logistical support to the PMF fighters.

Some PMF factions existed before al-Sistani's fatwa – for example, Hezbollah, Asa'ib, Badr, and Jaysh al-Mahdi. These factions are largely military in nature, and none of their military leaders have been nominated as candidates for the Basra provincial council or the municipal councils. However, a member of the Basra provincial council, Sheikh Ahmad al-Solaiti, served as deputy head of the PMF committee in the provincial council after the formation of the PMF. Al-Solaiti's party affiliation changed from the Supreme Council to the Badr Organization before the fatwa was issued.

### PMF leaders and members in local government positions

No PMF leaders have assumed administrative or security leadership positions, nor have they been entrusted with any administrative and security positions outside the organizational framework of the PMF. However, those who have assumed responsibility in those positions are affiliated ideologically with the armed movements, and some people who have assumed these offices receive support from the

PMF because of relationships or common interests. For instance, the Badr Organization controls most of the local police commanders because the minister in charge of the police, Muhammad al-Ghabban, merged many PMF fighters into the force. Asa'ib controls officers in Basra through proxies.

Of course, most administrative appointees in Basra province have the support of parties or factions. The education director is loyal to Badr, and the investment office head is affiliated with the Virtue Party (part of the National Program bloc). Oil has joint participation between al-Hikma, Da'wa, and the Supreme Council at the administrative level and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' and Hezbollah on the operations level. The ports and industry offices feature joint participation between the Asa'ib, Sa'irun, and Da'wa Party in their administration. As for the judiciary, it is controlled by the Da'wa Party, and some of the sectors are affiliated with the Virtue Party.

No relatives of PMF members or leaders appear to be in local positions of power, either; loyalty to a faction is considered greater than kinship.

### Provincial council members' connections with PMF

Though none of the members of the provincial council have

any formal membership in any of the PMF factions, they do have partisan, organizational, and ideological connections. One provincial council member, al-Solaiti, was entrusted with the title of deputy head of the PMF committee on the provincial council. Several provincial council members have provided logistical support to the PMF. Nadhem Nimr Abd and Mortadha Karim Khaz'al al-Shahmani are the two provincial council members with party and sect links, but no military connection, to the Badr Organization.

### Salah al-Din: Between State and Non-State

Every area in Salah al-Din has its own culture, whether in terms of tribal makeup or religious affiliation or in terms of the intent behind militias' desire to control it. Every faction in the PMF has an intelligence and security committee, a public relations and media committee, and an economic and financial committee.

The PMF presence in Salah al-Din can be divided into two classifications.

First, there are tribal PMF factions in areas that are not considered strategic in terms of religious affiliation, security, or economy, like al-Shirqat, al-Alam, and Aldor. Tribal PMF fighters can also be found in frontline resistance areas that constitute a security risk.



Second are the PMF and the Peace Brigades operating in areas of religious, strategic, security, and economic significance, such as Baiji, where there are oil refineries controlled by Asa'ib commanders. East Tikrit has the Alas and Ajeel oil wells, and Samarra has in it the religious tourism and shrines of the imams, plus the lake and agricultural crops. Additionally, Samarra is the heart of the province.

The provincial administration manages its relationship with the PMF based on interests, though the administration realizes the short- and long-term danger and has reservations about both the militias' presence and the soft efforts to remove them. The relationship between the PMF and the provincial security apparatuses is akin to the one between the commander and the commanded. The PMF factions have full control over sensitive sites.

### The map of the PMF

**1. Shirqat:** This is a town composed of a group of large villages located on the two banks of the Tigris River. The al-Jubour tribe represents the biggest segment of its inhabitants. The PMF in the town is a tribal one called Brigade 51, led by Asham Sabhan al-Khalaf. Most of the brigade members are of the al-Jubour tribe, with some from the al-Jumailat and the al-Dulaim who live in the town. Its territory

“The governor has offered to award projects to companies that represent the factions or are affiliated with them, along with contracts and investments in oil companies.”

starts at the southern border of Ninewa province and stretches to the Makhoul mountains. Affiliated with this brigade is Regiment 51, commanded by Ahmad al-Mahdi in the area of Talul al-Baaj and al-Mujam'at. Members of this regiment are from the Bedouin Shammar tribe. On the west side of the town of Shirqat is Regiment 36, Lions of the Tigris, affiliated with the Defense Ministry. Yazan Mash'an al-Jubouri, son of MP Mishaan al-Jubouri who allegedly led Sunni militias in Salah al-Din province during the fight against ISIS, became closely connected with al-Muhandis after the ISIS occupation. Also representing al-Shirqat in the PMF Commission in Baghdad is Ahmad Muhammad al-Saleh.

**2. Tuz Khurmato:** A town of three ethnicities. The largest population is the Kurds, followed by the Turkmen, and then the

Arabs. The Turkmen are divided into Shiites and Sunnis and distributed among districts and subdistricts. In the sub-district of Amerli are the PMF factions of the Shiite Turkmen, Brigade 16, and Brigade 52, both tied to the Badr Organization. Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (Brigade 15), the Asa'ib al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah also have a presence in Tuz Khurmato. The mayor of the town is Hassan Zain al-Abideen, who was appointed in January 2018 and is affiliated with Badr. The Kurdish areas in and around Tuz Khurmato have been under the control of the local police and the emergency response forces affiliated with the Interior Ministry.

**3. Tikrit:** Located in the center of Salah al-Din province, the city contains various tribes in addition to many newcomers from other districts and provinces because of employment and other opportunities, including Tikrit University. Its most prominent sub-districts are al-Alam, inhabited by the al-Jubour tribe; Albu Ajeel, inhabited by a tribe of the same name; and Al-Awja subdistrict, hometown of former President Saddam Hussein and inhabited by the Albu Nasir. Tikrit is considered the axis of PMF operations. Several factions have offices there, including al-Nujaba', Badr, Asa'ib, and Jund al-Imam. There is a joint office for the administration of PMF operations. Abu Mahmoud is the national security official for the PMF in the province. The head of Salah al-Din province's


intelligence is Ahmed al-Zarkani, who obtained his post due to his close ties to Hadi al-Amiri.

**4. Baiji:** Located north of Tikrit on the connecting route to Mosul. A number of tribes inhabit the city; the most prominent are al-Qaissin (al-Jisat), al-Jubour, al-Jawariyeen, and al-Janabiyeen in the al-Siniya area west of Baiji. Baiji has the biggest refineries in Iraq and a petrochemical fertilizer factory, and its Neighborhood 600 is part of the refineries. Baiji is also within the area of responsibility of Brigade 51. Most of the tribal PMF personalities there are affiliated with the Shuwaish and al-Hanishi clans, which fall under Hajji Kamil al-Farin al-Jumaili, who is affiliated with Brigade 51. The regiment of Maysam al-Hijab al-Qaisi is affiliated with Asham.

Inside Baiji, Omar al-Thamer al-Sultan is responsible for several PMF groups comprising 200 people. Al-Sultan has ties with Risaliyoun (Brigade 31), and groups affiliated with him hold the resistance line between Baiji and Haditha west of the town. It is considered a connection between Baiji and Anbar province. The Asa'ib also has an office in Baiji. The tribal PMF who are made up of locals coordinate with Major Sa'ad, national security official for Baiji.

**5. Samarra:** One of the largest districts of Salah al-Din, Samarra produced three of the 12 Shiite imams, and according to Shiite

## PMF: Salah al-Din Province



doctrine the Muslim messianic figure, Mahdi, will come from Samarra. The city used to be considered a commercial area, and the district had agricultural and fishing areas. All of these resources were destroyed after regime change in 2003, the jihadist insurgency in 2006, and when ISIS declared its caliphate in 2014. As for the southern part of Samarra, the river is held by Quwat al-Rusul al-Nahriya, a Badr-affiliated river patrol with a base on the Samarra bridge. The administration of the shrine of Hassan al-Askari (the 8th Shiite imam) is private and out of the Peace Brigades' control. Abd al-Sattar al-Murshidi, the secretary general of the shrine, is affiliated with prominent Shiite political leader Ammar al-Hakim. The previous administrator of

the shrine is now a PMF official in Salah al-Din.

Samarra has been controlled since 2014 by the Peace Brigades, which are affiliated with Muqtada al-Sadr. The leader of the brigades in Samarra and the Samarra operations command is Abu Hassan al-Halfi. The brigades took charge after they removed al-Nujaba', which controlled the western side of the city. Early on, Abu Ma'souma al-Khayqani was the one exercising disposition in the city for Saraya al-Salam. The director of Samarra intelligence is Major Salam from the Sadrist movement. The river is patrolled from the al-Abbasiya side (15 kilometers, or about 9 miles, north of Samarra) by Quwat Wa'ad Allah. These people adopt herds of buffalo and their owners, and these buffalo have led to many





incidents, especially at night, that have caused the deaths of citizens and left dozens wounded, including doctors, academics, and military personnel.

**6. Balad:** A town south of Samarra and the site of the shrine of Sayyid Muhammad, one of the Shiite imams. The town's population has a Shiite majority, but the villages and subdistricts surrounding Balad are inhabited mostly by Sunnis. The most prominent of these subdistricts is al-Ishaqi, which is considered the last area of control of the Peace Brigades among the southern subdistricts. The Asa'ib in Balad received help from the Sa'oud tribe in destroying houses and gardens, especially in the area of Azaz Balad. Abu Muhammad is the security official in the province, and he is from this tribe. The northern part of Balad is under the command of Brigade 43 Sab'a al Dujail, a PMF faction affiliated with Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq.

**7. Aldor:** Considered the smallest district in Salah al-Din, it is the hometown of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the former vice president under the Saddam Hussein regime. Aldor is located southeast of Tikrit and northeast of Samarra. It used to be the home of the Salah al-Din installation for military manufacturing and the Aldor technical institute. Aldor is under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Brigade from Karbala, led by Abu Sadiq al-Hilli. Within Aldor, there is a tribal PMF made up of the

“ The PMF operates in areas of religious, strategic, security, and economic significance, such as Baiji, where there are oil refineries.”

townspeople. In the al-Na'ima region east of Aldor, there is a tribal PMF led by Sabah Matshar al-Hassan. The Badr Organization is the main group holding the area connecting Aldor to al-Alam, including the route leading to the oil wells. The area inhabited by the Abu Ajeel tribe is controlled by the Asa'ib, which has recruited many members of the tribe. The official responsible for the PMF in the area, Sheikh Ali al-Nadda, is affiliated with the Asa'ib.

**8. Al-Dujail:** Located in the southernmost area of Salah al-Din, near Baghdad. Here, Saddam Hussein was subjected to an assassination attempt in 1981. The majority of al-Dujail's inhabitants are Shiite. The town is the embodiment of a tribal community. The village of Abu Fid'ous is one of several belonging to al-Dujail, and it is inhabited by the tribe of al-Tamim (al-Tamim includes both Shiites and Sunnis). The core of Abu

Fid'ous is the branch of the al-Tamim tribe that the village is named after, which consists of 40 pro-Asa'ib families.

**9. Al-Alam:** This area (which recently became a district) is a line of villages (al-Alam, Samra, Rabidha, Tel al-Saybat, al-Hamdaniya, al-Khazamiya). It is located within the area of Brigade 88, a Sunni PMF force led by Wanas Naji al-Jabara (the son of Sheikh Naji al-Jabara, who was killed in the battles against ISIS in 2014). The brigade is headed by Khalid Abdullah al-Jabara alongside Wanas Naji al-Jabara. The al-Jabara family is one of the best-known in al-Alam. The first local government established in 2003 was headed by the retired Gen. Hussein al-Jabara (deceased), and Abdullah al-Jabara was deputy governor until his assassination on March 29, 2011. Jasim al-Jabara administered the national security portfolio, and Khamees al-Jabara assumed responsibility for the province's tribal council.

**10. Al-Dhulu'iyah:** A town near Balad, where tribal PMF Brigade 88 has a presence. This faction is led by Thabit Subji al-Jubouri. Local police and the tactical regiment affiliated with the provincial police in al-Dhulu'iyah also maintain a presence there. The al-Jubour tribe alone defended al-Dhulu'iyah from ISIS, making great sacrifices to protect the town, and refused to hand over land to PMF groups from southern Iraq because they knew

the implications of giving the militias control of security and feared demographic change since the town is close to the Shiite city of Balad.

#### *Provincial officials*

The governor of Salah al-Din, Ammar Jabar Khalil, is from a tribe from al-Dhulu'iyah and has a doctorate in engineering from Tikrit University. He works there as a lecturer and is also a businessman. Khalil's predecessor was Ahmad al-Jubouri, from the village of al-Hajjaj, near the town of Baiji.

The deputy governor is Ismail Halub from the area of al-Ishaqi. The second deputy is Ammar Hikmat from the town of Balad.

The security leadership of Salah al-Din has two divisions. The first is the Salah al-Din command, under the leadership of Abd al-Mohsen Hatem al-Abbasi. The Salah al-Din police director is Qandil Khalil Muhammad al-Jubouri, from al-Dhulu'iyah. The director of police in Tikrit is Latif al-Sajri. The second division is the Samarra operations command, led by Emad al-Zuhairi; the federal police is headed by Maj. Gen. Adnan Wadi Muhsen, who replaced Maj. Gen. Ali al-Lami, while the director of Samarra police is Abd al-Jabbar Abd Aoun.

The creation of two commands for the province, including one in Samarra, is tied to a plan to make Samarra a province and

incorporate it with Balad and al-Dujail into a Shiite-majority entity, while the rest of Samarra is Sunni. This would be to address demographic changes and control the water and agricultural areas.

#### *PMF economic activity in Salah al-Din*

All the factions or registered militias affiliated with the council of ministers have funds designated for them in the general budget. Moreover, one of the members of the security and defense committee in parliament who is from Salah al-Din is in a bloc that includes PMF commanders.

#### *The PMF's economic committee*

In the PMF within Salah al-Din, there are 50 people divided up into two bodies: one in Tikrit and one in Baiji. These PMF members have seized the garages, empty land, and other areas affiliated with the Tikrit municipal office, as well as agricultural areas toward the Jazeera area and al-Duyum. They have also seized houses of Baath Party leaders and the ISIS members in the Qadisiya neighborhood and al-Zuhur. After plundering the houses, they started renting them out.

The PMF factions have imposed their control on quarries, oil refineries, and gasoline facilities in Baiji, demanding a portion of the profits from the sale of gravel, sand, blocks, and gasoline. They

control the contracts and bids for the Baiji refinery and impose a tax on half the profits. The PMF also dismantled the Baiji and Siniya refineries, along with a fertilizer factory. Large trucks moved the refineries to Baghdad. After the area was liberated from ISIS, the Asa'ib and Badr groups sold the dismantled facilities back to Salah al-Din at exorbitant prices.


#### *Oil sales*

In the areas between Aldor and al-Alam controlled by the Badr group, the militias take oil from the Alas and Ajeel field and move it eastward through the al-Safra checkpoint in order to sell it to Kurdish merchants. The security authorities, the NSC, and intelligence in Salah al-Din cooperate with them in allowing the smuggling. Control of the oil fields contributed to the Badr and Asa'ib's economic revival between 2015 and 2017. The oil ministry had complete control over the pipelines before that, but Asa'ib and Badr established control over the oil supply by breaking the pipelines and filling cargo basins with oil and selling it.

#### *Municipal projects*

In Balad, the main projects are controlled by Muhammad al-Baldawi, who is affiliated with the Asa'ib. Among these undertakings is a sewage project whose cost reached 50 billion Iraqi dinars (about \$41.8 million). Another large project is directed by Ammar Hikmet, the governor's





current deputy and Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's nephew.

### ***'Taxes' and checkpoints***

Jund al-Imam controls the highway outside Tikrit heading toward al-Tharthar and imposes taxes on farmers transporting their goods. The group also imposes fees on the company building the stadium west of Tikrit toward the Jazeera area.

In Tikrit, Hezbollah, Jund al-Imam, Risaliyun, Asa'ib, Badr, the security forces from Shirqat to the peripheries north of Samarra, and the office of the PMF security in Bayt Khairallah set up checkpoints on the road for cargo cars and impose fees on them.

### ***Seizing the Balad farmers' market***

When the Balad farmers' market was put up for auction, the Asa'ib and Peace Brigades seized the opportunity. To avoid problems they decided to carry out the auction in the directorate of the municipal offices of Salah al-Din in Tikrit, in the presence of Fa'iq Zaydan, the director of the municipal offices. The representative of the Asa'ib and the representative of the Peace Brigades quarreled, and Zaydan contacted the SWAT forces to put a stop to the fighting. One of the representatives opposed him, though, and brandished a pistol in the face of a SWAT officer and ordered him to withdraw immediately. The officer withdrew,

and afterwards Baghdad intervened to settle the dispute in favor of the Asa'ib.

### ***Fishing on Al-Tharthar Lake***

The lake is one of the best-known places for fishing. Many fishermen live there and take the fish they catch to the Samarra farmers market to sell it. People traveling through Samarra from different towns and different provinces would buy the fish, and the fishermen would make a lot of money. However, the Peace Brigades took control of fishing on the lake and sold fish to other provinces to collect profits. The Peace Brigades now allow other fishers, but after the fishers complete their catches, the brigades place a price on the fish that the brigades will collect. The Peace Brigades then allow the fishers to sell their catches at whatever higher price they want, as long as the brigades get their cut.

### ***Imposing fees on returnees***

The Asa'ib faction in the village of Albu Fid'ous in Yathrib has imposed fees on the families trying to return home after the area's liberation from ISIS: 500,000 Iraqi dinars (about \$418) for each family after their homes were plundered and destroyed and the gardens were washed away during their displacement. In addition, the Asa'ib demands a portion of the crops from land where the returning families have been allowed to recultivate

the fields. Families have begun returning from the Arabat camp in Sulaymaniyah after paying the fees to the Asa'ib.

### ***Plundering of Tikrit and Aldor***

The militias plundered and stole from houses and shops in Tikrit and Aldor and transferred property to Baghdad and the other provinces. Trucks and transport cars carried equipment, furniture, and money out of Tikrit and Aldor for days.

### ***Conduct of the PMF and the Peace Brigades***

#### ***The killing of the commander of the prime minister's bodyguard***

One of the major cases that shook public opinion is the killing of Sharif Ismail at the Peace Brigades checkpoint in Samarra in March 2018. Ismail was the commander of Brigade 57, which was entrusted with protecting Haydar al-Abadi when he was prime minister.

#### ***Attempts at demographic change***

The PMF and Peace Brigades have seized a great deal of land in the province on many pretexts in order to engineer demographic change. For instance, they seized an area called Albu Hirat, which is affiliated with Samarra. The Samarra municipal office distributed the land to workers in the city, but the Peace Brigades refused to give up the land.

The brigades also demanded 500 pieces of land from Omar al-Badri, director of the ruins of the town of Samarra, to build a residential neighborhood for themselves, saying the Peace Brigades sacrificed their blood. He realized their attempt at demographic change and strongly rejected their demand, saying the lands are archeologically valuable and cannot be distributed. But they insisted, so he offered to give them money to buy lands in their original areas of residence in southern Iraq.

#### ***Threatening journalists in the province***

Field research revealed that more than one journalist in the area said they had been subjected to threats from PMF actions if they shared information about what happens in the province.

#### ***Scores of people taken from the town of Aldor***

After the liberation of Aldor from ISIS, the Asa'ib seized the town and destroyed homes, stole properties, and led 160 people – women and children among them – to an unknown place. Many people have sought these 160 people and reached out to the highest authorities about the matter, but they remain lost. The names of the victims can be found online.

#### ***Scores of Al Sallo tribe members disappeared***

More than 100 people from the Al Sallo tribe in Samarra disappeared between Samarra and Aldor. There are no clues as to their whereabouts, though their names can be found.

#### ***Killing of the commander of the 4th Division of the federal police***

The federal police force is affiliated with the Interior Ministry, and the commander of its 4th Division, Brig. Gen. Ali al-Lami, had good relations with the people of Samarra. The command base was on the Tigris River before the entry of the original Samarra bridge (this bridge has been forbidden for any Samarran to use since the PMF arrived in 2014; it has been designated as an entrance for Iranians only). Al-Lami decided to take an inspection tour on the river. He reached an area where there were members of an unknown security authority. One of them took out his weapon and fired at al-Lami, killing him instantly and wounding those accompanying him – a major general and a soldier. The file was closed, as usual.

#### ***Al-Huwaish: A secret no one knew***

The village of al-Huwaish belongs to Samarra, and its inhabitants are from one tribe. Since the brigades entered the village in 2014, they inspired fear in the hearts of the inhabitants because the residents did not know where they would flee. Former

residents of al-Huwaish cannot re-enter without being subjected to humiliation and degradation at the hands of the PMF brigades. Dozens of people from al-Huwaish have been kidnapped by the militias, and there have been no clues as to their whereabouts or news of when they might return. Visitors cannot enter al-Huwaish even to visit family, unless a guarantor comes to vouch for them, and then they can only stay for a limited number of hours. Many times visitors are rejected absolutely, even the elderly, even if they are trying to get to a funeral for a relative. Foods are not allowed to be brought into al-Huwaish without security documents. Chemical fertilizers are among the forbidden items. Some people who fled the village in 2014 only found one route of escape – the Jazeera path leading to Mosul. Of those who fled to Mosul, dozens of the elderly died and are buried there, and some were killed in the bombings.

#### ***Entry to Tikrit***

After the liberation of Tikrit by the forces headed by Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa'adi, who launched operations from Tikrit University, the PMF forces Asa'ib and Jund al-Imam attempted to seize and control the entrances to the city and not permit any citizen to enter without a badge of entry. There are four entrances to Tikrit: al-Anwa' in the south, al-Aqwas in the north, and al-Alam and Albu Ajeel in the east. There are



three types of entry badges: monthly badges and three-month badges for employees and daily badges for others, including visitors. The badges include the time of entry and the time they must leave, and the state of the visitor – ill or elderly – is written on the badge. Members of the PMF began overlooking badges at the beginning of 2019, and they confined themselves to using employees' IDs.

### **Hampering business in Samarra**

The PMF has impeded economic activity in Samarra by closing commercial streets entirely. Bank Street includes hundreds of shops and dozens of hotels and is a major business center where people from the rest of the province go to shop, and Al-Shawaf Street is no less vital. Both have been closed. Butchers Street and the old industrial area are considered a center for the sale of vehicle spare parts and the repair of engines and farming equipment. A great portion of the Maryam business market has been closed, along with the main street for the old court, including two hospitals (the general prevention center and the family hospital of Dr. Jamal al-Daradi). The Bab al-Qabla business street has been closed entirely, along with the hotels and residential buildings in it.

### **Appointments in Baiji**

The Risaliyun faction pressures the general director for

distribution of electricity in the northern region, Waleed Khalid Hassan, to appoint certain people as public sector employees without qualifications.

### **Reclassifying ancient ruins**

After UNESCO classified the ruins around Samarra as world heritage sites, the PMF began calling the palaces and facilities from the Abbasid civilization “the Prison of the Imam Ali al-Hadi,” a sectarian move that also stirs up contrived victimhood. There is no historical evidence to support the new name.

### **Albu Ajeel and the parliament elections**

After Abd Dhiyab al-Ajeeli was nominated as the sole representative in the Iraqi Parliament for the whole Sunni tribe of Albu Ajeel, the Asa'ib faction came out on election day to vote for one of the candidates from the town of Balad – a Shiite affiliated with the Asa'ib. Militias often threaten to accuse Sunnis of taking part in the massacre at the Speicher training camp. The militias used this tactic to get Sunnis to vote for the Shiite candidate. The militias similarly promoted other specific candidates in elections in 2018, such as Ahmad al-Rifa'i, who is considered a pawn for the militias.

### **The seizure of residences**

Al-Awja is large and inhabited by thousands of families, many

of whom rejected Saddam Hussein's conduct during his regime. Some were punished, and some residents were executed. People fled al-Awja in fear of the oppression of the militias, and they were not permitted to return until several months ago, after they had lost their wealth and their homes were burned. The PMF took property to create bases for itself and changed the name of Al-Awja Hospital to the Imam al-Hadi Hospital.

The militias seized homes in the Jazeera Samarra and have exploited local livestock and produce for their interest. They prevent consumers from nearby villages from buying the farm goods until they are rancid. The PMF also forced the sale of homes and buildings near Ali al-Hadi and transferred them to the Shiite Waqf, compelling the families to sell their homes through threats, blackmail, and harassment, to the point where the families no longer wanted to reside in their homes.

### **Overlapping of authority**

The militias' claims of authority sometimes overlap with each other and with security forces. This misleads people, especially in imposing curfews and permission for movement between the Peace Brigades and the Samarra security command. The security forces permit movement and residents go outside for activities, but then the Peace Brigades

punish the residents or prevent their movements.

### **Influence over security**

The security forces, despite their revulsion at the conduct of the PMF and the Peace Brigades because they show no respect to the army, nonetheless remain under the PMF brigades' influence. Security forces participate in the PMF's efforts to create demographic change, regarding the possession of the Ali al-Hadi shrine, and other issues.

### **Establishing the 'Youth of Reform'**

A group has been established called the “Youth of Reform” from the town of Samarra. It is connected to the NGOs overseen directly by the Peace Brigades. The reform group promotes the Brigades' ideas and tries to make them more accepted.

## **A Deeply Entrenched Problem**

The decision by key Iraqi and foreign players to respond to the 2014 ISIS threat with large-scale militia mobilization likely made Iraq's current crisis inevitable. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the militarization or mobilization of so many men of military age, a great deal of them under Iranian auspices, would not create lasting, powerful interest groups and relations

that undermine the Iraqi state or Iraqis' daily lives.

This intelligence briefing has demonstrated the nature and extent of PMF infiltration of multiple dimensions of Iraqi public and private life. It also outlined the factions and currents within the PMF itself. The PMF's sheer size and complexity makes it prone to internal competition, if not infighting. In theory, the Iraqi state may, through a “carrot and stick” approach, co-opt some elements, particularly those ambivalent toward Iranian influence. Yet these latter forces appear to be especially well-placed to resist such efforts to constrain the militias, as the backlash against the current and former prime ministers' efforts has shown.

An Iraqi government may opt to tolerate the militias' de facto independent armed status and focus instead on a “rule of law” approach that tries to non-violently limit their room for maneuver. This would probably not work. The PMF is likely to see such indirect pressure as a prelude to more serious state efforts to weaken it, and may react violently. Whatever the government's intentions, the PMF's infiltration of public and private life is creating new interest groups ready and increasingly able to defend their privileges.

The PMF will likely continue to exert autonomy from the state

security organs. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is a separate military force with far greater strength than even the Lebanese armed forces, whereas the Iraqi PMF is an extension of the state that enjoys greater freedom of operation. This architecture is made possible because of the deep Iranian penetration into the Iraqi state, particularly its law enforcement, intelligence, and security forces.

In sum, Iraq's PMF problem – the tensions over monopolizing violence and rule of law – has become largely an extension of the Iran problem. Perhaps more intractably, it is now deeply intertwined with the Iraqi body politic, economy, commerce, education, and other sectors that touch the lives of millions of Iraqis and create powerful new predatory interest groups.

The central government lacks the capability to tackle this problem through force, and the PMF elements in question are too aware of their own strength to make concessions otherwise. It is becoming increasingly unclear how this proverbial disease can be cured without killing the patient, but any strategy to attempt this must treat the PMF's penetration into the Iraqi nation and Iraqi life that this report reveals as its premise. □





## Security Inspection Checkpoints: Hashd Economy at the Entrances of Baghdad

No.	Name	Location
1	Al-Sayafiya checkpoint	Albu Sayfi: Located on the international route that connects Baghdad and the mid-Euphrates provinces.
2	Diyala Brigade checkpoint	Located south of Baghdad at its entrance from the side of Mada'in. This checkpoint connects the old route between Baghdad and the southern provinces.
3	Al-Abayaji checkpoint	Located between north Baghdad and south Salah ad-Din on the international route.
4	Iskaniya-Awirij checkpoint	Located south of Baghdad on the Baghdad-Babil road.
5	Al-Ghalibiyah checkpoint	Located east of Baghdad on the route connecting Baghdad and Diyala. Its considered the main checkpoint for the eastern entrance in Baghdad.
6	Al-Karma checkpoint, al-Tahaddi checkpoint	East of Fallujah. This checkpoint connects Baghdad-Anbar through the old route known as the old Baghdad-Fallujah route.
7	Khan Bani Sa'ad checkpoint	On the old route between Baghdad-Baqubah.
8	Dira' Dijla checkpoint	On the road that connects northwest Baghdad-Fallujah.



## MPs of Ninewa Province in the Iraqi Parliament for 2018



No.	Name	Bloc/Alliance/Party
1	Khalid Mut'ab Yasin Hassan	Victory Alliance- Muttahidun lil-Islah
2	Muhammad Mahmoud Taher	Victory Alliance
3	Abd al-Raheem Jasim Muhammad Metlak	Wataniyah Coalition
4	Nawaf Sa'oud Zayd Farhan	Wataniyah Coalition
5	Khalil Muhammad Sa'id Ahmad Abbas	Victory Alliance
6	Basma Muhamad Basim Sabri	Victory Alliance
7	Muna Hussein Sultan Yusuf	Victory Alliance
8	Faris Sadiq Nouri Abd al-Jabbar	Kurdistani Alliance
9	Shirwan Jamal Khidr Khalid	Kurdistani Alliance
10	Tu'ama Abdullah Hamadi Handhal	Kurdistani Alliance
11	Bashar Hameed Mahmoud Abd al-Ghafur	Kurdistani Alliance
12	Safwan Bashir Yunis Muhammad	Kurdistani Alliance
13	Ikhlas Sabah Khidr Hussein	Kurdistani Alliance
14	Khalida Khalil Rasho Samo	Kurdistani Alliance
15	Falah Hussein Zaydan Khalaf	Wataniyah Coalition
16	Lateef Mustafa Ahmad Hassan	Wataniyah Coalition
17	Nayef Mukih Shanan Dabas	Wataniyah Coalition
18	Intisar Ali Khidr Mahmoud	Wataniyah Coalition
19	Thabir Muhammad Sa'id Ridha	Wataniyah Coalition
20	Muhammad Iqbal Omar Mahmoud Abdullah	Ninewa is my Identity
21	Mahasan Hamdoun Hamid Hassan	Ninewa is my Identity
22	Mukhtar Mahmoud Yusuf Salman	Fatah Alliance
23	Hanin Mahmoud Ahmad al-Qaddo	Fatah Alliance
24	Lilyal Muhammad Ali Yunis	Fatah Alliance
25	Osama Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Abd al-Aziz	Iraqi Decision Alliance
26	Ahmad Madloul Muhammad Matlak	Iraqi Decision Alliance
27	Huda Jarallah Dawoud Hassan	Iraqi Decision Alliance
28	Hassan Khalaf Alo Hameed	Patriotic Masses Party
29	Muhammad Farman Shahir Salman	Patriotic Masses Party
30	Siham Abbas Ali Hamada	Patriotic Masses Party
31	Mayzar Hamadi Sultan Yusuf	Democratic Program
32	Hussein Hassan Narmo Darwish	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
33	Ahmad Abdullah Muhammad Mousa	Tamaddun



## Members of the Ninewa Provincial Council Currently in 2020

No.	Name	Alliance/Party
1	Najim Abdullah al-Jubouri	The Patriotic Masses and the Alliance of Iraqi Forces (Ahmad al-Jubouri and Muhammad al-Halbousi)
2	Sirwan Muhammad al-Ruzbayani	First Deputy for Ninewa Governor: Kurdistan Democratic Party
3	Hassan Khalouf al-Sinjari	Second Deputy for Ninewa Governor: the Arab Project
4	Saido Jato Hasso al-Sinjari	Head of Council: Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
5	Omar Elias Ali Elias	Head of Council: Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/National Alliance
6	Fahima Abbas Babawati	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
7	Saido Hussein Khadr Aws	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
8	Khalil Shammo	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
9	Khidr Elias Adi Kajjo	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
10	Hashim Muhammad Ali Taha al-Barifkani	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
11	Barakat Shamo Nayef Qatto	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
12	Ghazwan Hamid Hameed Khalil al-Dawoudi	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic - Kuta al-Shabak
13	Dawoud Baba Bina	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party - Kuta al-Masihi
14	Khalifa Khalid Aido Hammo	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party - Kuta al-Yazidiyin
15	Kolestan Hassan Ali Suleiman	Brotherhood and Coexistence Alliance/Kurdistan Democratic Party
16	Nour al-Din Yunis Hussein Qablan	Deputy Head of the Council - Alliance of Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front
17	Luqman Najm Ahmad Najm al-Rashidi	Deputy Head of the Council - Alliance of Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front
18	Hussam al-Din Sa'adoun Hamid Sa'adoun al-Abbar	Ihsan Movement - Islamic Party
19	Ali Khudair al-Jubouri	Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Halbousi
20	Asin Hamza Khalil Amin	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Turkmen Front - Fatah Alliance
21	Bunyan Muhammad Dhiyab al-Jarba	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Shammar Tribe
22	Muhammad Abdullah Mousa	The Arab Project
23	Balqis Taha Hussein Shanin	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc
24	Marwan Rashid al-Zaydan	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Free Civil Progressive Party
25	Mahmoud Muhammad Mahmoud al-Jubouri	Patriotic Masses
26	Dahwi Jafal Muhammad al-Sa'ib	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari



## Continued: Members of the Ninewa Provincial Council Currently in 2020

No.	Name	Alliance/Party
27	Huda Zaki al-Wazan	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc (Head of the Culture and Media Committee)
28	Muhammad Ibrahim Ali al-Bayati	Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Hikma (Head of the Security Committee)
29	Ghanim Hameed Ahmad Hamat Awghlo	Iraqiyat Ninewa - al-Nahda
30	Owaid Ali Khidr al-Jahish	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union
31	Klawiz Ali Amin	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union
32	Dawoud Jundi Suleiman Sheikh Kalo	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Patriotic Union
33	Aseel Shaheen Agha	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project
34	Kamila Nashmi al-Matyuti	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc
35	Hassan Shabib Ibrahim	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project
36	Khalida Ismail Mahaimid al-Ma'amari	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Sanad Bloc
37	Hayam Ilham Abdal Azzo	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Arab Project
38	Daldar Abdullah Ahmad Zaibari	Iraqiyat Ninewa - Development and Justice Party
39	Khalaf Obeid Abdullah al-Hadidi	Islamic Party
40	Ayed Raheel Muhammad al-Luwaizi	Arab Project
41	Khaz'al Difan Jaber al-Luwaizi	Arab Project
42	Abd al-Rahman Sultan Muhammad al-Waka'	Patriotic Masses Party



## PMF Soldiers/Fighters

No.	Area	Head of Group	Brigade/Militia/Regiment
1,500	Ninewa Plain (Bartella and Kokjali)	Wa'ad al-Qaddo	Al-Shabak Regiment, Brigade 30 - Shiite
1,200	Tel Keppe, Qusayat, Qaraqosh	Rayan al-Kaldani	Kata'ib Babiliyun - Christian
2,000	Tal Afar - Kubba and Sharikhan	Abu Zaynab al-Ta'i (Badr)	Al-Abbas Regiment - Shiite
4,000-5,000	Sinjar	No individual leader, but links to the YPG in Syria and the PKK	Sinjar Resistance Units and Asayish Izidkhan (some units have been incorporated into Regiment 80)
400	Sinjar and al-Qaraiwan	Al-Khal Ali and Khadida Kojo	Lalish Regiment - Yazidi
3,000	Rashidiya and Kabbat Sharikhan	Abu Ala' al-Wala'i	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' - Shiite
2,500	Right side of Mosul	Abu Baqir al-Jubouri	Al-Asa'ib Regiment - Shiite
1,200	Badush	Khudair Alaiwi al-Sabbar	Saraya al-Khorasani - Shiite
600	Nimrud - al-Jad'a and al-Hud	Marwan al-Zaidan	Al-Luhaib - Sunni
3,000	Tal Afar, Tal Abta, and Tal Afar airport	Nayef al-Shammari	Al-Fatah Militia - Shiite
500	Rabi'a	Abd al-Raheem al-Shammari	Al-Nawadir Regiment - Sunni
120	Ba'aj and al-Hadhr	Muhammad al-Jubouri	Jubour Tribes Regiment - Sunni
100	Nimrud	Nazhan al-Sakhr al-Lahibi	South Mosul Regiment - Sunni
100	Rabi'a	Watban al-Ramah	Al-Tahaddi Regiment - Sunni
150	Salamiya and Nimrud	Khalid al-Sabah	Jubour Tribe Regiment - Sunni
200	Mosul - al-Arabi Neighbourhood	Omar al-Alaf	Al-Arabi Neighbourhood, Regiment 14 - Sunni
100	Ba'aj - Sakar area	Nawar Nayef al-Afin	Al-Jaghayafa Regiment - Sunni
300	Rabi'a	Fawaz Dhiyab al-Jarba	Rabi'a Regiment - Sunni
4,000	Badush	Muhammad Yahya al-Talib	Ninewa Guard Brigade 57 - Sunni
500	Qayyarah	Muhammad al-Mar'id	Al-Qayyara Martyrs - Sunni
400	Ba'aj and Hadhr	Abd al-Karim Madlul al-Jarba	Shammari Forces Regiment 52 - Sunni
1,200	Ba'aj	Dhiyab Makif al-Shammari	Mosul Shield Regiment - Sunni
150	Tal Abta	Abdullah As'ad al-Basha	Al-Tanaya Regiment 60, 2 - Sunni
500	Ba'aj	Ahmad Madlul al-Jarba	Lions of Ninewa Regiment 46 - Sunni
400	Rabi'a	Faysal Watban al-Jarba	Al-Tanaya Regiment 54, 1 - Sunni
250	Jazeera	Safuk Mani' al-Yawar	Jazeera Shield Regiment - Sunni
250	Qayyarah	Hamidi al-Jou'ani	Al-Jou'ana Regiment - Sunni
300	Jabban	Munif al-Ali al-Luwaizi	Al-Luwaizi Regiment 65 - Sunni
300	Tal Afar - al-Ayadiya	Muhammad al-Waka'	Al-Karar Regiment - Shiite

## Continued: PMF Soldiers/Fighters

No.	Area	Head of Group	Brigade/Militia/Regiment
150	Hadhr	Hawad al-Ahmadi	Al-Hadhr Regiment - Sunni
100	Ba'aj	Ahmad Mahaidi Saleh al-Shammari	Talul al-Ba'aj Regiment - Sunni
120	Hamam al-Alil	Naseef al-Ameed Ibrahim al-Marsoumi	Hamam al-Alil Regiment - Sunni
200	Nimrud	Ahmad al-Jawari	Al-Nimrud Regiment - Sunni
120	Mosul - al-Qahira and al-Tahrir	Ahmad Mahmoud al-Warshan	Shield of the Hunchback Regiment 15 - Sunni
75	Sinjar	Aamer al-Sinjari	Heroes of Sinjar Regiment - Sunni
300	Hadhr	Hisham al-Hamdani	Al-Hamdani Regiment 11 - Sunni
300	Ba'wiza, Kokjali and al-Rashidiya	Ahmad al-Jubouri	Knights of Jubour - Sunni
150	Ba'wiza and al-Rashidiya	Meqdad al-Sheikh Faris Abdullah al-Sab'awi	Bayariq al-Iraq Regiment - Sunni
79	Hadhr	Mazahem Ghazi	Al-Akoub Regiment 17 - Sunni
200	Left side of Mosul	Yusuf al-Ramah and Abu Ramah al-Siyab	Ramah al-Mosul Regiment - Sunni
200	Qayyarah	Muhammad Nouri al-Abd Rabbah	Al-Jubouri Commandos 39 - Sunni
291	Awinat, al-Ayadhiya sub-district (Tal Afar)	Fanar Ahmad Safuk	Al-Safuk Regiment 63 - Sunni
275	Badush	Radhwan Nafi' Muhammad	Badush Regiment - Sunni
150	Tal Abta	Ali Jasim al-Matyuti	Al-Matyutiya Regiment - Sunni
200	Qayyarah	Shahadha Jasim Azzawi al-Khafaji	Al-Khafji Regiment 46 - Sunni



## Basra Province

Position	Name	Affiliation
Governor of Basra	As'ad Abd al-Amir Abd al-Ghaffar al-Aidani	Deputy Secretary General of the Party of the National Iraqi Congress
First Deputy of the Governor	Muhammad Taher al-Tamimi	Sadrist Movement
Second Deputy of the Governor	Dergham Arif al-Ajwadi	Virtue Party (also known as National Program Bloc)
Head of the Provincial Council	Sabah Hassan al-Bazuni	Da'wa Party (Tanzim al-Dakhil)
Deputy Head of the Provincial Council	Waleed Hameed Kaytan	Al-Hikma
Rapporteur of the Provincial Council	Najla' Jabbar Majeed	Al-Hikma
Basra Police Commander	Lieutenant General Rasheed Falih al-Halfi	He is close to the governor, Popular Mobilization Forces commanders, and Iran
Basra Operations Commander	Lieutenant General Qasim Jasim Nizal al-Maliki	He does not have a relationship with the parties and factions. His official relationship with the governor and Popular Mobilization Forces is within the security frameworks. His area of responsibility deals with army intervention in the event of emergencies.
The Adel Abd al-Mahdi government has no minister from Basra.		



## The Names of the MPs from Basra Province

No.	Name	Alliance/Bloc
1	Aamer Hussein al-Fayez	Fatah Alliance
2	Uday Awad	Fatah Alliance
3	Faleh al-Khaz'ali	Fatah Alliance
4	Muhamad Abu al-Hail	Fatah Alliance
5	Intisar al-Moussawi	Fatah Alliance
6	Mithaq al-Hamidi	Fatah Alliance
7	Rami al-Sikini	Sa'irun
8	Mudhaffar Ismail al-Fadl	Sa'irun
9	Badr Sa'igh al-Ziyadi	Sa'irun
10	As'ad al-Abadi	Sa'irun
11	Najah al-Mayahi	Sa'irun
12	Jabbar al-Aibi	Victory Coalition
13	Jamal al-Muhammadawi	Victory Coalition
14	As'ad al-Aidani	Victory Coalition
15	Mazahem al-Tamimi	Victory Coalition
16	Thawra Hadaj	Victory Coalition
17	Khalid Abd al-Samad al-Katrani	State of Law
18	Salam Abd al-Mohsen al-Maliki	State of Law
19	Kadhim Finjan al-Hammami	State of Law
20	Safa' Muslim Bandar	State of Law
21	Hassan Khalati al-Bazuni	Al-Hikma
22	Zahra Hamza al-Bajari	A-Hikma
23	Abd al-Amir Najm Abdullah	Men of Works Gathering
24	Abd'un Alawi Taher	Will Movement
25	Safa' Adnan al-Ghanem	Al-Wataniyah



## Names of Members of the Basra Provincial Council

No.	Name	Bloc/Alliance/Party
1	Ghali Ali al-Mansouri	Al-Hikma Bloc
2	Salman Abd al-Razzaq al-Tamimi	Al-Hikma Bloc
3	Ameen Wahab Abdullah	Al-Hikma Bloc
4	Jawad Abd al-Abbas Muhammad al-Imara	Al-Hikma Bloc
5	Waleed Hameed Kaytan	Al-Hikma Bloc
6	Ali Shaddad al-Faris	Al-Hikma Bloc
7	Najla' Jabbar Majeed	Al-Hikma Bloc
8	Iktifa' Sabahi Muhammad	Al-Hikma Bloc
9	Mortada Karim Khaz'ali al-Shahmani	Badr Bloc
10	Ghanem Hameed Saleh al-Mansouri	Badr Bloc
11	Hussam Hanun Abu al-Hail	Badr Bloc
12	Amtar Raheem Nu'ama	Badr Bloc
13	Sumayyah Faysal Awda al-Halfi	Badr Bloc
14	Rabi' Mansour To'ama	Badr Bloc
15	Nadhim Nimr Abd	Badr Bloc
16	Ahmad Thajeel al-Saliti	Badr Bloc
17	Sabah Hassan al-Bazuni	State of Law Bloc
18	Ameen Mansour Qasim	State of Law Bloc
19	Jabbar Abd Ali al-Sa'adi	State of Law Bloc
20	Basma Dakhil al-Salmi	State of Law Bloc
21	Basim Khalaf Faris	State of Law Bloc
22	Ahmad Abd al-Hussein Kadhim	State of Law Bloc
23	Fatima al-Mayahi	State of Law Bloc
24	Haydar Abd al-Sada al-Sa'adi	Al-Ahrar Bloc
25	Muhammad Mahdi Saleh	Al-Ahrar Bloc
26	Bushra Hameed Salman al-Muhammadawi	Al-Ahrar Bloc
27	Raja' Fadhel Arir	Al-Ahrar Bloc
28	Mujeeb Aziz Kareem	Virtue Bloc



## Continued: Names of Members of the Basra Provincial Council

No.	Name	Bloc/Alliance/Party
29	Anwar Mudallil Shabar	Virtue Bloc
30	Nash'at Sakban Talib	Virtue Bloc
31	Mundhar Riyadh Abd al-Razzaq	Islamic Party
32	Jum'a Hajul Sabr	Communist Party
33	Aqeel al-Khalidi	Gathering of Justice and Unity
34	Karim Shawwal al-Maliki	Future
35	Nofak Aram Batsryan	Christian Component





## Names of the MPs in Salah al-Din Province


Name	Affiliated with:
Manar al-Baldawi	The Building Alliance, Abu Mazen, and sometimes with Badr
Muhammad al-Baldawi	The Asa'ib
Mahdi Taqi	Badr
Jasim al-Jabara from al-Alam	Ayad Allawi
Dr. Maqdam al-Jumaili from Shirqat	Khamis al-Khanjar
Shama'il Sahab al-Obeidi	Khamis al-Khanjar
Ahmad Abdullah Abd Abu Mazen	Fatah affiliated with Hadi al-Amiri
Ammar Yusuf Hamoud, al-Ata' Alliance	Faleh al-Fayadh
Kafa' Farhan Hussein	
Muthanna Abd al-Samad	Salim al-Jubouri
Qutaiba al-Jubouri	Ayad Allawi
Ali al-Sajri	The Interest



## Names of Members of the Provincial Council in Salah al-Din

Name
Ahmad Abd al-Jabbar Kareem
Ashwaq al-Jubouri
Amina al-Jubouri
Amira Abd al-Amir al-Baldawi
Jasim Mumtaz Ali Akbar
Jum'a Zahir al-Khazraji
Hardan Lafta
Hassan Muhammad Ahmad
Khalid al-Khazraji
Khalid Hassan Mahdi al-Darraji
Khaz'al Hamad al-Qaisi
Rasheed al-Bayati
Rana Abd al-Hameed al-Jubouri
Ziyad Ali Abdullah al-Ajeeli
Sabhan Mala Chayad
Sahar Mawlud
Sa'ad Muhammad Yusuf
Sa'adiya al-Obeidi
Abd Sultan Eisa
Uday Dhanun al-Jubouri
Ali al-Dujaili
Ali Fadhel
Faysal al-Jubouri
Kamil Abbas Ashraf
Mutshar al-Bayati
Mutshar Subhi Ghafel (bought the seat from the former member Adnan Ibrahim al-Faraji)
Mala Hassan Kirman
Munir al-Jubouri
Wasmi al-Sahan

Note: The district councils have not changed since their establishment and no elections have happened.



## Najaf Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Ihsan Tha'aban Abd Ali Kadhim	Victory Coalition
Hassan Razzaq Dawud al-Jahishi	Sa'irun
Hassan Abdullah Abadi al-Aquli	Sa'irun
Khalid Jawad Kadhim Aboud	Al-Hikma
Sa'ad Jabbar Muhammad Ali	Victory Coalition
Sana' Muhammad Hameed Jawad	Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link with Badr Organization)
About Waheed About Aneed	State of Law Coalition: political/organizational link with Da'wa Party
Adnan Abd Khudair Abbas	Victory Coalition
Ali Yusuf Abd al-Nabi Omran	Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link with Badr Organization)
Fadhil Jaber Abd Shanin	Fatah Alliance (factional link/a commander in Badr Organization)
Majed Adhab Jaber Sajit	Sa'irun
Wala' Raheem Hussein Salawi	Sa'irun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Asifa Hamid al-Yasiri	Al-Ahrar
Aseel Ibrahim al-Talqani	Al-Wafa'
Hussein Abd al-Ameer al-Hadrawi	Al-Wafa'
Fa'iz Hussein Sha'aban	Al-Wafa'
Sa'ad Mohsen al-Haris	Al-Wafa'
Wisam Hussein al-Zajrawi	Al-Ahrar
Razzaq Mohsen Muhammad Sharif	Al-Ahrar
Radwan Kamil al-Kindi	Al-Wafa'
Hussein Waheed al-Eisawi	Al-Wafa'
Sahr Karim al-Fatlawi	Al-Wafa'
Faruq Salman al-Ghazali	Al-Hikma
Idris Yahya al-Yasiri	Al-Da'wa al-Dakhil (political/organizational link)
Ameen Kamil Hameed al-Ghazali	Al-Ahrar
Bushra Abbas al-Ramahi	Al-Dawla al-Adila (political link/independent)
Jawad Oweiz al-Ghazali	Al-Wafa'
Hassan Hamza Mousa al-Zubaidi	Al-Islah
Hussein al-Zamili	Al-Wafa'
Khudair Nu'ama al-Jubouri	Saraya al-Jihad (factional link/a commander in the Saraya al-Jihad militia)
Zuhair Hamoudi Qanbar al-Jubouri	Al-Islah



## Continued: Najaf Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Zaynab Atiya Nour al-Alawi	Al-Hikma
Siham Man'am al-Mahna	Badr (family/relatives link, a Badr commander)
Sahila Sa'ad al-Sa'igh	Badr (political link/independent)
Abbas Jabar al-Alaiwi	Law
Ali Hassan Ismail al-Shammari	The Najaf for Change
Aamer Ali al-Arbawi	Al-Fadhila (factional link/a commander in the al-Awfiya' Hashd)
Kadhim Abd Hussein al-Jalayjawi	Badr (factional link/a commander in the Badr Hashd)
Mohsen Yasin al-Tamimi	Al-Jihad Movement (factional link/a commander in the al-Jihad Movement Hashd)
Hadi Da'boul al-Hatimi	Al-Hikma
Hala Hassib al-Mashhadi	Al-Hikma

### Administration

**Governor:** Luay al-Yasiri (Law)

**First Deputy:** Hashim Najm al-Kar'awi (Al-Hikma)

**Second Deputy:** Talal Bilal al-Aridhi (Al-Wafa')

**Head of Provincial Council:** Khudair Na'ama al-Jubouri (Saraya Al-Jihad)

**Police Commander:** Major General Ghanem Muhammad Ja'afar Al-Husseini

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (Commander of Mid-Euphrates Operations)



## Karbala Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Manal Hameed Hashem Abbas	Victory Coalition
Hazim Abd Sukhail Muhammad Hussein	State of Law Coalition (political links/Shura of the Da'wa Party)
Hussein Ahmad Hadi Hussein	State of Law Coalition (political links/Shura of the Da'wa Party)
Hussein Ali Muhammad Abbas	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Laila Falih Hassan Alwan	Fatah Alliance (political/organizational link in the Badr Organization)
Hamid Abbas Yaseen Hashem	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Hassan Muhammad Kadhim Alwan	Al-Hikma
Nabil Hamza Mahsun Ismail	Sa'irun
Fatima Abbas Kadhim Hassan	Sa'irun
Riyadh Muhammad Ali Awda Dahash	Sa'irun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Bushra Hassan Ashur Hita	Law
Sandis Imran al-Tarihi	Law (link of family/relatives: Leader in the Shura of the Da'wa Party)
Tariq Katif al-Khaykani	Al-Ahrar
Hussein Shadhan al-Aboudi	Al-Ahrar
Zuhair Ahmad Abu Dakka	Supreme Council (political/organization links: Supreme Council)
Ala' Abd al-Wahid al-Ghanimi	Al-Hikma
Janan Abbas al-Wazani	Al-Hikma
Jabbar Mohsen J'az al-Jalihawi	Amal al-Rafidain
Suhaila Shinu Adhab al-Zubaidi	Amal al-Rafidain
Ali Abd Sakhil al-Maliki	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Muhammad Abd Zaid al-Talaqani	Al-Dawla al-Adila (political/organization links)
Zahra Matar Hassoun al-Da'ami	Al-Dawla al-Adila (political links/independent)
Abbas Hameed Hashim al-Mousawi	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Ridha Muhammad al-Sailawi	Al-Ahrar
Jasim Hameed Hani al-Maliki	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Haydar Ali Al Khanjar	Kafa'at al-Taghyeer
Hana' Hadi al-Hasanawi	Al-Ahrar
Murad Anad al-Jubouri	Amal al-Rafidain
Aqeel Fa'iq al-Mas'oudi	Al-Ahrar
Naser al-Khaz'ali	Al-Ahrar



## Continued: Karbala Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Yusuf Majeed al-Habub	Al-Liwa'
Muhammad Hameed al-Mousawi	Amal al-Rafidain (overseer of the Qasim al-Jabarin brigade)
Safa' Hashim Nasrallah	Asa'ib (factional link/commander in Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)
Nafi' Hashim al-Mayali	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Hamid Sahib al-Karbala'i	Badr (factional link)
Majid Sa'eed Muhammad al-Maliki	Law (Al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi regiment/al-Sadr al-Awal)
Mahfouz Man'am al-Tamimi	Law (factional link/commander in the Al-Shaheed al-Sadr al-Awal militia)
Ahmad Jawad Madi al-Amari	-
Zuhair Kadhim Marhun al-Kariti	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)

### Administration

**Governor:** Naseef Jasim al-Khatabi (Law)

**First Deputy:** Jasim al-Fatlawi (Al-Ahrar)

**Second Deputy:** Ali al-Mayali (Al-Ata')

**Head of the Provincial Council:** Ali Abd Sakheel al-Maliki (Law)

**Police Commander:** Major General Ahmad Zuwaini

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab'oun (Rafidain Operations Commander)



## Samawah/Muthanna Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Faleh Abd al-Hassan Sakr Sultan	Victory Coalition
Adnan Hadi Nour Muhammad al-Asadi	State of Law Coalition (political link/Shura of the Da'wa Party)
Ashwaq Karim Mohsen Atouj	Fatah Alliance (family/relatives link, Commander in the Badr Organization)
Uday Hatem Rajouj Sha'alan	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Faleh Sari Abdadhi Okab	Al-Hikma
Rifah Khidr Jayad Ba'ir	Sa'irun
Sa'aran Obeid Shani Kassar	Sa'irun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Ammar Sahib Al Ghareeb	Law
Anwar Fahim al-Zalimi	Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Sa'ad Kadhim Al Sultan	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Basima Raheem al-Raishawi	Asa'ib (family/relations link: commander in the Asa'ib Organization)
Sana' Hussein al-Safrani	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Hakim Muslim al-Yasiri	Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council)
Hussein Manisad al-Abadi	Al-Hikma
Fariq Fuwain al'Aajaiyi	Al-Hikma
Qabil Zagheer al-Zayrjawi	Al-Hikma
Ahmad Marzuk Salal al-Hassani	Al-Hikma
Zahra Alaiwi al-Sayaghi	Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council)
Talib Salman al-Mayali	Al-Ahrar
Salam Hamza al-Jayashi	Al-Ahrar
Awsaf Abd al-Karim al-Zalimi	Al-Ahrar
Harith Lahmoud al-Zayrjawi	Tajammu' al-Kiafa'at
Ismail Sawadi al-Jayashi	Tajammu' al-Kiafa'at
Zaynab Hassan al-Toubi	Tajammu' al-Kiafa'at
Muhammad Arboud al-Zayadi	Al-Ahrar
Fahad Sayf al-Ghanimi	Tajammu' al-Muthanna
Ghazi Mousa al-Khateeb	Communist
Ali Hussein Aziz Ali Hanoush	Al-Muthanna Alliance for Change and Building
Wafa' Fadhil al-Khalidi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Zaynab Raheem al-Jayashi	Badr (political/organizations link: Badr Organization)



## Continued: Samawah/Muthanna Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Khudair Matar Hajim al-Raishawi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ajil Kadhim al-Ziyadi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Muhammad Hasouni Jawdan al-Eisawi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)

### Administration

**Governor:** Ahmad Manfi Jawda (Law)

**First Deputy:** Sami Na'ama al-Hassani (Al-Ahrar)

**Second Deputy:** Adel Nazik al-Yasiri (Al-Hikma)

**Head of Provincial Council:** Hakim Muslim al-Yasiri (Supreme Council)

**Police Commander:** Major General Sami Sa'oud Jafat

**Operations Commander:** Rafidain Operations Commander: Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab'oun.



## Diwaniyah/Qadisiyyah: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Huda Sajjad Mahmoud Shakir	Victory Coalition
Abd al-Hussein Aziz Ahmad Jalil	Victory Coalition
Abd al-Ilah Ali Muhammad Tahir	State of Law oalition (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Sa'ad Shaker Aziz Kadhim	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Siham Mousa Hamoud Jabar	Fatah Alliance (political/organizations link: Badr Organization)
Abbas Sha'il Awda Thajeel	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Ali Mani' Attiyah Salman	Al-Hikma
Maysoun Jasim Dawoud Ati	Sa'irun
Muhammad Ali Hussein Adhafa	Sa'irun
Ahmad Hamza Kati' Jabar	Sa'irun
Malhan Imran Mousa Salman	

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Intisar Hadi al-Mousawi	Law
Iyad Tali' al-Miyali	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Basim Abd Attiyah al-Awadi	Al-Ahrar
Baqir Ali Sha'alan	Al-Wafa' lil-Iraq
Basma Kadhim Nakar	Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Balsam Ali Talib al-Awadi	Abna' al-Diwaniyah
Jubayr Salman al-Jubouri	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ja'afar Mousa al-Mousawi	Jamahir al-Diwaniyah
Jamal Farid al-Attiya	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Hafiz Matshar al-Aboudi	Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Hakim Hameed al-Khaz'ali	Al-Hikma
Hussein Jahil al-Badairi	Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Hussein Abd al-Hameed Mazruk al-Abidi	Al-Mowatin
Hussein Muhaysan al-Karidhi	Al-Ahrar
Hussein Hadi al-Badairi	Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council)
Hakeema Adheem al-Shabali	Jamahir al-Diwaniyah
Haydar Hamza al-Shammari	Al-Ahrar
Khudair Sharif al-Mayahi	Wataniyah al-Bayda' (Political Link/Independent)
Zaynab Hamza al-Abidi	Al-Hikma



## Continued: Diwaniyah/Qadisiyyah: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Saleh Nouri al-Hayawi	Da'wa/al-Dakhil (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Duha Ridha al-Qusayr	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Abbas Matlab al-Shaybani	Al-Mowatin
Ali Fawzi al-Khaz'ali	Al-Madani
Anad Kadhim al-Na'ili	Al-Fadhila (factional link/commander in the al-Awfiya' Hashd)
Fatima Hatif al-Kar'awi	Al-Ahrar
Faydal Hasan al-Na'ili	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Majid Jaber al-Salihi	Wataniyah al-Bayda' (political link/independent)
Maytha Mousa Khasbak al-Zubaidi	Jamahir al-Diwaniyah

### Administration

**Governor:** Zuhair Ali al-Sha'alan (Law)

**First Deputy:** Hussein al-Mousawi (Al-Ahrar)

**Second Deputy:** Malik Kadhim Kati' (Abna' al-Diwaniyah)

**Head of Provincial Council:** Jubayr Salman al-Jubouri (Law)

**Police Commander:** Brigadier general Haydar Hassan Mankhi

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (commander of Mid-Euphrates operations)



## Babil Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Falah Abd al-Kareem Radhi Manoukh	Victory Coalition
Maha Fadhil Kadhim Khudair	Victory Coalition
Raheed Adai Karu Hamzah	Victory Coalition
Sadiq Madlul Hamad Jasim	State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Mansour Hussein Madour Abbas	State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Haitham Ramadan Abd Ali Harit	Kifa'at lil-Taghyeer Coalition (political link/Secretary General of the Kifa'at Bloc)
Thamer Dhayban	Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa'ib Militia)
Hassan Shaker Awdah Hussein	Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa'ib Militia)
Manal Wahab Muhammad Fadhil Ali	Fatah Alliance (political/organization link: Badr Organization)
Adnan Fayhan Mousa Shari	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in Asa'ib Militia)
Lubna Raheem Karim Fayd Allah	Al-Hikma
Salim Tahmir Ali Farhud	Al-Hikma
Hassan Fad'am Asal Hussein	Al-Hikma
Salam Hadi Kadhim Aboud	Sa'irun
Ali Ghawi Hassan Jasim	Sa'irun
Nouras Kamil Attiya Madi	Sa'irun
Muhammad Ridha Dawoud Nasir	Sa'irun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Ibrahim Habib Khabat al-Abbasi	Al-Hikma
Ahlam Rahid al-Watifi	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Ahmad Adnan Shaheed al-Gharibawi	Al-Fadhila (political/organization link: Al-Fadhila Party)
As'ad Abd Harab al-Daraiyi	Al-Ahrar
As'ad Man'am al-Muslimawi	Al-Hikma
Ban Mahdi Kadhim al-Ma'mouri	Ansar al-Hussein (family/relatives link, a militia commander)
Hassan Kamoun Karidi al-Ta'i	Supreme Council (political/organizations link: Supreme Council)
Hamza Obeid Mousa al-Khafaji	The Asa'ib (factional link: Commander in the Asa'ib Militia)
Haydar Jaber al-Zanbour al-Ajeeli	Al-Ahrar
Haydar Abd al-Karim Rasheed al-Janabi	Al-Iraqiya
Khatam Dawoud Jalab al-Hameedawi	Kafa'at lil-Taghyeer
Ra'ad Hamza Alwan al-Jubouri	Kafa'at lil-Taghyeer



## Continued: Babil Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Rafla' Radhi Abd al-Kareem al-Jahishi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Riyadh Adai al-Khafaji	Al-Hikma
Zuhair Abbas al-Jawdhari	Al-Hikma
Zayd Jawad Hassan Salim Watut	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Zaynab Ismail al-Husseini	Supreme Council (family link/wife of a leader in the Supreme Council)
Suhaila Ismail al-Khaykani	Supreme Council (political/organization link: Supreme Council)
Sadiq Rasul al-Mahna	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Talib Obeid Nasar	Al-Hikma
Ad Amir Ghali al-Jubouri	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Aqeel Jabbar hamza al-Rubai'i	Al-Madani
Ali Jasim al-Sultani	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Ali Hamza Dalli al-Kar'awi	Al-Islah
Kamil Shabeeb Shahtoul	Al-Hikma
Majid Hameed al-Qusayr	Asa'ib (factional link/commander in the Asa'ib Militia)
Mahdi Akoul Hassan al-Sultani	Law (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Khalid Ali Mousa al-Khafaji	Kafa'at
Habah Eisa Imran	Al-Ahrar
Zaynab Hamza Kadhim al-Shammari	Kafa'at lil-Taghyeer
Radhi Obeid Hajoul al-Jubouri	Al-Islah

### Administration

**Governor:** Karar Sabah al-Abadi (Law)


**First Deputy:** Habib Hashim al-Hillawi (Asa'ib)

**Second Deputy:** Hassan Mandeel (Al-Hikma)

**Head of Provincial Council:** Ra'ad Hamza Alwan al-Jubouri (Kafa'at lil-Taghyeer)

**Police Commander:** Major General Ali Kawa al-Zaghayyi

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ghazi al-Hashimi (commander of Mid-Euphrates operations)



## Anbar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Muhammad Nasir Dalli Ahmad	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Adel Khameed Abd al-Latif Fadhil	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Sa'adoun Juwair Farhan al-Dulaimi	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Faleh Yunis Hassan Jadou'	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Nahla Jabbar Khalifa Mohsen	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Muhammad Raykan Hadid Ali	Al-Anbar is Our Identity
Nahla Hamad Abd Saleh	Victory Coalition
Faysal Hussein Jabbar Abbas	Victory Coalition
Sami'a Muhammad Khalifa al-Ghalab	Wataniyah Coalition
Yahya Ghazi Abd Lateef	Wataniyah Coalition
Kareem Aftan Ahmad Ghatheeth	Wataniyah Coalition
Haybat Ahmad Abbas Abd al-Jabbar	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Abdullah Abd al-Hameed Dhiyab Kharbit	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Ibtisam Muhammad Darab Khalaf	Abirun
Qasim Muhammad Abd Hamadi	Abirun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Ahmad Hameed Sharqi al-Alwani	Al-Qarar
Arkan Khalaf al-Tarmuz	Al-Hall
Asma' Osama al-Ani	Al-Qarar
Amirah Uday Abbas	Al-Qarar
Iman Jihad Ahmad al-Mashhadani	Al-Qarar
Iman Kurdi al-Akidi	Abirun
Ibrahim Muhammad Sarhid	Al-Qarar
Jasim Muhammad al-Halbousi	Al-Qarar
Hudhaifa Khalaf Jarad al-Eisawi	Abirun
Riyadh Talib al-Jumaili	Abirun
Sa'ad Jasim Zaydan al-Amiri	Al-Hall
Salma Ahmad Lafi	Al-Hall
Shalal Naji Obeid al-Halbousi	Abirun
Sadiq Jamil Madkhar	Al-Qarar



## Continued: Anbar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Sabah Karhout	Al-Qarar
Taha Abd al-Ghanni al-Hazimawi	Al-Qarar
Taha Abd Muslih Abd al-Ghanni	Rawafid
Obeid Makhlaf al-Suweidawi	Abirun
Adhal Obeid Daji al-Fahdawi	Al-Qarar
Ali Muhammad Darab	Al-Qarar
Omar Abd al-Rahman Hassan Amalawi	Al-Qarar
Eid Emash Talak al-Karbouli	Al-Hall
Fatima Khalaf Saleh	Abirun
Farhan Muhammad Saleh	Abirun
Fahad Mash'an al-Rashid	Al-Ta'awun
Karim Halal Sharqi al-Karbouli	Al-Iraqiya
Muhammad Yaseen Hameed	Al-Iraqiya
Mahmoud Ahmad Khalaf al-Fahdawi	Al-Hall
Murdhi Muhammad al-Mahalawi	Al-Qarar
Na'im al-Ka'oud	Abirun
Wisam Qahir Abd al-Lateef al-Rawi	Al-Hall

### Administration

**Governor:** Ali Farhan Hameed (Al-Hall)

**First Deputy:** Jasim Muhammad Asal (Al-Qarar)

**Second Deputy:** Mustafa Ahmad Arsan al-Jumaili (Al-Hall)

**Head of Provincial Council:** Ahmad Hameed Sharqi al-Alwani (Al-Qarar)

**Police Commander:** Haji Razeed Kassar

**Operations Commander:** Major General Nasir al-Ghannam



## Wasit Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Yusuf Ba'ir Alwan Abd Ali	Victory Coalition
Iqbal Abd al-Hussein Abu Jari Madhi	Victory Coalition
Kadhim Hussein Ali Jaber	State of Law Coalition (political/organization link: Da'wa Party)
Abbas Yaber Owaid Sayeh	Kafa'at lil-Taghyeer Coalition
Sa'ad Hussein Hashim Hassan	Fatah Alliance (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization)
Qasim Muhammad Jalal Hussein	Fatah Alliance (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization)
Mahmoud Abd al-Ridha	Al-Hikma
Sa'adiya Abdullah Awfi Hussein	Al-Hikma
Hassan Jalal Muhammad Tahir	Sa'irun
Salman Hassan Badair Zayed	Sa'irun
Inas Naji Kadhim Ibrahim	Sa'irun
Mazen Abd al-Man'am Jum'a Rajab	Feyli Kurds

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Adel Raheem Bahak al-Tamimi	Al-Fadhila
Abbas Mayeh Sada Majhul	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Wasfi Nasir Zahir Jabar	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Ghalib Ahmad Kadhim al-Radini	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Ala' Ismail Hameed Hajim	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Karkana Qahtan Abd al-Hameed	Al-Jihad Movement (family/relatives link, secretary general of the al-Jihad Movement)
Mahdi Yunis Ayal Hazim	Al-Hikma
Hashim Maksar Mousa al-zamili	Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi)
Hashim Turki Shakir al-Awadi	Al-Hikma
Sajida Nazar Muhammad Ali	Al-Hikma
Hana' Khaz'al Jum'a Shabeeb	Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer)
Abd al-Ilah Nairman al-Shammari	Supreme Council (political link/close to the leader in the Supreme Council Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi)
Mazen Kandouh Salman al-Zamili	Al-Ahrar
Raheem Sawadi Kawad Bandar	Al-Ahrar
Muntadhir Naji Yasir al-Na'amani	Al-Ahrar
Sahib owaid Yaseen al-Jalaibawi	Al-Ahrar



## Continued: Wasit Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Maryam Abdullah Jadir al-Jizani	Al-Ahrar
Turki Khalaf Ali al-Abd al-Ghanaimawi	Law (political/organization links: Da'wa Party)
Mahdi Ali Jaber al-Mousawi	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' (factional link/commander in the Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada' Militia)
Murad Hamid Alawi al-Shujairi	Iraq al-Khair wa al-Ata'
Muhasin Khairi al-Dulaimi	Asa'ib (factional link/commander in al-Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Militia)
Khalid Hussein al-Ajaiawi	Al-Hikma
Haydar Hashim Ali al-Fayli	Feyli Kurds
Amal Abd al-Hussein al-Akeeli	Al-Mowatin/al-Mu'tamar (political/organizations link: al-Mu'tamar al-Watani)
Ghadanfar Kadhim Obeid al-Shammari	Badr (factional link/leader in the Badr Organization)
Karim Salman Nasir al-Baidani	Al-Hikma
Areebi Shaneen Muhammad al-Zamili	Al-Islah
Nasir Daham Muhammad al-Jahishi	Watan Mustaqil

### Administration

**Governor:** Muhammad Jameel al-Mayahi (Al-Hikma)

**First Deputy:** Adel Hamza al-Zirkani (Al-Ahrar)

**Second Deputy:** Rasheed al-Badairi (Al-Fadhila)

**Head of the Provincial Council:** Mazen Kandouh al-Zamili (Al-Ahrar)

**Police Commander:** Brigadier General Hameed Nahaiwi al-Ayadi

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab'oun (Al-Rafidain Operations Commander)





## Maysan Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Siham Shanun Abdullah Adhafa	Victory Coalition
Baha' al-Din Nour Muhammad Hussein	State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Karim Alaiwi Jahoush Sawainakh	Fatah Alliance (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Dalal Hassan Muhammad Eisa	Fatah Alliance (factional link/her father is a commander in Organization)
Abbas Sarout Mohsen Muslim	Al-Hikma
Jamal Fakhir Owaid Ali	Sa'irun
Ali Sa'adoun Ghalam Ali Abd al-Kareem	Sa'irun
Mudhar Khaz'al Salman Munshid	Sa'irun
Mahmoud Adeeb Zuwair Muhammad	Sa'irun
Muntaha Jabar Saleh Abd	Sa'irun

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Jasim Sahib al-Maliki	Al-Ahrar
Maytham Mohsen Hatem al-Sadkhani	Al-Ahrar
Wisam Jawad Kadhim al-Sa'adi	Al-Ahrar
Yasir Nu'ama Abd al-Hussein al-Lami	Al-Ahrar
Aamer Nasrallah Ali	Al-Ahrar
Eisa Hashim Faleh al-Naji	Al-Ahrar
Layla Hameed Shaktayar al-Dhahaybawi	Al-Ahrar
Ruqayya Raheem Mohsen al-Nouri	Al-Ahrar
Wajdan Abd al-Hameed al-Fatlawi	Al-Ahrar
Rahi Abd al-Wahid Nahidh	Al-Fadhila (factional link: commander in the al-Awfiya' Militia)
Hassan Ali Maz'al/Abu Jamal al-Firtousi	Law/ Kata'ib Jund al-Imam (factional link: commander in Kata'ib Jund al-Imam Militia)
Jawad Kadhim Kato/Abu Yahya al-Firtousi	Law/Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Abdullah Yahya Raji	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ali Hassan Karam al-Ghanimi	Law/Badr (factional link/commander in the Badr Organization)
Mundhar Raheem Khalaf al-Shawi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Sarhan Salim al-Ghalibi	Al-Mowatin/al-Hikma



## Continued: Maysan Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Maysoun Abd al-Jabbar Ismail	Law/Badr (family link: her husband is a commander in the Badr Organization)
Abd al-Hussein Abd al-Ridha al-Sa'adi	Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma
Mortadha Ali Hamoud al-Sa'adi	Law/Ansar Allah (factional link: commander in the PMF Commission)
Jawad Raheem al-Ghadeeri	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Lama Khudayr Dhiyab al-Zaidi	Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma
Yusra Naji Dhamad	Al-Mowatin/Supreme Council (Law (political/organizations link: Supreme Council))
Muhammad Jasim Habeeb al-Sudani	Al-Mowatin/Al-Hikma
Adnan Jasim al-Ghanami	Law/Badr (factional link: commander in the Badr Organization)
Nawal Abd Ali	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Muhammad Majeed Shuwai'	Law/al-Fadhila (factional link/commander in the al-Awfiya' Militia)
Siham al-Aqeeli	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)

### Administration

**Governor:** Ali Dawai (Al-Ahrar)

**First Deputy:** Jasim Kadhim al-Hajaji (Al-Hikma)

**Second Deputy:** Jawad Raheem al-Sa'adi (Al-Jihad and Al-Bina')

**Head of the Provincial Council:** Mundhar Raheem Khalaf al-Shawi (Law)

**Police Commander:** Brigadier General Abd al-Khidr Jasim Muhammad

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab'oun (Al-Rafidain Operations Commander)



## Dhi Qar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
As'ad Yaseen Sabah Barih	Al-Hikma
Ammar Toa'meh Abd al-Abbas Shanawa	Victory Coalition (political link: Member of Shura of al-Fadhila Coalition)
Kati' Najman Jaloud Dhaydan	State of Law Coalition (political link: Member of Shura of Da'wa Party)
Satar Jabbar Abbas	Al-Hikma
Nasir Turki Yasir Lufti	Fatah Alliance (factional link: Badr Organization)
Qusay Mohsen Muhammad Matar	Sa'irun
Hamd Allah Mazhar Jawad Hamdan	Sa'irun
Ala Ouda Layedh Shanawa	Victory Coalition
Waleed Abd al-Hassan Aboud Jafeet	Fatah Alliance (factional link: Badr Organization)
Abd al-Ameer Hassan Ali Ta'aban	Fatah Alliance (factional link: Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)
Zaynab Waheed Salman Ali	State of Law Coalition (political link/Da'wa Party)
Ghayeb Faysal Aneed Hami	Sa'irun
Abd al-Hadi Mohan Abdullah Ismail	State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Naji Radees Abd Sha'aban	Sa'irun
Muna Qasim Baqir Jaber	Fatah Alliance (political link/independence)
Haifa' Kadhimi Abbad Abd al-Jaleel	Sa'irun
Hussein Majid Faiz Munshid	Victory Coalition
Razzaq Muhaibis Ajeemi Tuwaili	Fatah Alliance (factional link/Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)
Sadiq Hameed Hassan Owaid	-

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Nu'man Anbar al-Ibrahimi	Al-Fadhila
Hassan Waraiwash al-Asadi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Rasheed Hameed al-Sari	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Halal Hussein al-Sahlani	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Jabbar al-Mousawi	Iraqi Hezbollah (factional link/Kata'ib Hezbollah)
Huda Abd al-Zahra	Badr (family link)
Shayma' Abd al-Sattar al-Fatlawi	Al-Fadhila (political/organizations link: al-Fadhila party)
Hassan al-Wa'ili	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
To'ameh Obeid al-Asadi	Al-Iraq organization (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Rasheed al-Sari	Al-Fadhila (factional link/al-Awfiya' Hashd)
Ashwaq Talib al-Zuhairi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)



## Continued: Dhi Qar Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Dahil Radhi Ali	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Rajah Matroud al-Aboudi	Al-Hikma
Abd al-Amir Salim Mushrif	Supreme Council (political link: close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi)
Ata Sajit al-Mousawi	Al-Hikma
Sa'ad al-Badri	Al-Hikma
Zaynab Khalaf al-Tamimi	Al-Hikma
Hussein Sanad	Al-Ahrar
Ali Attiyah Shajar al-Badairi	Al-Ahrar
Kadhimi al-Sahlani	Al-Ahrar
Mayraf al-Khafaji	Al-Ahrar
Nu'ma Shanan al-Zamili	Al-Ahrar
Abd al-Raheem Kadhimi al-Ta'i	Solidarity
Mortada Aboud al-Ibrahimi	Solidarity
Salma Hashim To'ameh al-Askari	Solidarity
Ali Jasim al-Ghalibi	Supreme Council (political link/close to Sheikh Hamam Hamoudi)
Hadiya Jasim Alaiwi al-Khaykani	Al-Wafa'
Deyaa' al-Hajimi	Al-Ahrar
Raheem Yasir al-Khaqani	Al-Ahrar
Shaheed Ahmad al-Ghalibi	Al-Madani
Yahya al-Mushrifawi	Al-Islah

### Administration

**Governor:** Adel al-Dakhili (Al-Hikma)

**First Deputy:** Akram al-Zaidi (Al-Fadhila)

**Second Deputy:** Abadhir Omar al-Omar (Al-Wafa')

**Head of the Provincial Council:** Raheem Yasir al-Khaqani (Al-Ahrar)

**Police Commander:** Brigadier General Raisan Kasid al-Ibrahimi

**Operations Commander:** al-Rafidain

**Operations Commander:** Major General Ali Ibrahim Dab'oun.

**Agriculture Ministry:** Minister Saleh al-Hassani (Kata'ib Jund al-Imam)

**Culture Ministry:** Abd al-Amir al-Hamdani (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)



## Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Muhammad Ali Saleh Baqir	Civil Democratic Alliance
Hamad Yasir Mohsen Ghayeb	Al-Madani
Hussein Ali Kareem Fanjan	Victory Coalition
Aras Habeeb Muhammad Kareem	Victory Coalition (Secretary General of al-Mu'tamar al-Watani)
Nada Shaker Jawdat Dhiyab	Victory Coalition
Haydar Abd al-Kadhim Nu'aima Sabahi	Victory Coalition
Haydar Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi	Victory Coalition
Haydar Jawad Kadhim al-Abadi	Victory Coalition
Hana' Turki Abd Hassan	Victory Coalition
Ala' Sakr Sarhan al-Dalfi	Victory Coalition
A'isha Ghazal Mahdi Madh'an	Wataniyah Coalition
Ghanidi Muhammad Abd al-Kareem Abd al-Qadir	Wataniyah Coalition
Zaytoun Hussein Marad Hamadi	Wataniyah Coalition
Kadhim Attiya Kadhim Ka'id	Wataniyah Coalition
Ziyad Tariq Abdullah Hamad	Wataniyah Coalition
Yahya Ahmad Faraj Hamadi	Wataniyah Coalition
Kareem Yusuf Hassan Ali	Wataniyah Coalition
Iyad Hashim Hussein Alawi	Wataniyah Coalition
Ali Jabbar Mu'ennis Jaber	State of Law Coalition (political link with Mr. al-Maliki)
Muhammad Shaya' Sabbar Hatem	State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da'wa Shura Council)
Hisham Abd al-Malik Ali Suhail	State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da'wa Shura Council)
Ammar Kadhim Obeid Jasim	State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da'wa Shura Council)
Layla Mahdi Abd al-Hussein Hadi	State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da'wa Shura Council)
Atwan Sayyid Hassan Thamer	State of Law Coalition (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ahmad Sulaim Abd al-Rahman Ali	State of Law Coalition (political link: link with the Da'wa Shura Council)
Aliya Naseef Jasim Azeez	State of Law Coalition (political link with Mr. al-Maliki)
Nouri Kamil Muhammad Hassan	State of Law Coalition (Secretary General of the Da'wa Party)
Muhammad Othman Ismail Mustafa	Bayariq al-Khair
Aliya Faleh Owaid Rasheed	Bayariq al-Khair
Ahmad Ali Hussein Jawad	Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Badr Organization)
Iktifa' Muzhar Abd Kassar	Fatah Alliance (political link with the Shura of the Badr Organization)



## Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Muhammad Salim Abd al-Hussein Abd al-Raheem	Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Badr Organization)
Wajih Abbad Hadi Faraj	Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Sadiqun)
Muhammad Sahib Khalaf Ghali	Fatah Alliance (political link: link with the commander Shibl al-Zaidi)
Iman Rasheed Hameed Eisa	Fatah Alliance (political link: Organizational link with the Badr Organization)
Ahmad Jasim Sabir Muhammad	Fatah Alliance (Secretary General of Kata'ib Jund al-Imam)
Hassan Salim Abbas Jabr	Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link with the Badr Organization)
Hadi Farhan Abdullah Hamad	Fatah Alliance (Secretary General of Badr)
Na'im Abd Yasir Sanikh	Fatah Alliance (factional/organizations link: Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)
Talal Khudair Abbas Ka'id	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Ahmad Ismail Ibrahim al-Mashhadani	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Wahda Mahmoud Fahad Abd	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Zafir Nadhim Salman al-Ani	Qarar al-Iraq Alliance
Ala Tahsin Habib Talabani	Baghdad Alliance
Laith Mustafa Hamoud Jaza'	Baghdad Alliance
Yunis Qasim Shaghati Abd	Baghdad Alliance
Fa'iq Da'boul Abdullah al-Sheikh Ali	Tamaddun
Insijam Abd al-Zahra Jawad Ali	Al-Hikma
Ali Jubair Lazim Dakhil	Al-Hikma
Jasim Mohan Abdal Khamat	Al-Hikma
Ali Jasim Muhammad al-Hameedawi	Al-Hikma
Hussein Sa'id Kadhim Ali	Will Movement
Sa'ad Maye' Saleh Abbas	Sa'irun
Shayma' Ali Hussein Hassan	Sa'irun
Ra'ad Hussein Shanawi Ghali	Sa'irun
Sattar Jabbar Abdullah hassan	Sa'irun
Sabah Hassan Muhammad Taloubi al-Akili	Sa'irun
An'am Mazid Nazil Darbash	Sa'irun
Jawad Hamdan Kadhim Hamad Allah	Sa'irun
Sabah Jaloub Faleh Hami	Sa'irun
Nisreen Fadhil Raham Ali	Sa'irun
Majida Abd al-Lateef Muhammad Ali	Sa'irun



## Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Parliament	Affiliation/Link
Jawad Abd al-Kadhim Muhammad Abbas	Sa'irun
Abbas Alaiwi Kadhim Arbij	Sa'irun
Ra'id Jahid Fahmi Saleh	Sa'irun
Amjad Hashim Thamer Mawla	Sa'irun
Ala' Sabah Hashim Shalash	Sa'irun
Hassan Karim Matar Shamkhi	Sa'irun
Manahil Jalil Ali Hussein	Sa'irun
Nofal Sharif Jawdat Sahar	Mandaeen

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Ahmad Jawdat al-Maliki	Al-Ahrar
Arkan Hassan al-Bayati	Turkmen
Arkan Fakhri al-Janabi	Al-Qarar
Iman al-Sheikh	Al-Ahrar
Iman Jawad al-Barzanji	Al-Iraqiya
Taghreed Saleh al-Shammari	Law (political link/Shura council of the Da'wa Party)
Tha'ir Abd al-Amir Jasim al-Bahadali	Al-Ahrar
Tha'ir Abd al-Jaleel al-Sa'idi	Law (political link/independent)
Jasuma Raheem al-Kareemawi	Al-Ahrar
Jawad Kadhim Awd al-Dalfi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Hassoun Kadhim Mohsen al-Ruba'ie	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Daha' Abd al-Azeez al-Rawi	Al-Qarar
Ra'ad Jabbar al-Khameesi	Mandaeen
Ra'ad Hatem al-Maliki	Al-Ahrar
Riyadh al-Adhadh	Wataniyah Coalition
Riyadh Mohsen Salman al-Aqabi	al-Fadhila (factional link: Leader of al-Awfiya' Militia)
Zaina Saleh al-Haydari	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Sa'ad Sader Hamsan al-Daraji	Al-Hikma
Sa'ad Abd al-Jabbar al-Matlabi	Law
Suhair Ghazi al-Jubouri	Iraq Coalition
Sadiq Aneed al-Zamili	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)



## Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Taha Mohsen Sayyid Ali	Al-Hikma
Zalim Abbas Mousa	Al-Hikma
Adel Matar al-Sa'adi	Al-Fadhila (factional link: Hashd of al-Awfiya')
Abbas Khudair Abbas al-Mafraji	Al-Khair wa al-Ata'
Abbas Mahdi Saleh al-Hamdani	Wataniyah
Adnan Jameel al-Mashhadani	Al-Qarar
Ali Ahmad al-Eithawi	Wataniyah Coalition
Ali Hamdan Salman al-Husseini	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ali Ahmad Faraj	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Ali Thamer al-Sarhaid	Wataniyah Coalition
Ali Ja'afar Ali Hussein al-Allaq	Badr (factional link: Badr Organization)
Ali Khudair Hajoul al-Hassani	Al-Ahrar
Ali Kamil Albuawaimar	Al-Fadhila (factional link: Hashd of al-Awfiya')
Ali Na'ama Ali al-Hamdani	Al-Ahrar
Ghaleb Abbas al-Zamili	Al-Ahrar
Gharub Sabri al-Azzawi	Wataniyah Coalition
Fadhil Hussein al-Shuwaili	Al-Ahrar
Farhan Qasim al-Nasiri	Communist
Falah Hamoud Ahmad	Al-Iraqiya
Fu'ad Ali Akbar al-Fayli	Fayli
Kamil Sa'id Obeid	Al-Ahrar
Majid Ali To'ameh al-Sa'adi	Al-Ahrar
Mazen Yunis Razouqi	Christian
Muhammad Ameen Sha'alan al-Hamza	Wataniyah Coalition
Muhammad Jaber al-Ata	Law (political link/close to Nouri al-Maliki)
Muhamad Jasim Hamoud Fayadh	Badr (factional link/Badr Organization)
Muhammad Jasim Muhammad al-Ruba'ie	Al-Hikma
Ma'een Hameed al-Kadhimi	Badr (factional link/Badr Organization)
Mahdiya Abd Hassan al-Lami	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Nahida Ali al-Tamimi	Law (political/organizations link: Da'wa Party)
Nazar Thamer al-Sultani	Al-Hikma



## Continued: Baghdad Province: Parliament, Provincial Council

Members of Provincial Council	Affiliation/Link
Nisreen Hadi al-Jahimi	Al-Ahrar
Na'im Hato al-Naji	Al-Dakhil organization (political link/from the Da'wa Party al-Dakhil organizations)
Nouri Jasim al-Janabi	Wataniyah Coalition
Huda Jalil al-Janabi	Al-Hikma
Wajan Zagheer al-Akili	Badr (political/organizations link: Badr)
Ya'qoub Abd al-Wahid al-Mousawi	Law (political link: Shura council of the Da'wa party)
Ru'uf Sabri Alaiwi	Al-Iraqiya

### Administration

**Governor:** Muhammad Jaber al-Ata (State of Law)

**First Deputy:** Ali Hajjal Hamad al-Jubouri (Al-Qarar)

**Second Deputy:** Ahmad Ali Faraj al-Eithawi (Al-Iraqiya al-Hurra)

**Head of the Provincial Council:** Riyadh al-Adhadh (Al-Wataniyah)

**Police Commander:** Major General Majid Faleh al-Mousawi

**Operations Commander:** Major General Abd al-Hussein al-Tamimi

**Interior Ministry:** Yaseen al-Yasiri (Candidate/Badr)

**Connections Ministry:** Dr. Na'im al-Ruba'ie (Badr)

**Transportation Ministry:** Abdullah al-La'ibi Bahidh (Badr)

**Ministry of Work and Social Matters:** Basim Abd al-Zaman al-Ruba'ie: (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)




## PMF Operations Commanders

Region	Commander	Unit
East Anbar	Taher al-Khaqani	Imam Ali Combat Division, Brigade 2
West Anbar	Qasim Muslih	Liwa al-Tafuf: Brigade 13
Ninewa	Khudair al-Matruhi	Badr: Brigade 21
Rafidain	Nadhim Kadhim al-Mousawi	Linked to Badr: Brigade 10
Diyala	Taleb al-Mousawi	-
Mid-Euphrates	Ali al-Hamdani	Ali al-Akbar: Brigade 11
Salah al-Din	Safa' al-Sa'adi	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
Jazeera	Unknown	Presumably Kata'ib Hezbollah, stretches from Jurf al-Sakhr, to south of Baghdad, toward the Syrian border in west Anbar
Basra	Abu Jinan al-Basri	Badr: Brigade 1
Kirkuk and East Tigris	Hameed Ibrahim al-Sahalani	Badr Organization




# Checkpoints Linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces, 2020

- 1. Ba'aj
- 2. Hatra
- 3. Shirqat
- 4. Baiji
- 5. Tikrit
- 6. Al-Doz
- 7. Al-Dour
- 8. Samarra
- 9. Balad
- 10. Hawija
- 11. Daquq
- 12. Kifri
- 13. Khanaqin
- 14. Khalis
- 15. Baqubah
- 16. Balad Ruz
- 17. Badra
- 18. Suwayrah
- 19. Mahmudiyah
- 20. Mada'in
- 21. Karbala
- 22. Ayn al-Tamr
- 23. Fallujah
- 24. Ramadi
- 25. Hit
- 26. Haditha
- 27. Ana
- 28. Qaim
- 29. Rutbah



■ District closest to the checkpoint  
 ▲ Popular Mobilization Forces checkpoints


The total annual proceeds from checkpoints is \$75-\$90 million




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# Customs Under the Control of Popular Mobilization Forces, 2020




○ Customs zones  
 ✈ Airports free zones  
**Areas controlled by:**  
 ▲ Popular Mobilization Forces  
 ■ Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq  
 ◆ Badr Organization  
 ● Saraya al-Salam  
 ⬠ Kata'ib Hezbollah  
 ▲ Najaf establishment  
 □ Liwa al-Tafuf  
 ◆ Saraya al-Khorasani




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## ISIS Presence and Movement and PMF Checkpoints



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## Military Training Camps for Popular Mobilization Forces, 2020




1. Dujayl camp
2. Balad camp
3. Speicher camp
4. Seneia camp
5. Tooz camp
6. Aludaim camp
7. Khalis camp
8. Khanaqin camp
9. Sudour camp
10. Saadiyah camp
11. Nahrawan camp
12. Badra camp
13. Ali al-Garbi camp
14. Numaniyah camp
15. Samawah camp
16. Gariq camp
17. Nukhib camp
18. Habbaryah camp
19. Jurf Sakhar camp
20. Oweisat camp
21. Thamil

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
## Military Factories Linked to Popular Mobilization Forces, 2020



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## Oilfields Controlled by the Popular Mobilization Forces, 2020





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